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FOREWORD
LUCIANO BARDI
Luciano Bardi is Professor 
of Comparative Politics and 
International Relations at the 
University of Pisa as well as 
part-time Professor at the European 
University Institute and co-Director 
of the EUI’s Schuman Centre’s 
Observatory on Political Parties 
and Representation. He was member 
of the Executive Committee (2006-
2009) and then Chair (2009-2012) of 
the European Consortium of Political 
Research (ECPR). His main research 
interests include political parties 
at the national and European level, 
party systems, elections, democracy 
and representation in the European 
Union.
This e-book is based on selected contributions 
presented at the EUDO Conference on Elections 
in Europe in Times of Crisis. The conference was 
held at the European University Institute on 28-29 
November 2013. The Conference brought together 
some of the best experts to assess democracy 
in Europe and the current world crisis’ impact 
on the elections of 2013 and 2014. The rationale 
of the Conference departs from considerations 
of how decisions made at the European level to 
respond to the crisis are increasingly generating 
tensions between member states that are differ-
ently equipped to face it and that have different 
approaches to the solution of the problems it is cre-
ating. These tensions have profound implications 
for EU democracy and governance that are likely 
to be reflected in electoral dynamics at national 
and European level. The Conference offered par-
ticipants an opportunity to analyse the results of 
the national elections that were held in Europe in 
2013 and to provide prospective insights on the 
2014 European elections, by focusing on links 
between actors, strategies, and themes that char-
acterise the elections at both levels.
National elections are analysed with a particu-
lar attention to the impact of the Euro Crisis on 
national context and with a view to verifying 
hypotheses that, as a possible consequence of the 
crisis, European level actors will try to influence 
national electoral outcomes. The 2014 European 
Elections will be particularly important for at 
least three reasons. First, these elections will be 
the first after the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, which assigns more prerogatives and pow-
ers to the EP. Second, the stronger Parliament that 
will emerge from the elections may be called to 
elect the President of the EU Commission from 
amongst the candidates proposed and supported 
by the largest Europarties. In the last years sev-
eral institutional reforms, mostly concerning the 
electoral law and Europarty status and financing, 
were proposed in order to bridge the gap between 
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European citizens and European institutions. 
However, they fell short of their intended aims or 
were not implemented at all. Political actors, in 
particular the strongest among the Europarties, 
are thus trying to overcome the EU’s institutional 
limits by changing their electoral strategies to 
maximise their influence within the existing insti-
tutional framework. Third, the 2014 elections will 
represent the first Europe-wide test of hypotheses 
linked to the new forms of Euroscepticism gener-
ated by the crisis. All these elements will contrib-
ute to make European themes crucial both at the 
national and at the European level.
The contributions that are included in this e-book 
address five different sets of questions.
1. Factors Driving Electoral 
Outcomes: Partisan Cueing 
and Candidates
The first article in this section Do parties still 
orient voters in times of crisis? Experimental 
evidence of partisan cueing effects by Lorenzo 
De Sio, Aldo Paparo, Joshua A. Tucker, and Ted 
Brader, adopts survey experimental approaches to 
assess the extent to which parties not only aggre-
gate preferences, but are also able to shape them 
- a research question which becomes crucial as 
the economic crisis is weakening trust in parties 
and the party system in many European coun-
tries. The paper reports findings from a survey 
experiment on high-saliency issues, which was 
included in the 4th wave of the CISE (Italian Cen-
ter for Electoral Studies) Electoral Panel. Results 
show effects of party cueing that are large and 
significant although this effect depends on the 
complexity of the issues at stake. The paper also 
investigates variation in party identification, with 
findings that confirm mainstream theories: party 
identifiers show stronger cueing effects than non-
identifiers, although different levels of party close-
ness do not always correspond to cueing effects 
that are significantly different. The paper also 
explores whether alternative forms of identifica-
tion (e.g. ideology) might discriminate better than 
party identification among groups with different 
party cueing effects, but finds no empirical confir-
mation for this claim.
The second paper in this section, The Evolution of 
the Candidate Selection Procedures in the Italian 
Political Parties by Enrico Calossi and Eugenio 
Pizzimenti, investigates the degree of territorial 
centralization of the most relevant Italian par-
ties, with regard to the procedures of Candidate 
Selection. In organizational theory, centralization 
relates to the distribution of control and effective 
decision-making authority among the party units. 
As Candidate Selection is one of the core func-
tions carried out by political parties, the ways in 
which parties, belonging to different ideological 
families and characterized by different organiza-
tional traditions, regulate these procedures, reflect 
the organizational arrangements deemed more 
effective in a specific political context. In particu-
lar, by comparing the degree of centralisation in 
the Candidate Selection procedures to other rel-
evant organizational variables, the paper aims to 
define to what extent this crucial activity had sig-
nificantly followed patterns of decentralisation or, 
on the contrary, whether it still represents a pre-
rogative of the national party organs. The conclu-
sions underline that Italian political parties have 
been only partially influenced, at least in their for-
mal organizational profiles, by changes occurred 
at the institutional level: only parties belonging to 
the communist tradition (Democratici di Sinistra 
– DS and Rifondazione Comunista – PRC) have 
proved more inclined to adapt their organizations 
to the process of denationalization of party poli-
tics. With the exception of the Lega Nord (coher-
ently with its declared federal profile), all other 
parties, have adopted organizational strategies in 
line with their predecessors (AN and PPI) or, in 
any case, oriented to top-down institutionaliza-
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tion strategies (Forza Italia - FI, Popolo della Lib-
ertá – PDL, La Margherita - DL, Partito Demo-
cratico - PD).
2. Economic Crisis, Economic 
Voting, and National 
Elections
Economic voting in Western Balkan countries 
by Trajche Panov examines economic voting in 
the former Yugoslav countries of Slovenia, Croa-
tia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, 
Macedonia and Kosovo. Through an analysis of 
aggregate level data from the period of the fall 
of communism and breakup of Yugoslavia until 
the most recent elections, the paper tests the basic 
postulates of economic voting theory with a view 
to assessing whether there are differences between 
these countries and which factors might aventu-
ally explain them. While Slovenia has shown a 
significant economic progress which has resulted 
in EU membership and inclusion in the European 
Monetary Union, other countries like Macedonia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina are facing very high 
unemployment rates and very low GNP growth 
levels. The paper examines whether different eco-
nomic circumstances cause different electoral out-
comes in these countries. While economic voting 
has important influence on the electoral process, 
the consequences of the breakdown of Yugoslavia 
has also very strong explanatory power for voters’ 
decisions. Additional explanations suggested in 
the paper are the instable and volatile party sys-
tems, high level of corruption and risky intereth-
nic relations. 
Finally in this section, Conventional and uncon-
ventional political participation in times of 
political and financial crisis in the Netherlands 
by Rik Linssen, Hans Schmeets, Manfred te 
Grotenhuis, and Peer Scheepers investigates the 
extent to which the economic and financial crisis 
affected political participation in the Netherlands 
by deriving competing and complementary theo-
retical propositions concerning the effect of eco-
nomic downturn on political participation. Eco-
nomic decline could mobilize people to voice their 
concerns in the political arena, especially through 
unconventional modes of political participa-
tion such as demonstrations. Conversely, against 
a background of growing concerns on declining 
social cohesion and community involvement in 
the Netherlands, it is also argued that economic 
adversity might induce apathy, make people less 
likely to connect with their communities and less 
likely to participate politically. The authors use 
the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies data 
collected both before and during the economic 
crisis in 2006, 2010 and 2012. By distinguishing 
between conventional (electoral) en unconven-
tional (non-electoral) modes of political participa-
tion they assess the extent to which these contrast-
ing and complementary theoretical propositions 
affect different modes of political participation. 
3. EU Elections
European representative democracy beyond 
2014: Can elections to the European Parliament 
be made more consequential ? by Wilhelm Lehm-
ann addresses the issue of the ever lower voter par-
ticipation in European elections and of its impor-
tance in electoral studies and on the theory of 
political legitimacy. The sociological and political 
reasons why European elections are a second-order 
contest have been intensively researched and thus 
provide some guidance for corrective measures. A 
much smaller literature focuses on the relations 
between policy-making powers, the design of 
electoral institutions and electoral salience. Under 
the premise that electoral periods are an appro-
priate moment to take stock of the quality of a 
polity’s input legitimacy the paper scrutinises EU 
efforts made over the past few years to counter-
balance the populist debate around its crisis man-
agement. For an operational definition of input 
legitimacy the paper focuses on the strengthening 
of European party politics through reform of its 
legal basis, notably the new party statute currently 
under negotiation, and on attempts to revital-
ize European elections in a context where media 
attention and citizens’ perceptions of European 
governance are dominated by bargaining between 
member states. The paper evaluates current politi-
cal and administrative proposals for the prepara-
tion of the 2014 elections, such as the appointment 
by political parties at European level of their can-
didates to presidency of the Commission or new 
procedures for the development of party posi-
tions and the design of campaigns. The paper also 
assesses steps being made towards making the EU 
more of a political community beyond 2014, nota-
bly the Europeanisation of electoral campaigning 
and the strengthening of the statute and impact of 
European political parties. 
The core argument of the paper The economic 
representation crisis in Europe? by Simon Otjes 
is that European voters and politicians have radi-
cally different views about economic issues. It is 
not just that politicians and voters disagree about 
economic matters, they think differently about 
these issues. Where party politicians think in 
terms of a one-dimensional economic left/right 
dimension, which integrates questions of redis-
tribution and government intervention, the eco-
nomic views of citizens cannot be integrated into 
a left/right dimension. A large segment of the 
electorate desires economic equality but does not 
support the measures that from the perspective 
of politicians would be necessary to achieve this 
equality. These voters are in the terms of Derks 
(2006) and Kitschelt (2007) ‘economic populists’. 
They may find it difficult to find representation 
in the party system, the supply side of politics, 
because no party offers a mix of policies that fits 
their preferences. The paper then examines to what 
extent this lack of representation leads to distrust 
in political institutions and electoral volatility.
4. The Impact of the Economic 
Crisis and Europe on the 
Party Systems
In Exporting Europolitics in the Eastern Neigh-
bourhood: Elections in the Post-Soviet Area and 
the Regional Activity of Europarties, by Angelos 
Chryssogelos a new avenue in the research of the 
impact of Europe on national party politics is pro-
posed. In particular the authors focuses on how 
transnational party federations (more commonly 
referred to as ‘Europarties’) affect national party 
politics, especially in the EU’s periphery, under 
conditions of as yet unformed party systems, 
semi-authoritarian power structures and rampant 
economic and political corruption. These theo-
retical suggestions are assessed with reference to 
developments in three post-Soviet states: Geor-
gia, Moldova and Ukraine. The basic argument of 
this contribution is that Europarties can play an 
important role in the legitimation and consolida-
tion of party politics. In all three cases, democratic 
revolutions have made democratization/authori-
tarianism the overarching dimension of political 
competition and increased proximity to Europe 
has allowed democratizers to present democracy 
and ‘Europe’ as mutually reinforcing choices. In 
all three cases and to a varying degree, the democ-
ratization/authoritarianism axis has also served to 
structure better than before the expression (if not 
genuine representation and mobilization) of social 
divisions (linguistic, ethnic, religious) as well as 
having formed a powerful normative framework 
with which personal-oligarchic agendas are com-
pelled to engage. In this context, the opportunities 
for transnational political cooperation offered by 
Europarty affiliation are important legitimating 
mechanisms for anti-authoritarian strategies.
Revisiting and Extending Peter Mair: The Impact 
of Europe on National Parties and Party Systems 
in the Times of Economic Crisis, by Ilke Toygur 
aims to revisit and extend Peter Mair’s article on 
Elections in Europe in Times of Crisis                                   CONTENTS á9
the limited impact of Europe on national party 
systems in the light of the current economic and 
political situation by examining the direct impact 
of Europe on the format and mechanics of Euro-
pean party systems with recent data. Chapel Hill 
Expert Survey Data (2010) is used to define party 
positioning on pro-vs. anti- European integration 
dimension. The study covers 27 Member States 
and analyzes the vote distribution of anti/pro 
European parties in the most recent national elec-
tions in every member state with a special focus 
on euroscepticism. The paper further discusses 
the spillover mechanism from the European 
arena to the national arenas. The roles of arenas 
have been changing, the distinction between the 
national arena and the European arena is blur-
ring, as Europe has been producing more and 
more important policy decisions with an impact 
on daily lives of citizens.
In his Radical Right and the Welfare State: 
The Electoral Relevance of Welfare Politics Elie 
Michel aims at providing a conceptual framework 
to assess the relation between welfare politics and 
the radical right by bridging the literature on the 
radical right vote with the political sociology of the 
welfare state. To do so, the author relies on a nor-
mative theory, based on the moral economy of the 
welfare state; and on a risk-based theory. First, he 
develops the risk-based theory, and explains how 
economic insecurity can account for the radical 
right vote. Then, he proposes a normative theory 
that links welfare attitudes resulting from norm 
violation to this voting behaviour. In this paper 
two hypotheses that contribute to the explana-
tion of the radical right vote are developed. First, 
the “losers of globalization” are expected to face 
economic insecurity; confronted to economic risk 
and expressing a negative perception of global-
ization, they seek protection by voting for radical 
right parties. Second, individuals that feel the core 
norms of the moral economy of the welfare are 
being violated, and thus express extreme welfare 
attitudes that target a specific group, are expected 
to support radical parties that reflect these group 
boundaries. 
5. Nationalisation of European 
Elections vs. Europeanisa-
tion of National Elections
In Elections in Multi-Level Political Systems: 
Implications for Representative Democracy, by 
Simona Piattoni the author looks at elections in 
multi-level political systems from a very particu-
lar angle: that of the division of labor – in the issu-
ance of voice, expression of will, and exertion of 
control – between representative assemblies at dif-
ferent governmental levels.
These functions are called voice, will and sur-
veillance. The author first illustrates these three 
democratic functions. Then, she argues that in 
the EU multi-level political system these func-
tions have been separated and allocated to differ-
ent parliamentary levels. Finally she concludes by 
showing how this affects both institutions and the 
kind of representation that they can offer to Euro-
pean citizens and how this might affect electoral 
behavior in the 2014 European parliamentary 
elections. The paper identifies a “reversal of roles” 
between European and the national parliaments 
and a consequent misallocation of the democratic 
activities of judgment and will on the part of EU 
citizens. They both affect national campaigns and 
European and national elections. National politi-
cal parties are beginning to campaign on consti-
tutional issues – whether to leave the Union and/
or which functions to retain at national level and 
which to decide at EU level – rather than over 
policy issues over which they no longer have full 
control. Thus, national campaigns may be on their 
way to becoming a more veritable forum for open 
discussion on the right kinds of questions. How-
ever, paradoxically, this new awareness might 
have the effect of weakening the European Union 
by electing a large number of Euro-skeptic repre-
sentatives to the European Parliament.
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FACTORS 
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1. 
DO PARTIES STILL 
ORIENT VOTERS IN 
TIMES OF CRISIS? 
EXPERIMENTAL 
EVIDENCE OF 
PARTISAN CUEING 
EFFECTS IN 2013 
ITALY
LORENZO De SIO, ALDO PAPARO, JOSHUA A. 
TUCKER and TED BRADER
Lorenzo De Sio is Assistant 
Professor at LUISS Guido Carli 
University in Rome. His main 
interests are in elections, public 
opinion and voting behaviour, both 
in Italy and in comparative 
perspective, with a specific focus on 
models of voting behaviour and party 
competition. A member of the 
Scientific Committee of the Italian 
National Election Studies (ITANES), 
he is the coordinator of the Italian 
Center for Electoral Studies (CISE, 
LUISS Rome), and a member of the 
Methods Working Group for the “True 
European Voter” international 
research project. Besides his two 
books in Italian, his scientific 
publications include articles 
appearing in Comparative Political 
Studies, West European Politics, 
South European Society and Politics, 
Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica. 
He has been Visiting Research Fellow 
at the University of California – 
Irvine, and Jean Monnet Fellow at 
the European University Institute.
Aldo Paparo is a PhD student 
in comparative politics at SUM, 
Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane, 
in Florence. He is a member of 
the Italian Center for Electoral 
Studies (CISE). His major research 
interests are electoral systems, 
party systems and voting behavior, 
with a particular emphasis on local 
levels. His PhD thesis project deals 
with the relationship between local 
elections results and national level 
variables, such as the national 
electoral cycle. He has published in 
Quaderni dell’Osservatorio Elettorale 
and has co-edited the first Cise 
Dossier: Le Elezioni Comunali 2012 
(CISE, 2012).
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Joshua A. Tucker is Professor of 
Politics and (by courtesy) Russian 
and Slavic Studies at New York 
University (NYU) and an Affiliated 
Professor of Politics at NYU-Abu 
Dhabi. He is a Co-Director of the NYU 
Social Media and Political 
Participation (SMaPP) laboratory and 
a Co-Director of the NYU Center for 
Social and Political Behavior. 
Professor Tucker specializes in 
comparative politics with an emphasis 
on mass political behavior in East-
Central Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, including elections and 
voting, the development of partisan 
attachment, public opinion formation, 
and mass protest, as well as the use 
of social media in facilitating all 
forms of political participation. He 
is the author of Regional Economic 
Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, 
Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, 
1990-99 (Cambridge University Press, 
2006). His work has appeared in 
numerous academic journals, including 
the American Journal of Political 
Science, British Journal of Politics, 
Comparative Politics, Comparative 
Political Studies, Electoral Studies, 
the Journal of Politics, Political 
Analysis, and the Annual Review of 
Political Science, and his opinions 
have been published in The New 
Republic, The Wall Street Journal, Al 
Jazeera English, and the 
International Herald Tribune. In 
2006, he was awarded the Emerging 
Scholar Award for the top scholar in 
the field of Elections, Public 
Opinion, and Voting Behavior within 
10 years of the doctorate. He is 
currently the Vice-President of the 
Midwest Political Science Association 
and a Member of the Executive Board 
of the Association for the Study of 
East European and Eurasian Societies. 
He is also a co-author of the award 
winning politics and policy blog The 
Monkey Cage.
Ted Brader is Professor of Political 
Science at the University of 
Michigan, as well as Research 
Professor in the Center for Political 
Studies (Institute for Social 
Research) and Faculty Associate at 
the Weiser Center for Emerging 
Democracies. His expertise lies 
principally in the areas of political 
psychology, political communication, 
public opinion, and elections, 
especially the role of emotion in 
politics, effects of mass- mediated 
messages, and the development of 
party identities. He is the author of 
Campaigning for Hearts and Minds 
(University of Chicago Press, 2006) 
and numerous articles in journals 
such as American Journal of Political 
Science, Journal of Politics, 
Comparative Politics, Comparative 
Political Studies, Public Opinion 
Quarterly, Political Behavior, and 
Political Psychology. He serves as 
Principal Investigator for the 
American National Election Studies 
and Associate Principal Investigator 
for TESS: Time-Sharing Experiments in 
the Social Sciences. He received the 
2009 Emerging Scholar Award in 
Elections, Public Opinion, and Voting 
Behavior.
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1. Introduction
The recent financial crisis has accelerated develop-
ments that have characterized electoral competi-
tion and political representation in the last decades 
in Europe and beyond. Processes of individualiza-
tion of vote choices weaken long-standing group 
loyalties, while economic globalization is chang-
ing the economic landscape and influences politi-
cal alignments. The democratic system of elec-
torally accountable, representative government 
increasingly appears as the most vulnerable link 
in a complex system of multi-level governance. 
Furthermore, the development of the Internet 
and of online social networks rapidly changes the 
dynamics of public opinion.
In such a challenging environment, it is not sur-
prising that, after the enforcement of severe aus-
terity measures in many countries, unprece-
dented electoral outcomes have emerged in recent 
national elections. Several European countries 
have witnessed a resurgence of protest move-
ments and anti-establishment parties: against 
financial austerity, national elites, and – not least 
– against the EU. These phenomena may lead to 
deep changes in the configurations of party sys-
tems. An example of such development is clearly 
the case of the recent Italian general elections held 
in February 2013, where a new, anti-establishment 
party, the Movimento 5 Stelle (5-Star Movement, 
M5S) reached 25.6% of valid votes – ranking first 
among parties – in what clearly emerged as a trip-
olar party structure, leading to radical changes in 
the format and mechanics of the Italian party sys-
tem. These developments point to important ques-
tions for scholars working on electoral behaviour 
and public opinion, as they represent important 
challenges for existing theories of voting behav-
iour and party competition.
In particular, our aim is to highlight how recent 
developments in the Italian party system appear 
particularly stimulating as for the interplay of at 
least two of the main frameworks in voting behav-
iour research: spatial models of voting behaviour 
and party competition (Downs 1957; Enelow and 
Hinich 1984; Adams, Merrill, and Grofman 2005) 
and party identification theory (Campbell et al. 
1960; for a recent assessment see Bartle and Bel-
lucci 2009). We argue that their interplay appears 
particularly meaningful in light of recent theo-
ries about the effect (and actual measurement) of 
partisan cueing effects, i.e. the ability for parties to 
shape public opinion by cueing voters to adopt the 
party’s policy positions on some issues (Camp-
bell et al. 1960; Przeworski and Sprague 1986; 
Goren 2005; Carsey and Layman 2006; Brader 
and Tucker 2012b; Brader, Tucker, and Duell 2012; 
Brader, Tucker, and Ryan 2013). While not provid-
ing yet a rigorous theoretical argument, we sug-
gest that interest in these effects could be moti-
vated by the ability of partisan cueing to avoid the 
typical disequilibria and decision cycles implied 
by intense multidimensionality in the issue space 
(Arrow 1951). Previous research on Western 
Europe has highlighted how parties, despite a 
limited ability to shape voters’ opinions on issues 
related to the left-right dimensions, are more suc-
cessful in doing so on other dimensions (Ray 
2003; Steenbergen, Edwards, and De Vries 2007; 
Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu 2011; Milazzo, 
Adams, and Green 2012). If confirmed, such find-
ing would highlight a dynamic that might be cru-
cial in terms of economic crisis and discontent 
towards political elites: even clearly multidimen-
sional challenges to the party system (such as the 
one provided by M5S) might be limited in their 
potential disequilibria effects, due to an enduring 
party cueing ability on dimensions beyond left-
right. As a result, decision equilibria on the left-
right dimensions would still appear as legitimate 
in terms of their implication on other dimensions, 
due to partisan cueing effects. At the same time, 
the bases for such partisan loyalties have to be 
carefully assessed in times of plummeting trust 
in parties, with potential for party realignment 
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towards new parties. Evidence of citizens switch-
ing from blind faith into a party to blind faith into 
another party (rather than through an assessment 
of policies and/or group identities) might hardly 
be considered as leading to a well-functioning and 
responsive democracy.
This paper aims to contribute to a reflection on this 
topic, by trying to assess the presence of partisan 
cueing effects among Italian voters in the after-
math of the 2013 general elections. We argue that 
the theoretical relevance outlined above might be 
even augmented in a context where party identifi-
cation could be guessed to be extremely weak. Italy 
is a clearly multi-party system; recent polls have 
been showing all-time lows in overall levels of trust 
in political parties; recent elections have shown 
both an increase in fragmentation, with electoral 
ENP reaching 5.3 (Chiaramonte and Emanuele 
2013), and an important success of new parties 
(Maggini 2013). As a result, conditions appear the 
least favourable for strong partisan cueing effects 
on policy issues. With a large number of relevant 
parties (thus leading to a predominance of ideol-
ogy over party identification – see Van der Eijk, 
Schmitt, and Binder 2005), and several of them 
of very recent emergence (thus unlikely to have 
developed a large base of strong identifiers), we 
might expect partisan cueing effects to be difficult 
to find. Evidence for their presence should then 
suggest that the basic dynamics of party identifi-
cation could be at play even in a clear multi-party 
system, with very young parties, and in times of 
low trust in political parties.
Our measurement strategy builds on recent lit-
erature that has successfully used experimental 
methodology to assess the presence and strength 
of partisan cueing effects. In such studies, survey 
respondents are typically administered items that 
measure individual preferences on policy issues. 
The experimental setup implies administering 
such items with or without a mention of the party 
endorsing each of the proposed policy positions, 
and then assessing – among respondents whose 
party preference has been measured elsewhere in 
the questionnaire – how much the policy posi-
tion congruence between respondents and their 
preferred party varies when parties are explic-
itly mentioned in the response item (Brader and 
Tucker 2012b). We then conducted similar survey 
experiments on the fourth, post-electoral wave of 
the CISE Electoral Panel 2012-2013. Our data also 
represent a significant improvement compared to 
previous researches, as we employed issues with 
a high level of saliency in the current campaign, 
while most previous research has been employing 
low-saliency or even artificial issues.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
briefly introduces the literature, and derives spe-
cific hypotheses to be tested on our dataset. Sec-
tion 3 presents the dataset and our specific mea-
surement choices. Section 4 then presents empiri-
cal findings about the presence and strength of 
partisan cueing effects, and tests the heterogene-
ity of treatment effects across issues and parties. 
Sections 5 specifically tests hypotheses derived 
from party identification theory, by testing effect 
heterogeneity across respondents with different 
levels of partisanship. Section 6 moves then on to 
specific hypotheses about partisan cueing dynam-
ics in times of crisis, by testing effect heterogene-
ity across respondents with different exposure to 
the economic crisis, as well as across respondents 
with different levels of trust in mainstream politi-
cal parties. Conclusions follow.
2. Party identification and 
partisan cueing effects
It can be safely said that few concepts have had 
such an importance in the study of voting behav-
iour and political attitudes as the concept of party 
identification (Campbell et al. 1960). The very 
idea that individuals develop a socio-psycholog-
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ical attachment towards a political party, either 
through the family environment or through key 
experiences during the political socialization pro-
cess, quickly established itself as one of the key cat-
egories for interpreting political attitudes and vot-
ing behaviour in the United States. So central was 
its role, that even challenges to the mainstream 
sociological paradigm for the interpretation of 
voting behaviour precisely targeted that concept, 
by reframing it in more dynamic, individual-level, 
choice-oriented terms (Fiorina 1981). Still, despite 
the emergence of structural changes in the pat-
terns of partisanship (Dalton 1984), party identi-
fication still retains an absolutely central role in 
the study of voting behaviour and political atti-
tudes in the U.S (Bartels 2000, 2002; Lewis-Beck 
Michael et al. 2008).
Given the success and usefulness of the concept, 
it is no wonder then that, shortly after its intro-
duction in the United States, attempts were made 
by social scientists to adopt the same conceptual 
apparatus to study multi-party systems, especially 
in Western Europe. However, it could be said, with 
much less success. Looking from today’s perspec-
tive, the usefulness of the concept of party iden-
tification is still widely contested with reference 
to multi-party systems (Bartle and Bellucci 2009). 
The application of the concept of party identifica-
tion to multi-party systems led first to measure-
ment problems; secondly, first empirical findings 
on genuine multi-party systems ended up openly 
rejecting some of the cornerstones of the theory, 
such as the prediction that party identification 
ought to be more stable than actual vote choice 
(Thomassen 1976).
As a result, European scholars have always been 
careful in systematically adopting the party 
identification framework (Inglehart and Klinge-
mann 1976; Bartle and Bellucci 2009), and they 
have much more consistently and systematically 
referred to the left-right dimension as the funda-
mental political orientation device for citizens in 
multi-party systems in Western Europe (Fuchs 
and Klingemann 1990; Knutsen 1990, 1995; Budge 
et al. 2001; Gunther and Montero 2001). And the 
left-right ideological self-placement has even 
been suggested as a possible functional equiva-
lent for party identification in Western Europe 
(Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Percheron and 
Jennings 1981; Lewis-Beck 1983; Lancaster and 
Beck-Lewis 1986), especially after Van der Eijk 
and Niemöller (1983) effectively demonstrated 
that, in the Netherlands, left-right self-placement 
was much more stable than party identification, 
and that in general, such dimension is a stable 
driving force of vote choice in Europe (Van der 
Eijk, Schmitt, and Binder 2005), suggesting the 
very presence of some form of ideological identi-
fication. We argue, however, that an effective and 
useful conceptualization of long-term forces that 
shape voting behaviour in multi-party systems 
cannot be derived from ideological identification 
alone. There are aspects of the original Party ID 
theory that can hardly be reformulated in terms of 
ideological identification; especially those aspects 
that involve an active role by political actors. 
Among these there are clearly partisan cueing 
effects. Especially in presence of citizens with lim-
ited levels of information and interest in political 
affairs1, it is easy to imagine that, if there is a party 
that the voter identifies with, it might be able to 
form the voter’s opinion, especially on relatively 
minor and perhaps complex issues (Campbell et 
al. 1960; Converse 1964; Zaller 1992; Miller and 
Shanks 1996). It should be clear how it would be 
more complex to imagine that such function can 
be performed by a general ideology, especially 
when dealing with issues that were not present at 
the time of the original ideological elaboration2. In 
1. And also when low ideological sophistication does not 
allow the development of an abstract system of beliefs 
which could help the autonomous formation of opin-
ions on new issues (Converse 1964).
2. This has clearly been the case of environmental poli-
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our case, the presence of partisan cueing effects 
in a very unfavourable environment might dem-
onstrate how some of the dynamics predicted by 
the party identification theory are present even in 
a complex multi-party system.
Coming to a measurement strategy, in recent years 
scholars have tried to overcome the problem of 
measuring party identification effects in different 
contexts by adopting experimental designs con-
taining party cues. The experiments consist in a 
manipulation of the presence of party cues in pol-
icy questions. Respondents are typically adminis-
tered items that measure their preferences on pol-
icy issues. While respondents in the control group 
receive plain policy preference items, respondents 
in the treatment group also receive a mention of 
the party endorsing each of the proposed policy 
positions. Given that individual party preference 
is measured elsewhere in the questionnaire (or 
even in a previous panel wave, as in the present 
study), it becomes possible to assess how much the 
policy position congruence between respondents 
and their preferred party varies when parties are 
explicitly mentioned in the response item (Brader 
and Tucker 2012b; Brader, Tucker, and Duell 2012; 
Samuels and Zucco 2013; Merolla, Stephenson, 
and Zechmeister 2005; Merolla, Stephenson, and 
Zechmeister 2008; Coan et al. 2008). And, apart 
from demonstrating the presence of partisan cue-
ing effects, such experiments made possible for 
scholars the comparison of party identification 
effects on policy preference among countries with 
different characteristics in terms of age and sta-
bility of the political system (Brader and Tucker 
2012b; Merolla, Stephenson, and Zechmeister 
2005) or among different kind of parties (Brader, 
Tucker, and Duell 2012) and different types of 
individuals (Brader, Tucker, and Ryan 2013; Kam 
2005).
cies, which became integrated among the core issues 
of the Left only many years after their first emergence.
However, one key limitation in most of these 
studies lies in the very frequent adoption of low-
salience, often artificial policy issues. This choice 
is understandable in many regards. Real-world, 
salient issues are prone to potentially low, under-
estimated cueing effects, for at least two different 
reasons. On the one hand, policy congruence rates 
in the treatment group might be lower (and thus 
close to the control group) on very well known and 
debated policies, as voters might have developed a 
stronger and more stable opinion, with less room 
for party cueing. On the other hand, congruence 
rates in the control group might be higher (and 
thus closer to the treatment group) if the party’s 
position has been widely publicized, so that party 
supporters would be able to conform with their 
party’s position even without an explicit party 
mention. Other reasons for using artificial issues 
include experimental design requirements, often 
requiring the possibility for all parties to plausi-
bly support a certain proposal, or requiring clearly 
distinct party positions on the same issue.
It is clear how such choices raise concerns of exter-
nal validity. To what extent it is possible to gener-
alize the presence of significant partisan cueing 
effects, when they have been demonstrated under 
very unnatural conditions3? For these reasons, 
we decided to carry on our experiment on three 
issues, varying in complexity, but all extremely 
salient during the electoral campaign for the last 
Italian general elections4. To some extent, this test 
represents the first systematic application of the 
aforementioned experimental design to high-sali-
ence, real-world policy issues.
3. See the discussion in Samuels and Zucco (2013). Also 
see Brader and Tucker (2012a). Other concerns are 
also raised by the relationship between a specific issue 
and a particular party in terms of the strategic impor-
tance of the issue (De Sio and Franklin 2012). 
4. Lacking data sources on issue saliency, we selected 
them based on our qualitative assessment of their high 
saliency in the public debate.
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It is important to stress that, from many viewpoints, 
our specific dataset represents a worst-case scenario 
for the presence of strong, significant partisan cue-
ing effects. There are several reasons for this. 1) As 
mentioned, high-salience, real-world issues lend 
themselves by definition to lower cueing effects, 
as confirmed by a previous research (Samuels and 
Zucco 2013); 2) given that our survey experiments 
were administered (see below) few weeks after 
the general elections, the aforementioned prob-
lem would be extraordinarily relevant, with voters 
already clearly aware of both their and their par-
ties’ positions (these latter, even without party men-
tions). 3) Italy is a clear multi-party system, where 
much of long-term socio-psychological attach-
ments could be anchored to ideologies, rather than 
specific political parties; 4) given the radical trans-
formations of the party system from 1992 on, and 
especially in more recent years (D’Alimonte, De Sio, 
and Grofman 2012), Italian parties can be expected 
to lack a large base of strong party identifiers; this 
is even more relevant for 2013, as new parties have 
obtained more than 30% of votes, with the newly-
formed Movimento 5 Stelle becoming Italy’s largest 
party. Given the aforementioned considerations, 
there are then several research questions of interest. 
I. Is there any party cueing effect?
As mentioned previously, the conditions of the 
experiments are particularly demanding. As such, 
demonstrating the sheer presence of partisan cue-
ing effects would already constitute a relevant 
empirical finding.
II. Does the effect vary across parties and issues?
The previous theoretical considerations would sug-
gest lower partisan cueing effects for younger par-
ties, and also lower effects for more salient issues. 
However, it is clear that, given the very low num-
ber of higher-level contexts (four parties, three 
issues), we can only derive tentative indications, as 
no explanatory hypothesis on this question can be 
assessed in a statistically rigorous fashion5.
III. Does the effect vary across voters?
On this last question, our theoretical interest is 
mostly driven by party identification theory, as 
well as by considerations connected to exposure 
to the economic crisis. As a result, we have two 
main interests. The first is in determining whether 
party identifiers are more affected by party cue-
ing, compared to non-identifiers; and if there are 
differences based on the declared closeness to the 
party. Secondly, we want to assess treatment effect 
heterogeneity in relationship to exposure to the 
economic crisis, and to levels of trust in parties. 
These interests translate into four specific subor-
dinate research questions:
a. Compared to non-identifiers, are identifiers 
cued more by their party?
b. Is there a different effect for voters accordingly 
to the self-reported degree of identification?
c. Is there a different effect for voters differently 
affected by the economic crisis?
d. Is there a different effect for voters with 
different levels of trust in parties6?
In terms of operational expectations, our general 
criterion of assessment and comparison is based 
5. There are multiple potential mechanisms leading to 
effect heterogeneity across parties and issues, whose 
theoretical identification will lead to specific research 
designs in the future. Apart from party age potentially 
increasing the strength of partisan cueing effects, we 
can already easily identify multiple potential factors: 
at the issue level, policy domain, issue complexity, and 
overall saliency; at the party-issue level, party-issue 
saliency, clarity, internal cohesion of the party on the 
issue; at the voter level, voter-issue saliency.
6. This last effect could be conceptualized as the direct 
explanatory mechanism for the indirect effect of the 
former (exposure to crisis). However, in this explora-
tory stage we prefer to test the two separately.
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on the estimation of average treatment effects 
(ATEs). When defining the congruence rate as the 
proportion of respondents that select the policy 
option supported by their preferred party, in gen-
eral we observe an ATE when such congruence 
rate is different between the treatment and con-
trol group, i.e. the group receiving party mentions 
along with policy positions, and the group only 
receiving policy positions. Given this definition, 
we can translate the above research questions into 
specific hypotheses:
H1: We expect a significant, positive ATE in the 
overall sample
The congruence rate should be significantly higher 
in the treatment group compared to the control 
group. This finding would be theoretically even 
more relevant, given the above considerations 
leading to the expectations of small, perhaps non-
significant effects. As a result, this hypothesis is 
perhaps the key test of this paper: its confirmation 
would, in our opinion, alone justify the analysis; 
its rejection would strongly restrict the relevance 
of subsequent hypotheses.
As a result, the hypotheses that follow all concern 
the presence of effect heterogeneity: whether (and 
to what extent) ATEs vary across issues, different 
groups of voters and finally parties.
First, we expect different effects for different issues 
(see note 5): in particular we believe that parties 
should be able to drive the voters’ choice on com-
plex issues or on issues that strictly involve insti-
tutions (such as e.g. electoral reform). Conversely, 
it should be less likely for parties to move people’s 
opinions on moral issues, on which is easier for 
voters to develop autonomous judgements, with-
out recurring to the partisan shortcut:
H2: ATEs should vary across issues.
Secondly, we examine differences across par-
ties. Previous literature has highlighted different 
effects across old, established and new democra-
cies, as well as across old, established vs. new par-
ties (Brader, Tucker, and Duell 2012). Th e con-
temporary Italian context provides an interesting 
setting for testing the presence of such differences 
(new parties such SC and M5S vs. older parties 
such as PD and PdL). 
H3: ATEs should be higher for older, established 
parties, and lower for new parties.
Finally, we examine differences of ATEs across 
individual-level characteristics. Our first test con-
cerns the effect of partisanship. As suggested by 
the literature, party cues should have a stronger 
effect on voters that also identify with their pre-
ferred party, than on those who don’t. (Campbell 
et al. 1960; Brader and Tucker 2012b):
H4: Partisan voters should present higher ATEs 
than non-partisan voters.
The literature also suggests that proper subgroups 
can be distinguished among identified, in terms of 
the strength of their identification7: 
H4b: Voters that are more strongly partisans 
should present higher ATEs.
Then we investigate the impact of the economic 
crisis on party-voters relationship. In particular 
we hypothesize that: 
H5: Voters more affected by the economic crisis 
should present lower ATEs.
Our last test concerns the trust in the party sys-
tem. We hypothesize that
H6: Voters with lower trust in parties should 
present lower ATEs.
3. Data, design and 
measurement 
The experimental questions were included in the 
fourth wave of the CISE Electoral Panel, which was 
conducted few weeks after the elections, in March 
7. Obviously starting from the seminal contribution by 
Duverger (1950).
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2013. As a fourth, post-electoral wave of a panel, 
it is inherently affected by self-selection8. This can 
create a bias, so that only those more interested 
to politics are overrepresented. However, we think 
that this would be one more reason to consider our 
design as a least-likely case study. It is reasonable 
to hypothesize that it would be more difficult for 
parties to drive individual preference among the 
most involved fractions of their electorates. Those 
voters are indeed more likely to hold an autono-
mous position on salient issues and to be aware of 
their party’s position, regardless of the mention of 
the party name. 
On a total of 1,490 respondents in our experi-
ment, 753 were randomly assigned to the control 
group, 737 were assigned to the treatment group. 
Each respondent was assigned to either treatment 
or control for all the three questions. We selected 
three issues, in order to maximize variance on 
issue complexity and policy domain: rights for gay 
couples, house property tax and electoral reform9. 
For each of these issues, respondents in the control 
group were asked to choose among four different 
policy options without party labels. Respondents 
in the treatment group received the same options, 
but each labeled with the specific endorsing party.
We performed balance tests through a multivari-
ate logistic regression of treatment assignment 
based on a large set of typical predictors of voting 
behaviour, as well as actual vote choice. The results 
(see Table 12 in the Appendix), show that the sam-
ple is well balanced: none of the included classical 
electoral variables discriminates the two groups 
in a statistically significant way. Also, it has to be 
noted that this logistic regression test is much more 
demanding than traditional bivariate tests, as our 
test shows that none of the aforementioned varia-
8. Although the fi rst three waves included a replenish-
ment of respondents to compensate for panel attri-
tion, and partially recover representativeness on basic 
socio-demographic variables.
9. Actual question wordings are in the Appendix.
bles predicts treatment net of all other variables. As 
a result, the pseudo-R-squared of the model is vir-
tually zero. This confirms that the random assign-
ment was performed correctly, so it is possible to 
not include control variables when comparing 
treatment and control groups: simple bivariate tests 
and means comparisons are appropriate.
Coming to measurement considerations, party 
identification is operationalized trough the tra-
ditional questions used in studies of multiparty 
systems in Western Europe: respondents are first 
asked if there is a party they feel closer to. If the 
answer is positive, they are then asked what party 
it is and if they consider themselves as simple sym-
pathizers, quite close or very close to the party. 
Exposure to the economic crisis was measured 
through an item asking whether the respondent 
(or someone in her family) had actively and unsuc-
cessfully sought a job in the last six months. Trust 
in parties (given the lack of specific items in our 
data) was measured as the difference between the 
PTV (propensity-to-vote) measure for the highest 
party (Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996), and the 
corresponding measure for abstention, available 
in our dataset.
Concerning the dependent variable, in general 
we assess treatment effects on the party-respond-
ent congruence rate on a given policy position. 
In practice, for each policy issue we offered four 
alternatives corresponding to the actual policy 
position of the four largest parties: the leftist Par-
tito Democratico (PD), the rightist Popolo delle 
Libertà (PdL), the anti-establishment movement 
Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) and finally the new 
party founded by the incumbent prime minister 
Mario Monti, called Scelta Civica (SC). These four 
parties obtained respectively 25.4, 21.6, 25.6 and 
8.3 percent of votes in the February 2013 elec-
tion. For each of the three issues tested (see the 
Appendix) we calculated a dichotomous “congru-
ence” indicator, coding whether the respondent 
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chose the policy option endorsed by his preferred 
party, measured in a previous pre-electoral wave10. 
Congruence rates in a given group (e.g. treatment 
vs. control) were calculated based on this dichoto-
mous congruence indicator. We also calculated an 
overall party-respondent congruence index across 
all issues, by averaging over valid values of the 
congruence indicators for all issues.
4. Partisan cueing effects
The first test we provide is the ATE of the entire 
experiment, across all issues. As we have said, 
each respondent was assigned to either treatment 
or control for all the three questions together. We 
selected those cases that support one of the four 
parties included in our experiment. For each of 
them, we employed the aforementioned over-
all average congruence index as our dependent 
10. Th is required us to exclude supporters of other par-
ties, which overall received 19.3 percent of Italian 
votes. Identification of the preferred party is per-
formed according to the same algorithm adopted 
in previous analyses using this experimental setup 
(Brader and Tucker 2012a), with the difference that, 
in this analysis, we employed all items in the previ-
ous, pre-electoral panel wave, to try to limit post-hoc 
rationalization effects. The party identification item 
is used first (if present, the party towards which R 
feels close is coded as the preferred party); if no party 
closeness is present, vote intention is then used; for 
respondents still without a preferred party, we finally 
code – as preferred party – the party that receives the 
maximum PTV (propensity-to-vote) score. Through 
this algorithm we were able to link 1,147 respondents 
out of the total 1,490 with one of the four major parties. 
All analyses are performed on this subsample, while 
we had to remove 343 respondents not preferring any 
of the major parties.
variable. By focusing on this index, we thus esti-
mated the overall ATE across items. Findings are 
reported in Table 1. 
This first test already shows, in our opinion, 
impressive results. On average (over three issues, 
and only among supporters of the four major 
parties), 52.2% of respondents in the treatment 
group (where voters are informed of the party 
endorsing each position) pick the option held by 
their party, compared to only 33.9% in the con-
trol group (where parties were not mentioned). In 
other words, we have a strong ATE, reaching 18.3 
percentage points. Such effect is positive to a sta-
tistically significant extent, with p < 0.001. From 
this result we conclude that H1 is definitely con-
firmed: in our sample and with our choice of pol-
icy issues, party cues have a not only significant, 
but definitely very strong effect in driving respon-
dents towards the policy positions endorsed by 
their party on all three issues. This is a huge find-
ing supporting the ability of parties to shape vot-
ers preferences, despite – as discussed previously – 
all the conservative biases included in our design, 
which features real-world, highly debated issues, 
in the immediate aftermath of a general election.
Finally, it is worth briefly commenting on the 
policy congruence rate in the control group, 
expressed by the constant. Such value is above 
25% to a statistically significant extent, meaning 
that respondents in general tend to be closer to 
their party’s position than according to a random 
prediction (given that four alternatives were 
offered, a random choice in the control group 
Table 1. Effects of treatment inclusion on party-respondent congruence rate, for all the three experimental issues
Treatment 18.306*** [14.622,21.990]
Constant 33.918*** [31.306,36.531]
Observations 1,147
R2 0.077
95% confidence intervals in brackets
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Elections in Europe in Times of Crisis                                   CONTENTS á21
would yield a constant of 25 points). However, such 
difference is small: respondents appear to have 
little ability to discern their party’s policies, when 
a party label is not provided. In general, we have 
no previous analyses to rigorously compare with 
and to provide theoretical expectations. We will 
mostly comment on such findings in comparing 
between subgroups of our sample.
We now separately analyse and compare ATEs for 
each of the three issues of our experiment, in order 
to test H2, where we stated our expectation of ATE 
variance across different issues. Each of them can 
be considered as a distinct experiment. As clear 
from Table 2, each of the three ATEs is statistically 
significant with p < 0.001. The strongest effect is 
on electoral reform: on that issue we have the 
lowest congruence rate in the control group: 26% 
(expressed by the constant). This is probably part 
of the reason why we find the strongest effect on 
this issue, with an ATE almost reaching 27 points.
For both the other two issues we have effects that 
are slightly lower, but still very strong. On the 
house property tax, the presence of party labels 
increases the congruence rate of 15 points, from 
39% to 55%. Despite being slightly lower than 
on electoral reform, such ATE appears as a very 
strong finding, if we consider that this very topic 
has been at the centre of the electoral campaign. 
Berlusconi based virtually his whole campaign 
strategy on this issue, even with specific campaign 
events (letters promising the abolition of the tax 
and the reimbursement of the tax amount paid 
in the previous year were sent to millions of 
households of potential voters). Other parties too 
were committed to come up with some reform 
proposal, due the vast popular discontent towards 
such tax. It was definitely the most covered issue 
on all media. It is then indeed notable that even 
on such a debated issue, where we would expect 
voters to have clearly formed opinions and a clear 
awareness of their party’s opinion, the explicit 
mentions of party labels still have a 15-point effect.
Finally on gay couples’ rights the ATE is 13 points, 
increasing the congruence rate from 36 to 49%. 
The effect is still strong. However, now even in the 
treatment group (with explicit party mentions) the 
respondent-party congruence rate is below 50%. 
Essentially, more than half of treated respondents 
do not pick up their party’s (clearly stated) policy 
option. It is not surprising that we find the lowest 
effect on gay rights: it is a moral issue on which 
it is very likely for voters to have their own posi-
tions, regardless which one their party support. 
However, it could be argued that an effect higher 
than 10 points on such a sensitive issue is still an 
important partisan cueing effect.
Overall, we then observe that H2 is essentially 
confirmed. ATEs clearly differ among issues. In 
particular the electoral reform issue shows an ATE 
that is statistically different from those observed 
Table 2. Effects of treatment inclusion on party-respondent congruence rate for different issues
House tax (IMU) Gay marriages Electoral reform
Treatment 15.468*** 12.733*** 26.717***
[9.749,21.186] [7.047,18.419] [21.257,32.177]
Constant 39.298*** 36.140*** 26.316***
[35.242,43.354] [32.108,40.173] [22.443,30.188]
Observations 1,147 1,147 1,147
R2 0.024 0.017 0.075
95% confidence intervals in brackets
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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on the other two. A tentative explanation we sug-
gested for the variance among issues is issue com-
plexity. The extremely high effect we observe on 
the electoral reform issue can indeed be explained 
by the many technicalities involved in such mat-
ter. This is even confirmed by the very low value 
of the constant, which is not significantly different 
from 25. Given that there were four alternatives, 
this shows that – when not offered explicit party 
cues – respondent are not able to autonomously 
identify their party’s position, as a random choice 
in the control group would yield a value of 25. 
Another factor that might potentially play a role, 
as we suggested, is policy domain: the more an 
issue is close to voter’s personal beliefs or every-
day life, the less likely it is for party cues to pro-
duce large effects; However, such small number of 
issues makes impossible to disentangle the effects 
of issue complexity and policy domain: more 
research on more issues is needed for a rigorous 
test of the impact of such differences. In any case, 
H2 seems to be confirmed: different issues clearly 
show different ATEs11.
11. However, it is worth spending a few words on our 
analysis setup. We originally hypothesized that the 
presence of specific ATEs would be an appropriate 
measure of party cueing effects; however, we antici-
pated that congruence levels in the control group 
might reflect the tendency of some voters to already 
recognize the policy position of their party, without 
the need of a specific mention. What is to some extent 
a bit puzzling is the interplay of these two aspects. In 
terms of differences across issues, we would expect 
sensitive personal issues to not only have lower ATEs, 
but also lower congruence in the control group, so as 
to result in an overall lower level of policy congruence, 
which would be theoretically appropriate. We observe 
instead that party labels have a “levelling” effect: while 
baseline congruence in the control group differs sig-
nificantly across issues, and while party cueing effects 
differ significantly across issues, the final outcome 
(overall congruence level when party labels are men-
tioned) does not vary significantly across issues. Such 
finding suggests that voters tend to conform to their 
preferred party in a uniform way across very different 
issues. Perhaps this might suggest social desirability 
effects, to be further investigated. One possible expla-
nation could be question ordering: our survey experi-
We then move on to assessing heterogeneity in 
terms of party characteristics. Here too, the limited 
number of parties does not really allow for a rig-
orous test of any explanatory hypothesis on effect 
heterogeneity at the party level. However, a first 
qualitative assessment might be useful, especially if 
clearly highlighting counterintuitive patterns.
The experiment includes the four largest parties. 
Two of them are extremely new: both M5S and 
SC are competing for their first national elections. 
More than that, the latter was formed only few 
months before the elections. The other two, PD 
and PdL, are still in part new if compared to other 
advanced democracies: they appeared in late 2007 
and early 2008. But each of the two was formed by 
the federation of previous parties: they represent 
the two poles of Italian bipolar party system that 
has characterized the last 20 years.
Among the new parties, SC was clearly an incum-
bent party: it was founded by the prime minister 
of the technocrat cabinet. On the other hand, M5S 
was the fiercest opponent of such government.
To some extent, the same thing can be true for the 
group of old parties. It is true that they both sup-
ported Monti’s government, but during the electoral 
campaign Berlusconi managed to successfully sepa-
rate his image from the government’s one. Bersani, 
the leader of PD, campaigned on the possibility of a 
post-electoral alliance with Monti’s coalition.
Table 3 reports the regression table of the interac-
tion between preferred party and treatment expo-
sure. We were expecting differences due to the 
party age of the parties, with oldest parties having 
higher effects. On the contrary, we find no signifi-
cant differences among parties. 
This finding is best understood when looking at 
the marginal effects presented in Table 4, which 
synthetically reports the confidence intervals of 
ments are administered after questions on vote choice.
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the ATEs for supporters of the different parties, 
allowing us to easily see their overall size and 
assess the statistical significance of the observed 
differences. First of all we notice that none of the 
four effects statistically differs from any of the 
others: this is a first very negative finding for H3.
 On average on the three issues, PdL shows the 
strongest effect: above 24 percentage points. Again 
contrary to what H3 would suggest, we find a lower 
ATE on PD’s supporters (17 points) than on M5S’s 
one (21). So party age clearly does not seem to 
have a decisive impact on variance among parties, 
even if SC, the newest one, shows the lowest effect 
(13 points) and the only one not significant at the 
99,9% level. We also have to consider the large dif-
ferences in congruence (across different parties) in 
the control group. For PD supporters the “base-
line” congruence in the control group reaches 
42%, while for PdL’ supporters it is less than 18%, 
even below random choice. SC has around a one-
third congruence rate in the treatment group, and 
M5S has 28%. From this perspective the party 
mention in the treatment group seems to be work-
ing as a leveller for the overall congruence for the 
different parties. Electorates whose congruence 
rates would be significantly different (in terms of 
their ability to adopt the position of their party 
Table 3. Effects of treatment inclusion, preferred party and their interaction on party-respondent congruence rate
Treatment 14.862*** [9.769,19.955]
Party: Pd (Bersani) 0.000 [0.000,0.000]
Pdl (Berlusconi) -25.221*** [-31.988,-18.454]
M5S (Grillo) -14.955*** [-21.576,-8.334]
Sc (Monti) -7.006 [-15.715,1.703]
Treatment * Pd 0.000 [0.000,0.000]
* Pdl 9.388+ [-0.377,19.152]
* M5S 6.132 [-3.134,15.398]
* Sc 2.088 [-9.757,13.933]
Constant 42.638*** [39.047,46.230]
Observations 1,147
R2 0.138
95% confidence intervals in brackets
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 4. Confidence intervals of the different ATEs for supporters of the different parties
Delta-method
ATE Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
Treatment
_at
PD 14.8616 2.5958 5.73 0.000 9.77393 19.9493
PdL 24.2493 4.24589 5.71 0.000 15.9275 32.571
M5S 20.9936 3.9451 5.32 0.000 13.2614 28.7259
SC 16.95 5.45056 3.11 0.002 6.26708 27.6329
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without an explicit mention) become very similar 
once they receive a party mention. 
These findings leave us no option but to reject 
H3: we were expecting PD and PdL to have simi-
lar effects, and statistically higher than those of 
the two new parties, but that is not what the data 
show. On the contrary we have no statistical dif-
ferences and the highest difference in the effects is 
among the two old parties. In any case these find-
ings lead us to some considerations about what we 
are actually observing. The fact the newborn M5S 
can deploy similar effects to the PD, the last heir 
of Italian mass parties, definitely points out to the 
fact that for Italian voters partisan cueing effects 
do not stream from a deep enduring psychological 
attachment.
It is however clear that party-specific differences 
might call into question the relationship between 
each party and each particular issue. This is con-
firmed by Table 5, which reports ATEs on different 
issues for supporters of the four parties. We can 
see a certain issue-specific variance in the effects 
from the different parties. First of all, we notice 
that on the electoral reform the four big parties 
show similar huge effect (ranging from 25 to 30 
percentage points). On the other two issues, they 
widely differentiate in the ability to shape their 
own supporters preferences. The party with the 
overall weakest effect (SC) manages to have the 
strongest effect on voters’ policy preferences on 
the gay rights issue; on the same issue PD has the 
weakest effect, a non-statistically significant one. 
On the house tax issue PdL has the strongest effect 
and SC a not significant effect. We can see then 
how party effects rankings are not stable across 
the three issues.
Going back to H3, from Table 5 we receive more 
evidence to reject it. It is true that one of the two 
old parties (PdL) has the strongest overall ATE but 
the other one (PD) has all three effects lower than 
M5S and on gay rights presents the lowest effect, 
which is not significant. And on that issue, it is 
the other new party (SC) that shows the strongest 
effect, almost 22 points.
5. The role of party 
identification
So far we have only confronted ATEs on congru-
ence rates on different issues and in general terms. 
We now want to test the presence of heteroge-
neous treatment effects across different categories 
of respondents, beginning from the key distinc-
tion between partisans and non-partisans. In 
other words, we want to test H4: whether there is 
an impact of party identification on the way party 
cues affect the answers of the respondents.
We divided our group of supporters of the four 
selected parties in two subgroups according to 
the answers to party identification questions: 
partisans (those close to the preferred party); non-
partisans (those not close to the preferred party). 
Heterogeneous effects within these two groups 
are observable in Table 6. H4 is fully confirmed: 
Table 5. Average treatment effects for supporters of different parties on various issues
  PD PdL SC M5S Overall
Electoral reform 25*** 29.8*** 27.8** 25.5*** 26.7***
Rights for gay couples 8 16.8** 21.7* 15.8** 12.7***
House property tax 11.6** 26.2*** 1.3 21.7*** 15.5***
Overall ATE 14.9*** 24.2*** 17** 21*** 18.3***
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as expected, partisans show a stronger effect: 
25 points, from 36 to 61% of party-respondent 
congruence rate, averaged over the three issues. 
This effect is statistically significant with p < 0.001. 
The effect among non-partisans decreases to 12 
points: party cues increase the congruence rate 
from 32 to 43% (still p < 0.001). 
Finally, we present findings of the empirical 
test of H4b: whether the level of closeness to the 
preferred party is actually able to discriminate 
among groups that respond in different ways 
to the party cues. As we can observe in Table 7, 
effects grow with the level of closeness with the 
party, in a pretty orderly way: about 7 additional 
points from each category to the next. In any case 
we can immediately observe that the effects on 
non-partisans and simple sympathizers are not 
significantly different. 
But in order to properly test H4b we have to 
look at the conditional marginal effect, reported 
in Figure 1. This shows differences that are a bit 
blurred. As you can see, the three categories of 
identifiers do not show statistically different ATEs. 
Furthermore, only the two categories of strongest 
identifiers, “quite close” and “very close” have 
ATEs statistically different from non-identifiers, 
while “mere sympathizers” are not different from 
any of the other three groups. In conclusion 
H3b has to be rejected as we cannot observe any 
statistically significant difference among voters 
with different degrees of party closeness.
6. The impact of an economic 
and political crisis
Finally we investigate if the economic recession 
has decreased the ability of parties to influence 
individual policy preferences. In particular we 
want to verify if those voters particularly afflicted 
by the crisis are less receptive to the stimulus of 
party labels because they no longer trust political 
parties tout court, not even their preferred one.
We selected those respondents who reported 
themselves or a family member as unsuccessful job 
seekers during 2012 (374 respondents out of our 
1,147 party supporters). Table 8 shows on the left 
side the regression of the interaction of treatment 
exposure and this unemployment measure. As you 
can see, there is a statistically lower congruence for 
job seekers in the control group, but this does not 
Table 6. Effects of treatment inclusion, party identification and their interactions on party-respondent congruence 
rate
Party ID
Treatment 11.513*** [6.277,16.749]
Party identification 4.143 [-0.994,9.280]
Treatment * party ID 13.643*** [6.412,20.874]
Constant 31.679*** [27.903,35.455]
Observations 1,147
R2 0.115
95% confidence intervals in brackets
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 7. Effects of treatment inclusion, party identification level and their interactions on party-respondent 
congruence rate
Party ID level
Treatment 11.513*** [6.290,16.736]
Non-partisans 0.000 [0.000,0.000]
Simple sympathizers 3.893 [-2.583,10.368]
Quite close 5.858+ [-1.047,12.763]
Very close 1.654 [-6.902,10.210]
Non-partisans * treatment 0.000 [0.000,0.000]
Sympathizers * treatment 7.301 [-2.061,16.662]
Quite close * treatment 15.157** [5.605,24.709]
Very close * treatment 22.405*** [10.096,34.714]
Constant 31.679*** [27.912,35.446]
Observations 1,147
R2 0.122
95% confidence intervals in brackets
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Figure 1. ATEs on party-respondent congruence rate, for groups with different levels of party identification (95% c.i.)
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hold in the treatment group12. From this data we 
12. We have also provided a similar test including a three-
way interaction with the party preference variable 
together with exposures to the economic crisis and 
treatment. We did that in order to test if for voters 
of any specific party we could observe a significant 
effect of the economic crisis. In particular, we hypoth-
esized that M5S supporters would react to the crisis 
differently from supporters of the parties holding the 
technocratic cabinet up. The assumption was that 
M5S supporters could be influenced regardless of the 
economic crisis by their party cues because they have 
found in it a possible political alternative solution to 
the crisis, while mainstream parties supporters are left 
with the only choice of maintaining austerity meas-
ures. If that was the case we might find no interaction 
effect of the crisis in the whole sample because it was 
washed away by the different mechanism applicable to 
M5S supporters. We do not present the findings here, 
have to conclude that H5 is rejected: the economic 
crisis did not impact on the adoption by voters of 
party cues shortcut to select policy positions.
A final test concerns then the potential effect of 
what should be the direct factor activated by expo-
sure to the economic crisis: a lower trust in parties. 
Its ability to produce effect heterogeneity is shown 
in Table 9. As you can see, the interaction term is 
positive and significant. The more respondents are 
likely to vote for their most liked party, as opposed 
to abstain, the more they are cued by their party. 
The 0.95 coefficient means that there is a 19 points 
but for none of the four parties we could observe a 
significantly different treatment effect between those 
affected and those not affected by the crisis.
Table 8. Effects of treatment inclusion, unsuccessful job seeking and their interaction on party-respondent 
congruence rate 
Job seek
Treatment 17.558*** [13.063,22.053]
JobSeek -5.498* [-10.946,-0.051]
Treatment * JobSeek 1.462 [-6.417,9.341]
Constant 35.890*** [32.629,39.152]
Observations 1,145
R2 0.082
95% confidence intervals in brackets
Party*Treatment interaction does not add significant changes.
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 9. Effects of treatment inclusion, propensity to abstain and their interactions on party-respondent congruence 
rate
Propensity to abstain
treatment 13.085*** [7.280,18.889]
Maximum Ptv – Abstention Ptv 0.620* [0.027,1.213]
Treatment * maxptv-abstptv 0.949* [0.118,1.781]
Constant 30.529*** [26.428,34.630]
Observations 1,145
R2 0.103
95% confidence intervals in brackets
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Elections in Europe in Times of Crisis                                   CONTENTS á28
difference in the treatment effect between those 
respondents with maximum propensity to abstain 
and minimum propensity to vote the preferred 
party and those with opposite propensities. 
We have reported in Figure 2 the margin plot 
graph of this interaction. It visually shows that 
treatment effects are positive and significant only 
among respondents that have a higher level of 
trust in parties, a finding supporting H6.
We have also adopted another strategy to assess 
the impact of trust in parties on the partisan cue-
ing effect, using the set of questions dealing with 
the most important problem facing Italy at the 
moment. Respondents are first asked what they 
consider to be the most important problem, and 
then they are asked which government could solve 
it. One of the possible answers is “none could solve 
it”. We selected those 342 major parties supporters 
who gave such answers and compared them with 
the rest of the sample. Table 10 reports the out-
come of the regression of the interaction between 
treatment inclusion and perceived inability to 
solve Italian most important problem. 
Looking at all the 1,147 respondents, we find a sig-
nificant lower congruence in the control group, 
but the interaction term in not significant. We 
have then excluded supporters of M5S, focusing 
on supporters of the parties who parliamentary 
supported Monti’s cabinet. We did so considering 
that the fact that neither a left, a center nor a right 
government could solve Italian most important 
Figure 2. Margin plot of the effect of trust in parties on party-respondent congruence rate (95% c.i.) 
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problem should be particularly relevant for vot-
ers supporting those parties that would lead such 
governments. A separate test on this subsample is 
presented in model 2 of Table 10: we can observe 
a huge negative and significant interaction term. 
This fits with H6.
Table 11, reporting the confidence interval of the 
effects on mainstream parties supporters divided 
by their perception of the ability of parties to 
solve Italian most important problem, confirms 
that these two groups are statistically differently 
affected by the partisan cues. More than that, for 
those who support one of the three parties support-
ing Monti’s government and who believe the cur-
rent political system will not be able to solve what 
they consider Italian most important problem, the 
treatment effect is not statistically significant. 
From this evidence we can confirm H6: trust in par-
ties has a positive effect on partisan cueing effect, in 
particular for supporters of mainstream parties.
7. Conclusions
We started this paper with the aim of investigating 
the ability of parties to shape voters’ preferences 
on relevant policy issues. The answer appears defi-
nitely positive. Our findings show that even when 
issues are real-world and salient, party cues have 
a strong and significant effect on voters’ prefer-
ences. The share of respondents choosing the pol-
icy option endorsed by the preferred party sensibly 
increases when party labels are explicitly added 
to the different options. This is in line with party 
identification theory, which is also confirmed by 
differences due to partisanship and to decrease of 
trust in parties, as a result of the economic crisis. 
Table 10. Effects of treatment inclusion, perceived inability to solve Italian most important problem and their 
interactions on party-respondent congruence rate
All four major parties 
supporters
Mainstream parties 
supporters
Treatment 20.053*** [15.694,24.413] 20.885*** [16.276,25.493]
None could solve the mip -6.938* [-12.724,-1.153] -3.183 [-11.187,4.821]
Treatment * no mip solution -4.572 [-12.571,3.427] -15.300** [-26.165,-4.435]
Constant 35.841*** [32.795,38.888] 36.060*** [32.843,39.276]
Observations 1,147 903
R2 0.094 0.095
95% confidence intervals in brackets
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 11. Confidence intervals of the different ATEs for supporters of mainstream parties feeling at least one 
coalition could solve Italian most important problem (1) or that none could solve it (2)
    Delta-method        
  dy/dx Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
Treatment
_at
1 20.8846 2.34816 8.89 0.000 16.2823 25.4869
2 5.58483 5.01321 1.11 0.265 -4.2409 15.4105
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A second interesting finding is heterogeneity of 
effects across issues and parties: cueing effects 
tend to vary across different issues (although the 
very low number of issues did not allow us to more 
systematically test potential explanatory factors 
at the issue level: this constitutes a particularly 
stimulating question for further research) as they 
do across parties. It is however on this last ques-
tion that we observed unexpected findings: cueing 
effects appear as strong in new parties as they are 
in older, more established parties.
It is interesting to look at these empirical findings 
in light of the recent economic (and political cri-
sis). In this regard, findings suggest two partially 
conflicting dynamics. The first is related to dif-
ferences across groups of voters that had different 
exposure to the crisis. Those more exposed show 
weaker party cueing effects. This would suggest a 
potentially rational response to crisis, with vot-
ers becoming less looking at parties for advice, as 
they become less trustful in them. But, in a par-
tially contrary direction, there is the surprising 
finding of the lack of differences in cueing ability 
across different parties. The newly formed M5S 
appears to have partisan cueing ability as strong 
as the two older and more established Pd and PdL. 
This appears even more surprising as the M5S has 
presented an intrinsically contradictory, inconsis-
tent policy programme. This might be considered 
understandable for a populist, anti-establishment 
party. But we might have expected its voters, while 
attracted by its anti-establishment stance, to still 
be more sceptical in terms of (at least some of the) 
actual issues, so as to present overall lower cue-
ing effects. On the contrary, such effects are pretty 
high. This suggests how voters that might have 
selected the M5S for protest voting, non-policy 
reasons, appear prone to have their policy prefer-
ences shaped by this new party.
To some extent this pattern is not new in Ital-
ian politics. It was actually the very first pattern 
of democratic legitimation at the beginning of 
the Italian democracy: in a situation of strong 
ideological conflict after WWII, voters with 
extremely low levels of education and sophistica-
tion were socialized into mass parties, to which 
they essentially delegated the task of negotiating 
policy. After several decades, in a time of crisis, 
once again there are some signs that part of the 
electorate might be simply switching from one 
uncritical party affiliation to another, without any 
policy evaluation taking place as an intermediate 
process, and once again under the influence of a 
charismatic leader. This does not sound exactly 
optimistic for the political future of Italy.
Obviously, the proper framing of such findings 
can only take place in comparative perspective. 
To what extent are our expectations of effect 
heterogeneity across parties justified? Isn’t there 
the possibility of the above paradox to be replicated 
also in other European countries, perhaps even 
in those with a longer democratic tradition? And 
what about those with a younger democratic 
background? All in all, we think this paper 
demonstrates the potential of an experimental 
research strategy on partisan cueing effects, 
when applied to salient, real-world issues. This 
obviously calls for a comparative extension, which 
might be particularly enlightening especially in 
times of potential party system change due to the 
economic crisis.
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Appendix13
Table 12. Balance table: regression of typical electoral 
control variables on the dichotomy treatment/control 
for supporters of the four major parties
b s.e.
Woman -0.095 (0.122)
Age (classes) 0.024 (0.049)
Education -0.031 (0.054)
Political interest 0.014 (0.087)
L-R self -0.031 (0.080)
Church attendance 0.042 (0.039)
2013 Vote choice (center-left) 0.000 (.)
Center-right -0.043 (0.222)
Center 0.018 (0.228)
M5S 0.289 (0.182)
Others 0.270 (0.377)
DK/NA/Not valid vote 0.453 (0.232)
Constant -0.049 (0.419)
Observations 1,142
Pseudo R2 0.005
AIC 1598.475
BIC 1658.961
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
13. The question wording reported in this appendix is a 
translation of the original questions in Italian.
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Experimental questions for the treatment group:
1. One of the topics at the centre of the debate is 
electoral reform. Several proposals have been advanced 
in order the change the current law. Which of the 
following proposals is your favorite? 
[1] The French run-off system, as proposed by the PD
[2] A proportional system with a threshold, similar to 
the German model, as proposed by SC
[3] The current law, with the introduction of a majority 
bonus at the national level also for the Senate, as 
proposed by the PdL
[4] The current system, but with preference voting, as 
proposed by the M5S
[88] doesn’t know
[99] Doesn’t answer 
2. Another controversial issue concerns the IMU, i.e. 
the house property tax. Several proposals have been 
advanced in order the change the current law. Which 
of the following proposals is your favorite? 
[1] Abolishing the tax for the first house, as proposed by 
the M5S
[2] Abolishing the tax for the first house and refunding 
the amount paid in 2012, as proposed by the PdL
[3] Exemption for the first house for low income 
families, as proposed by the PD
[4] Gradual remodeling of the tax through time, as 
proposed by SC
[88] Doesn’t know
[99] Doesn’t answer 
3. Another relevant theme is rights for homosexual 
couples. Which of the following proposals is your 
favorite? 
[1] The introduction of a law that recognizes civil 
unions, as proposed by the PD
[2] The protection of individual rights for cohabitants, as 
proposed by SC
[3] Keeping the current law, as proposed by the PdL
[4] Opening a debate towards a new law, as proposed by 
the M5S
[88] Doesn’t know
[99] Doesn’t answer 
Experimental questions for the control group:
4. One of the topics at the center of the debate is the 
electoral reform. Several proposals have been advanced 
in order the change the current law. Which of the 
following proposals is your favorite? 
[1] The French run-off system
[2] A proportional system with a threshold, similar to 
the German model
[3] The current law, with the introduction of a majority 
bonus at the national level also for the Senate
[4] The current system, but with preference voting
[88] Doesn’t know
[99] Doesn’t answer 
5. Another controversial issue concerns the IMU, i.e. 
the house property tax. Several proposals have been 
advanced in order the change the current law. Which of 
the following proposals is your favorite?
[1] Abolishing the tax for the first house
[2] Abolishing the tax for the first house and refunding 
the amount paid in 2012
[3] Exemption for the first house for low income families
[4] Gradual remodeling of the tax through time
[88] Doesn’t know
[99] Doesn’t answer 
6. Another relevant theme is rights for homosexual 
couples. Which of the following proposals is your 
favorite? 
[1] The introduction of a law that recognizes civil unions
[2] The protection of individual rights for cohabitants
[3] Keeping the current law
[4] Opening a debate towards a new law
[88] Doesn’t know
[99] Doesn’t answer 
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Introduction
In recent years, a bulk of literature on party orga-
nizational change has focused on the relation-
ships between party national structures and party 
sub-national units. The theme has been addressed 
through different lenses. On the one hand, modi-
fications in the allocation of powers, competences 
and resources at different party layers have been 
interpreted as the resultant of the institutional 
reforms adopted by European countries, towards 
more decentralized governmental settings. On 
the other hand, the strengthening and progressive 
autonomization of sub-national party bodies have 
been considered as the by-products of the shift 
from a hierarchical to a stratarchical organiza-
tional template in contemporary parties.
What is at stake, then, in contemporary party 
politics, is the intra-party distribution of power 
among relevant party units in managing critical 
aspects of party internal life and the electoral com-
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petition. In what follows we will focus on methods 
and procedures of Candidate Selection (CS).
The methods of Candidate Selection are at the 
heart of the democratic system and political rep-
resentation. Ranney defines the process of CS as 
the one «by which a political party decides which 
of the persons legally eligible to hold an elective 
office will be designated on the ballot» (Ranney 
1981, p. 75). The relevance of CS methods has been 
stressed overtime by many scholars. Sartori main-
tains that CS is the core activity by which political 
parties differ from other political organizations 
(Sartori 1976). More recently, Hazan and Rahat 
have noted that «Whatever the electoral formula 
used in elections, candidate selection is one of the 
first things that political parties must do before 
they take place» (Hazan, Rahat 2006, p. 109), and 
Cross even got to the conclusion that «under cer-
tain circumstances, party candidate selection pro-
cess may be equally or more determinative of who 
ends up in the legislature than are general elec-
tions» (Cross 2008, p. 615). 
In general, CS methods reflect and affect the power 
struggle within parties: consequently an in-depth 
study of these procedures – compared to other rel-
evant organizational variables – could raise inter-
esting indications about party’s organizational 
attitudes as well as party’s electoral strategies. By 
drawing on a new-institutionalist approach to 
organization theory, the aim of this contribution 
is to investigate to what extent Italian state-wide 
parties have followed patterns of organizational 
change towards more decentralized party mod-
els and/or have experienced significant shifts of 
intra-organizational power in terms of reciprocal 
autonomy between the central (national) and the 
sub-national (regional) level.
At the EU level, the Italian case presents a num-
ber of peculiarities. In fact, at the beginning of the 
Nineties, a rapid and multifaceted process of insti-
tutional reform ran parallel to the radical renewal 
of domestic party politics, after the collapse of 
the s.c. First Republic. By focusing on 10 orga-
nizational variables, we analyse diachronically 
continuity and change in 8 Italian party organiza-
tions, through an in-depth analysis of the statutes 
adopted from the beginning of the 90s to present 
days. We expect to find significant modifications 
in the involvement of regional party delegates/offi-
cers at the national level as well as in the degree of 
autonomy accorded to the regional party.
1. Studying party change 
through the lenses of 
organization theory
Literature on organizational change has been 
neglected for a long time in the mainstream anal-
ysis of political parties (Panebianco 1982; Katz, 
Mair 1992; Bardi 2006), which has focused on 
different aspects of party behavior, role and func-
tions in contemporary liberal-democracies. This 
subordination contributed to foster the existing 
fragmentation within the literature on organiza-
tional change, thus hindering the evolution of an 
integrated and coherent analytical framework or, 
at least, of a general scheme based on shared theo-
retical, conceptual and methodological premises. 
Furthermore, these studies have paid little atten-
tion to different theories and approaches inter-
ested in the analysis of the relations between orga-
nizations and their environment. In this respect, 
organization theory (Harmel 2002; Scott 1991; 
1995; 2012) – and, more specifically, the new-insti-
tutional approach to the study of organizations – 
may represent a useful landmark to analyse the 
dynamics of party change. The reconstruction 
of the theoretical development of the new-insti-
tutionalist approach(es) to organization studies 
goes well beyond the scope of this contribution14. 
Rather, we are interested in employing those 
14. Cfr. Lanzalaco 1995; Scott 1995; Hall, Taylor 1996; Di 
Maggio 1998; Immergut 1998; Peters 1999; Schmidt 
2010.
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conceptual instruments, drawn by new-institu-
tionalism, which could be helpful to define inter-
pretative frameworks of organizational change 
based on multiple levels on analysis: in particular, 
focused on the relations between the environment 
where political parties move and single organi-
zations. Moreover it is crucial to define precisely 
what we mean when referring to “organizational 
change”: in what circumstances and under which 
conditions it is more likely to expect organiza-
tional change to take place; which parts of the 
organization are primarily affected; the depth of 
the observed modifications.
In traditional organizational analysis, the pecu-
liarities of the environment where organizations 
interact were not central (Powell, Di Maggio 2000). 
It was after the development of the “open system” 
approach and its further evolution that scholars 
have been devoting significant attention to the rela-
tions between organizations and their environment. 
In particular, the new-institutionalist approach 
focused on the functional (or organizational) fields 
of organizations and on institutional regimes and 
technical environments organizations have to con-
front with (Scott, Meyer 1983; Scott 1994). While 
institutional regimes condense the set of values, 
norms, procedures and requisites to which organi-
zations are expected to conform, technical environ-
ments are those arenas where organizations carry 
out their specific functions, in return for rewards 
which certify (qualitatively and quantitatively) the 
success/failure of their performances.
Powell and Di Maggio (1983) argue that organiza-
tions move within a number of functional fields 
and interconnected institutional regimes and 
technical environments, each of them exerting (to 
different extent) pressures on them. The combined 
mix of these exogenous pressures represent the set 
of rational myths that confer legitimacy to those 
organizations that conform to these (socially 
approved) prescriptions. This tendency favors 
organizational isomorphism among actors operat-
ing in a specific functional field: this process may 
be explained as a response based on both instru-
mental/rational and symbolic/expressive basis 
(Meyer, Rowan 1977; Scott, Meyer 1991; Lanzalaco 
1995). Indeed, organizations are embedded within 
a complex and multifaceted environment which 
influences their organizational profile (Powell 
1998). In our perspective, the “organizational pro-
file” of an organization consists in the prevailing 
representation of internal power and authority; 
the degrees of freedom accorded to its structural 
articulations; the internal chain of delegation and 
accountability; the role assigned to members and 
the mechanisms set to guarantee their rights and 
dues; the source and entity of human/financial 
resources and the directions of their partition. 
2. Organizations and 
organizational change
As stated above, functional fields are formed by 
institutional regimes and technical environments: 
on the one hand, these components help stabi-
lising the functioning of the field (providing the 
legitimating rational myths); on the other, they 
enhance the levels of complexity of the requisites 
that organizations need to comply with. The suc-
cess of an organization depends on its ability to 
conform to multiple exogenous pressures, which 
is the conditio sine qua non to access the resources 
provided by the context and to ascribe a meaning 
to the organizational action itself.
By focusing on isomorphism, new-institution-
alism has privileged the observation of homo-
geneities rather than variance in organizational 
templates: this imprinting lead authors to anal-
yse organizational persistence, i.e. the tendency 
to reproduce and reinforce the prevailing orga-
nizational models within a given environment 
(Greenwood, Hinings 1996). In this sense, even if 
new-institutionalism is not considered a theoreti-
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cal approach mainly oriented to explain organi-
zational change, in our opinion it can also pro-
vide scholars with concepts and ideas suitable to 
develop an interpretative model of organizational 
change based on both environmental and intra-
organizational dynamics. Intra-organizational 
dynamics are crucial, in this perspective, as orga-
nizations operating within the same functional 
field may react differently to identical exogenous 
pressures. Thus, while pressures coming from the 
functional field are decisive, organizations may be 
considered per se as vectors of change (Scott 1994). 
By considering organizational change as a depen-
dent variable we assume that it will be the resul-
tant of a mix of exogenous and endogenous factors 
(the independent variables), more specifically: 1) 
the degree of organizational institutionalization 
of the actors; 2) the degree of the incorporation of 
the actors within the functional field; 3) the degree 
of structuring of the functional field. 
We define organizational institutionalization 
as the process by which organization-building 
strategies undertaken at a t0 moment (the genetic 
moment) lead to a tn moment when organizational 
structures, values and repertories of action become 
permanent and are reproduced, in time. Organi-
zational institutionalization thus corresponds to 
the crystallization of different dimensions, which 
become distinctive properties of the organization. 
The degree of incorporation represents the filter 
between intra-organizational and environmental 
dynamics, as it reveals the extent to which organi-
zations fit with the institutional regimes and tech-
nical environments: the more the organization 
fits, the more it will cover a central position (in 
terms of strength, visibility, relative power) within 
the functional field. Finally, the degree of struc-
turing of the functional field registers the stabil-
ity of the broader environment, in time. A highly 
structured field reduces uncertainty and promotes 
isomorphism; viceversa, changes in institutional 
regimes and the instability of technical environ-
ments determine the modification of the rational 
myths, and consequently impose adaptive dilem-
mas to organizations.
3. Party organizations and 
their functional field
An institutional analysis of the process of party 
change should focus on the interactions between 
parties and their “natural” functional field: the 
political system. The institutional regimes politi-
cal parties have to confront with may be distin-
guished between formal and informal: the form-
ers are constituted by the set of norms and pro-
cedures regulating State institutional architecture 
(the balance of powers between the executive and 
parliament; the level of territorial decentraliza-
tion etc.), party activities (the existence of party 
laws) and the political competition (the electoral 
law, public funding schemes, access to media etc.); 
informal regimes relate to those prevailing values, 
believes, ideas which provide external legitimacy 
to conforming organizations. The technical envi-
ronments of political parties are the electoral arena 
and the representative arena. In the electoral arena 
parties compete to obtain democratic consensus 
on their programs and candidates and to enter 
representative institutions: if their efforts are suc-
cessful, parties may legitimately aspire to place 
their elected personnel in key governmental/par-
liamentary roles (representative arena).
At the same time, not every single party orga-
nization undertakes institutionalization pro-
cesses (Panebianco 1982). Institutionalization 
is completed once each different organizational 
dimensions become crystallized (Lanzalaco 1995; 
March, Olsen 1998). Party organizational institu-
tionalization implies stability, in time, of: 
1. party organizational boundaries;
2. party values/ideology;
Elections in Europe in Times of Crisis                                   CONTENTS á39
3. party formal profile (stability of party articu-
lations and functioning);
4. party resources (human/financial/material)
The original imprinting will influence further 
evolutions of the institutionalization process 
(Pierson 2004), which will be conditioned also 
by the degree of stability/instability of the func-
tional field. As far as the cognitive, formal and 
material profile of the organization crystallize, the 
organization assumes a specific identity, diverse 
from those of the other organizations operating 
within the same functional field. (Scott 1998). 
In general, the higher the organizational institu-
tionalization, the higher the capacity to resist to 
external pressures and to control the environment 
(Panebianco 1982): however, if the organizational 
boundaries become excessively impermeable to 
systemic inputs, the risk of over-institutionaliza-
tion (Lanzalaco 1995) may compromise the future 
survival of the organization.
4. Purpose and method
The definition of a complete and integrated analyti-
cal framework to study party change through the 
lenses of new-institutionalism goes well beyond the 
purposes of this paper, which is part of a broader 
and more comprehensive research project on party 
organizations at regional level, launched in 2007 
(Ignazi, Bardi, Massari 2013). Here we limit the 
focus of our analysis on changes in the formal pro-
file of Italian parties, with specific attention to the 
distribution of power between the national and the 
regional levels of party organizations. We are inter-
ested in verifying to what extent Italian State-wide 
parties have followed patterns of organizational 
change towards more stratarchical/decentralized 
party models and have experienced significant shift 
of intra-organizational power in terms of recipro-
cal autonomy between the central (national) and 
the sub-national (regional) level. Albeit stratar-
chical tendencies in party organizational change 
have been observed in most Western democracies 
(Katz, Mair 1993; 1995; Carty 2004; Bolleyer 2011), 
we argue that this widespread paradigmatic shift 
has been reinforced, in Italy, by the institutional 
reforms cycle begun at the beginning of the 90s, 
which has brought to a massive decentralization of 
competences from the State to the regions.
At the EU level, the Italian case presents a num-
ber of peculiarities (Bardi 2013). In fact, at the 
beginning of the Nineties, a rapid and multifac-
eted process of institutional reforms ran parallel 
to the radical renewal of domestic party politics, 
after the collapse of the s.c. First Republic. In par-
ticular, the impact of the new electoral formula 
introduced for the election of the executive posts 
at the sub-national level brought to an observ-
able autonomization of local politics and to party 
organizational decentralization (Massari 2013). 
We consider the progressive denationalization of 
Italian party politics conducive to observe party 
organizational arrangements based on power dis-
persion among different layers and stratarchical 
tendencies (Allern, Saglie 2012). By focusing on 
10 organizational variables – and, in particular, 
on candidate selection procedures – we analyze 
diachronically continuity and change in 8 Italian 
party organizations, through an in-depth analysis 
of the statutes adopted from the beginning of the 
90s to present days. We are interested in observ-
ing similarities and variance in the involvement 
of regional party officers/delegates at the national 
level as well as in the degree of autonomy accorded 
to the regional party, among parties belonging to 
different political cultures and characterized by 
different organizational imprinting. Put differ-
ently, we are interested in analyzing how different 
(party) organizations respond to systemic pres-
sures (changes in institutional regimes) coming 
from their functional field (the political system). 
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As the allocation of power between national and 
regional levels of party organization is the core of 
our research we aim at analyzing to what extent 
regional and national levels determine political 
functions performed by parties. A coding scheme 
by which measuring the respective influences 
between national and regional levels needs to be 
drawn. Some attempts to code party organizations 
already exist, but few provide analytical categories 
useful for our purpose. Richard Katz and Peter 
Mair’s Data Handbook (1992) is a huge collection 
of data on party organisation but does not pro-
vide dedicated indicators to measure level of cen-
tralisation/decentralisation of parties. Kenneth 
Janda’s International Comparative Parties Project 
(1980) provides categories, including several vari-
ables linked to the “centralization” of power. This 
comprehensive analysis cannot be simply updated 
because its categories include also sub-regional 
actors, which are out of our study, and consider 
only processes at the national levels, without 
analyzing those performed at regional ones: our 
interest is on the respective powers of central and 
regional levels towards each other. Thorlakson 
(2009), who tries to compare parties in seven dif-
ferent federations, assigns only one value to each 
party without differentiating amongst functions.
Probably, of the existing coding schemes, Elo-
die Fabre (2010) has produced the methodology 
which is the most useful for our purposes. First 
of all, she designs her analytical framework only 
with respect to regional and national levels, as the 
“other levels are only important in so far as they 
impinge on or strengthen the power of the cen-
tral or regional level” (Fabre 2010, 346). Therefore, 
she concentrates her focus on two dimensions 
of multi-level organizations: the level of involve-
ment of regional units in national party organs 
and, vice versa, the level of autonomy of regional 
units from the national levels. The first relates to 
the degree to which regional units are represented 
in central organs and involved in decision-making 
processes. The latter refers to the extent to which 
regional units are able to perform processes at the 
regional level independently from the national 
party. According to her scheme, each dimension 
is represented by a cluster of 5 variables, which 
represent correspondent party processes at the 
national and at regional levels. Each party receives 
a value between 0 and 4 for each variable. Despite 
the prominent advances offered by Fabre’s ana-
lytical scheme for our analysis we see fit to make 
some changes to both the variables and the indi-
cators. These changes are due to the specific pecu-
liarities of the Italian case but also to provide a 
more defined comparison between the two levels. 
In fact, for what concerns variables, while Fabre 
analyzes different functions performed by politi-
cal parties at the national and regional levels, we 
analyze for both levels the same five functions, 
which are:
1. Selecting the party leader;
2. Selecting the party candidates for elections;
3. Composition of the party executive;
4. Amending the party statute;
5. Deciding the party electoral campaign strategy.
Also for what concerns the operationalization 
of the variables drawn from the aforementioned 
functions, we follow an identical rationale. In par-
ticular, we do not only consider the mere numeri-
cal presence of regional or national party officers 
in the party organs, but also the “rights/powers” 
they are entitled of. So, for all the ten variables – 
i.e. the five functions at the national and at the 
regional level – the following values are assigned:
1. A decision is taken from a party organ, exclu-
sively composed by officers/delegates of the 
regional level.
2. A decision is taken by a party organ, formed 
partly by regional officers/delegates with vot-
ing rights
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3. A decision is taken by a party organ, formed 
partly by regional officers/delegates without 
voting rights
4. A decision is taken by a party organ, where 
regional officers/delegates are only invited or 
consulted
5. A decision is taken from a party organ, exclu-
sively composed by officers/delegates of the 
national level.
Evidently, while value 1 represents situations of 
the maximum level of concentration of power at 
the regional level, and value 5 represents the max-
imum level of power for the national organs, inter-
mediate values represent situations of prerogatives 
shared between the two levels. A complete view of 
all the variables and values is offered in the follow-
ing tables (Tabs. 1 and 2). 
Thus, parties which receive for the variables of the 
Involvement dimension a higher number of values 
close to 5 are those which do not guarantee any 
roles for the regional levels to influence the func-
tions of the national bodies. On the contrary, par-
ties which receive lowest values are those which 
grant the highest prerogatives for the regional 
levels to influence the functions performed at 
the national level. A similar assumption can be 
addressed for the variables of the Autonomy 
dimension. Parties that receive an average value 
close to 5 are those that foresee a top-down cri-
teria inside their organization with more powers 
assigned to the national level in influencing the 
regional level. On the contrary average values 
close to 1 depict parties which grant high levels 
of autonomy to their regional levels. In Section 6 
we proceed to a diachronic analysis variable by 
variable. We consider the first and the last statute 
adopted in the period (Tot= 16) by the 8 parties 
analyzed: Rifondazione Comunista (PRC); Partito 
Democratico della Sinistra-Democratici di Sini-
stra (PDS-DS); Partito Popolare Italiano-Demo-
crazia è Libertà (PPI-DL); Partito Democratico 
(PD); Forza Italia (FI); Alleanza Nazionale (AN); 
Lega Nord (LN); Popolo della Libertà (PDL).
5. Regionalization and 
stratarchy: the Italian case
Institutional reforms are one of the main causes of 
the “denationalization” of party politics and party 
organizational change (Hopkin 2003). While in 
unitary States parties are expected to present well 
identifiable, centralized/hierarchical organiza-
tional profiles (Allern, Saglie 2012), in federal and 
regional States the search for the core locus of the 
party may prove to be more difficult (Deschouwer 
2003). In fact the relevance of sub-national politics 
may vary greatly, by conditioning parties’ organi-
zational strategies. In particular, depending on the 
level of interconnectedness of the different insti-
tutional layers; the degree of asymmetry among 
regions and the degree of autonomy accorded to 
regions (Ibidem), state-wide parties may consider 
more fruitful to diversify their organizational 
structures and electoral strategies in highly differ-
entiated (also in terms of cultural/societal homo-
geneity) territorial units, while integration and 
uniformity in party articulation, governance and 
political alliances may result more effective in less 
heterogeneous polities (Van Biezen, Hopkin 2006). 
At EU level, since the beginning of the Nineties 
– as a consequence of the isomorphic tendencies 
(Di Maggio, Powell 1983) to conform to the gen-
eral guidelines set for the formulation and imple-
mentation of the cohesion policies – an increasing 
number of States have promoted the introduction/
empowerment of sub-national levels of govern-
ment (Keating 1997; Hooghe, Marks 2001). This 
process enhanced the salience of intermediate 
institutions as political arenas and forced State-
wide parties to re-think and adapt their electoral 
strategies and organizational profiles to tackle the 
new challenges of decentralization (Hopkin 2003; 
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Van Biezen, Hopkin 2006). In fact, State institu-
tional architecture is expected to influence, to dif-
ferent extents, party organizational arrangements 
(Deschouwer 2003).
At the same time, the strengthening and progres-
sive autonomization of sub-national party bodies 
have been interpreted as the by-products of the 
shift from a hierarchical to a stratarchical orga-
nizational template in contemporary parties. By 
building on S. Eldersveld’s (1964) pioneering work, 
scholars have focused on different aspects of intra-
party relationships along territorial-functional axis. 
While cartel party theorists suggest that parties 
have become more stratarchical as a consequence 
of the cartelization process (Katz, Mair 1995), other 
consider stratarchy as a continuum of structures 
whose configurations rest on intra-organizational 
arrangements (Webb 2000; Carty 2004; Bardi, 
Ignazi and Massari 2007); or as a specific model of 
party organization (Bolleyer 2011).
In what follows we try to combine both the above 
mentioned perspectives to analyze the Italian 
Dimension 1: Involvement
Variables Scores and operational definitions 
Selecting 
National 
Leader (SNL)
1. By a national party organ, formed exclusively by sub-national delegates/officers;
2. By a national party organ, formed by sub-national party delegates/officers with voting right;
3. By a national party organ, formed by sub-national party delegates/officers without voting right;
4. By a national party organ, after consulting sub-national party delegates/officers;
5. By national party organ, where sub-national party delegates/officers are not present;
Selecting 
National 
Candidates 
(SNC)
1. By a national party organ, formed exclusively by sub-national delegates/officers;
2. By a national party organ, formed by sub-national party delegates/officers with voting right;
3. By a national party organ, formed by sub-national party delegates/officers without voting right;
4. By a national party organ, after consulting sub-national party delegates/officers;
5. By national party organ, where sub-national party delegates/officers are not present;
Composition 
of the National 
Executive 
Organ (NEO)
1. The NEO is formed exclusively by sub-national delegates/officers;
2. The NEO is formed partly by sub-national party delegates/officers with voting right;
3. The NEO is formed partly by sub-national party delegates/officers without voting right;
4. Sub-national delegates/officers may only be invited to the meetings of the NEO;
5. Sub-national delegates/officers are not present in the NEO; 
Amending 
National 
Statute (ANS)
1. By a national party organ, formed exclusively by sub-national delegates/officers;
2. By a national party organ, formed partly by sub-national party delegates/officers with voting right;
3. By a national party organ, formed partly by sub-national party delegates/officers without voting 
right;
4. By a national party organ, after consulting sub-national party delegates/officers;
5. By national party organ, where sub-national party delegates/officers are not present;
National 
Campaign 
Strategies 
(NCS)
1. By a national party organ, formed exclusively by sub-national delegates/officers;
2. By a national party organ, formed partly by sub-national party delegates/officers with voting right;
3. By a national party organ, formed partly by sub-national party delegates/officers without voting 
right;
4. By a national party organ, after consulting sub-national party delegates/officers;
5. By national party organ, where sub-national party delegates/officers are not present;
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case. Shifts from hierarchical to stratarchical 
party organizations may be observed in those 
political contexts, like Italy, where parties main-
tained a highly centralized/top-down profile until 
the beginning of the Nineties, notwithstanding 
the existence of formal party structures at the 
regional level (Massari 2013). In a recent volume 
on centre-periphery relations in the Italian parties 
edited by Ignazi, Bardi and Massari (2013), the 
authors argue that the progressive autonomization 
of local politics intertwined with high intra-orga-
nizational differentiation and a deep modification 
in the links between the three “faces” (Katz, Mair 
1993) of political parties. By drawing on Carty’s 
franchise party model (2004) – which relies on the 
idea that stratarchy and hierarchy coexist in every 
party organization with different configurations, 
thus implying a certain degree of autonomy for 
party peripheral structures – Bardi (2013, p. 14, 
our translation) maintains that “this approach 
proves extremely helpful to analyze the process 
of formation and institutionalization of parties in 
multi-level systems, with particular regards to the 
regional dimension”. 
Dimension 2: Autonomy
Variables Scores and operational definitions
Selecting 
Regional 
Leader (SRL)
5. By a regional party organ, formed exclusively by national delegates/officers;
4. By a regional party organ, formed partly by national party delegates/officers with voting right;
3. By a regional party organ, formed partly by national party delegates/officers without voting right;
2. By a regional party organ, after consulting national party delegates/officers;
1. By regional party organ, where national party delegates/officers are not present;
Selecting 
Regional 
Candidates 
(SRC)
5. By a regional party organ, formed exclusively by national delegates/officers;
4. By a regional party organ, formed partly by national party delegates/officers with voting right;
3. By a regional party organ, formed partly by national party delegates/officers without voting right;
2. By a regional party organ, after consulting national party delegates/officers;
1. By regional party organ, where national party delegates/officers are not present;
Regional 
Executive 
Organ (REO)
5. The REO is formed exclusively by national delegates/officers;
4. The REO is formed partly by national party delegates/officers with voting right;
3. The REO is formed partly by national party delegates/officers without voting right;
2. National delegates/officers may only be invited to the meetings of the NEO;
1. National delegates/officers are not present in the NEO; 
Amending 
Regional 
Statute (ARS)
5. By a regional party organ, formed exclusively by national delegates/officers;
4. By a regional party organ, formed partly by national party delegates/officers with voting right;
3. By a regional party organ, formed partly by national party delegates/officers without voting right;
2. By a regional party organ, after consulting national party delegates/officers;
1. By regional party organ, where national party delegates/officers are not present;
Regional 
Campaign 
Strategies 
(RCS)
5. By a regional party organ, formed exclusively by national delegates/officers;
4. By a regional party organ, formed partly by national party delegates/officers with voting right;
3. By a regional party organ, formed partly by national party delegates/officers without voting right;
2. By a regional party organ, after consulting national party delegates/officers;
1. By regional party organ, where national party delegates/officers are not present;
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The regional level of administration and govern-
ment, which was formally included in the 1948 
Constitution, was not implemented until 1970 
because of the strong reluctance of Italy’s political 
class. In particular, the Christian Democrats (DC), 
the predominant party until the Nineties, opposed 
to regionalization as it could hinder country’s 
post-war reconstruction (at that time coordinated 
from the centre); moreover, regionalization could 
favour the Communist Party (PCI), given the exis-
tence of a strong concentration of electoral support 
in the regions situated in the center of the country 
(the so-called “red belt”) - cfr. Bardi, Pizzimenti 
forthcoming. Beginning with the 1980s, the wors-
ening of the North-South socio-economic divide 
and the increasing discontent towards the central 
State were elements in the success of the indepen-
dence movement of Northern League (LN), which 
ultimately had a role in the collapse of the DC and, 
consequently, of the First Republic. Political par-
ties born after the 1992-1993 political earthquake 
had different positions on regionalization, whose 
importance dramatically increased after the LN 
had become a relevant actor at national level by 
imposing the “Northern question” (Diamanti 
2003) in the political debate. In addition, the 
electoral reform cycle begun in 1993 had positive 
effects on the devolution process (Pasquino 2007). 
The introduction of the direct election of mayors 
and presidents of provinces (1993) and presidents 
of regions (1999), and the contextual provision of 
increased powers over their executives and the 
legislative assemblies enhanced the relevance of 
sub-national politics. Furthermore, the strength-
ening of sub-national governments was confirmed 
by important administrative reforms, carried out 
by the Center-Left. The so-called Bassanini acts, 
(1997 and 1998) expanded regional competences, 
successively increased through the already men-
tioned 2001 reform of Title V of the Constitution 
(L. Cost. 3/2001), which introduced a form of co-
operative federalism between the State and the 
regions, by assigning to the latter more legislative 
powers.
As a consequence of the denationalization of poli-
tics, the prevailing pyramidal and top-down party 
model (Bardi, Morlino 1994) started decompos-
ing, by favoring new isomorphic tendencies. More 
specifically, by trying to validate the hypotheses 
formulated by Katz and Mair (1994), the results of 
an empirical analysis coordinated by Bardi, Ignazi 
and Massari on Italian parties, from 1991 to 2006, 
showed that (2010, p. 214): 
[...] the general trend in the organizational 
evolution of political parties is largely con-
firmed […]. The dominant quota of state 
financing in spite of members’ revenues, the 
centralization of power in the hand of the 
executives and leaderships, the parliamen-
tarisation and increase of staff and resources 
in the hands of parliamentary groups, and 
the persisting irrelevance of the membership 
role are all common features of contemporary 
Italian parties. 
The empirical evidence confirmed the profound 
transformation undergone by Italian political par-
ties since the beginning of the Nineties. Although 
alternative explanations of this phenomenon have 
been raised by specialized literature, in our opin-
ion the decentralization of politics (resulting from 
a mix of institutional, electoral and administrative 
reforms) has played a major role in determining 
party organizational isomorphism. As Massari 
(2013, p. 315, our translation) puts in “[...] as far as 
personal parties and federalism stand out, the dis-
tinction between centre and periphery blows up. 
[…] The territory is the new hegemonic centre” of 
Italian politics. 
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Tab 3: Selecting the National Leader 
Involvement PRC 1996 PRC 2011 PDS 1991 DS 2005 PPI 1995 DL 2006 PD 2008 PD 2010
SNL
2 5 3 5 2 2 5 5
LN 1998 LN 2012 AN 1995 AN 2006 FI 1998 FI 2004 PDL 2009 PDL 2011
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Tab 4: National Executive Organ
 
Involvement PRC 1996 PRC 2011 PDS 1991 DS 2005 PPI 1995 DL 2006 PD 2008 PD 2010
NEO
5 5 3 5 2 3 2 2
LN 1998 LN 2012 AN 1995 AN 2006 FI 1998 FI 2004 PDL 2009 PDL 2011
2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2
Tab 5: Selecting National Candidates
Involvement PRC 1996 PRC 2011 PDS 1991 DS 2005 PPI 1995 DL 2006 PD 2008 PD 2010
SNC
4 4 3 5 2 5 4 4
LN 1998 LN 2012 AN 1995 AN 2006 FI 1998 FI 2004 PDL 2009 PDL 2011
2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5
Tab. 6: Amending National Statute
Involvement PRC 1996 PRC 2011 PDS 1991 DS 2005 PPI 1995 DL 2006 PD 2008 PD 2010
ANS
2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2
LN 1998 LN 2012 AN 1995 AN 2006 FI 1998 FI 2004 PDL 2009 PDL 2011
2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2
Tab. 7: National Campaigning Strategies 
Involvement PRC 1996 PRC 2011 PDS 1991 DS 2005 PPI 1995 DL 2006 PD 2008 PD 2010
NCS
5 5 3 2 2 3 2 2
LN 1998 LN 2012 AN 1995 AN 2006 FI 1998 FI 2004 PDL 2009 PDL 2011
2 2 3 3 2 2 2 5
Tab. 8: Selecting the Regional Leader
Autonomy PRC 1996 PRC 2011 PDS 1991 DS 2005 PPI 1995 DL 2006 PD 2008 PD 2010
SRL
1 1 1 1 3 1 5 5
LN 1998 LN 2012 AN 1995 AN 2006 FI 1998 FI 2004 PDL 2009 PDL 2011
4 4 5 4 5 5 5 5
Tab. 8: Regional Executive Organ
Autonomy PRC 1996 PRC 2011 PDS 1991 DS 2005 PPI 1995 DL 2006 PD 2008 PD 2010
REO
1 1 1 1 3 3 4 4
LN 1998 LN 2012 AN 1995 AN 2006 FI 1998 FI 2004 PDL 2009 PDL 2011
1 1 4 2 4 4 3 3
Tab. 9: Selecting Regional Candidates
Autonomy PRC 1996 PRC 2011 PDS 1991 DS 2005 PPI 1995 DL 2006 PD 2008 PD 2010
SRC
1 1 2 1 3 4 5 5
LN 1998 LN 2012 AN 1995 AN 2006 FI 1998 FI 2004 PDL 2009 PDL 2011
4 1 3 3 4 4 4 4
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6. Involvement
Selecting the National Leader (SNL)
The Selection of the National Leader of the party 
(SNL) is a key variable to analyze the level of 
involvement of regional party delegates/officers 
at the national level, as it represents one of the 
core factors to frame the functioning of the intra-
party chain of delegation and accountability. The 
observed parties show different values if we con-
sider the left-right axis, while inter-party variance 
is lower within the left-wing and right-wing blocs. 
On the left side of the spectrum (see Tab. 3), both 
the PRC and the PDS-DS, the heirs of the commu-
nist organizational tradition, present tendencies to 
a decrease in the ex officio involvement of regional 
representatives within the organ in charge of the 
selection. While the 1996 statute of the PRC con-
templated the ex officio presence of the Regional 
Secretaries within the Political Committee (score 
2), the last by-law of the party does not provide any 
specific provision (score 5). The case of the PDS-DS 
is more controversial. An ex officio presence within 
the National Council of the PDS was granted, 
without voting rights, to all those Regional Sec-
retaries who were not already (elected) members 
of that organ (score 3). Successively, the DS intro-
duced primary elections opened to party members 
for the SNL: the party thus abdicated the principle 
of intra-party delegatory democracy in favour of a 
direct appeal to the membership, which is a clear 
indicator of a tendency to stratarchy as it is widely 
recognized by literature (score 5). The same applies 
for the PD, whose foundation myth relies on pri-
mary elections opened also to voters (score 5): this 
plebiscitary mechanism weakens the intra-party 
chain of delegation from below.
The post Christian-Democratic parties, the PPI 
and DL, show an identical score of 2, which 
stands for a selection made by a national party 
organ formed partly by regional delegates/officers, 
empowered with voting right. In both cases, the 
National Congress – an organ mostly composed 
by sub-national party delegates – was entitled to 
the selection of the National Leader. 
Parties of the right do not show neither inter- 
nor intra-party variance, in time, as all of them 
receive a score of 2. However, for all these parties a 
clear identification of the leader with single, char-
ismatic personalities emerge during the whole 
period. This is particularly true if we consider Sil-
vio Berlusconi and his undisputed leadership as 
Party President of both FI and the PDL (the party 
born in 2009 after the merger between FI and 
AN); but this de facto plebiscitary tendency char-
acterized also Umberto Bossi’s leadership over the 
LN, at last until the 2012 statute; and, to a lesser 
extent, the presidency of Gianfranco Fini in AN.
Tab.10: Amending Regional Statute
Autonomy PRC 1996 PRC 2011 PDS 1991 DS 2005 PPI 1995 DL 2006 PD 2008 PD 2010
ARS
5 5 2 1 3 5 1 1
LN 1998 LN 2012 AN 1995 AN 2006 FI 1998 FI 2004 PDL 2009 PDL 2011
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Tab 11: Regional Campaigning Strategies
Autonomy PRC 1996 PRC 2011 PDS 1991 DS 2005 PPI 1995 DL 2006 PD 2008 PD 2010
RCS
1 1 1 1 3 3 4 4
LN 1998 LN 2012 AN 1995 AN 2006 FI 1998 FI 2004 PDL 2009 PDL 2011
1 1 4 4 4 4 3 3
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Composition of the National Executive Organ 
(NEO)
The number of regional delegates and officers 
who are granted an ex officio presence within the 
National Executive Organ and who are provided 
with voting rights is a reliable indicator of the rel-
evance of the regional layer of the party (see Tab. 
4). The composition of the National Direction of 
the PRC was not integrated with regional repre-
sentatives (score 5). Also the DS, in 2005, did not 
assign to regional delegates/officers reserved seats 
in the NEO: Regional Secretaries were present in 
the National Direction of the PDS, without vot-
ing right (score 3). This type of organizational set-
ting was set by the 2006 statute of the DL, while 
Regional Secretaries were empowered with the 
voting right in both the PPI and the PD (score 2). 
Among the right-wing parties, only AN did not 
grant the voting right to the Regional Coordina-
tors, who were ex officio members of the organ. In 
the other cases regional secretaries (LN, FI, PDL) 
as well as regional delegates (LN) and elected per-
sonnel (FI) were all provided with the voting right 
(score 2).
Selecting the National Candidates (SNC)
The analysis of the process of selection of candi-
dates to national elections gives us a rather diversi-
fied snapshot of the organizational arrangements 
deemed more effective by the selected parties. 
While intra-party variance is limited, differences 
among parties are significant (see Tab. 5). Both the 
PDS-DS and the PPI-DL have modified, in time, 
their organizational profile toward a more hier-
archical/top-down approach in carrying out this 
crucial function. While the PDS assigned to the 
National Direction the power to approve the lists 
proposed by the Regional Directions, in the 2005 
statute of the DS a specific National Electoral Com-
mission, nominated by the National Direction, 
was responsible for the selection (score 5). Regional 
Coordinators participated with full rights to the 
National Direction of the PPI, the organ in charge 
of SNC: in the statute of DL, each party level was 
responsible for the selection of candidates. The PD 
– the party founded after the merge between the 
DS and the DL – receives a score of 4 as the Coor-
dinamento Nazionale approves the lists proposed 
by the regional level. The same applies also to the 
PRC, as the National Direction analyzes the lists 
formulated by the provincial federations on the 
basis of the proposals advanced by the National 
Committee and the Regional Committees.
Parties of the right do not show significant intra-
party variance in the SNC. The PDL shows the 
most hierarchical profile (score 5), as the National 
President is entitled to choose candidates, after 
consulting the Presidency Bureau: in the 2009 
statute the lists were ratified by the National Coor-
dinators, while in the following by the National 
Secretary. Also in FI the National Presidency was 
the organ provided with the competence of SNC, 
after having consulted the Regional Coordina-
tors (score 4). On the contrary, the involvement of 
the Regional Secretaries and regional representa-
tives is massive for what concerns the LN (score 
2), as the Federal Council is mostly composed by 
regional officers and delegates. In AN the National 
Direction was the selecting organ, thus it is scored 
3 (see above).
Amending National Statutes (ANS)
In all the analyzed parties the organ in charge 
of modifying the national statute is, in general, 
a national deliberative organ (the National Con-
gress for PRC, DS, PPI, FI, PDL; the Federal Con-
gress for the LN; the Federal Assembly for the DL), 
thus an organ elected by the sub-national layers 
of the party and largely composed by sub-national 
delegates (Tab. 6). Only the PDS and AN made 
exception: in both cases, an ex officio presence 
within the competent organs was accorded to the 
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Regional Secretaries who were not already elected 
members, without voting right (Score 3). 
National Campaigning Strategies (NCS)
The definition of the political strategies is a core 
function for all parties: the composition of the 
organ (at least formally) in charge of setting the 
“line” of the organization is a predictor of its hier-
archical/stratarchical tendencies. As the analy-
sis of the statutes shows, the National Executive 
Organ is the organ which defines the NCS: thus 
the scores are the same as those assigned for the 
variable NEO (Tab. 7). The only exception is rep-
resented by the PDL, that shows intra-party vari-
ance (from 2 to 5): the first statute of the party 
empowered the National Direction with the task 
of defining the political strategies, while succes-
sively a monocratic organ (the National Secretary) 
was assigned. 
7. Autonomy
Selecting Regional Leader
The 1996 statute of the PRC foresees that the 
Regional Political Committees (i.e. the largest 
body of the party at the regional level) choose 
the Segretario Regionale. None parliamentarian 
neither any member of the national bodies of the 
party are ex officio members of the Regional Com-
mittees, thus the score assigned to this function is 
1, which reflects the maximum level of autonomy 
of the regional level. This function in completely 
unchanged in the 2011 statute, thus still scored 1 
(Tab. 8).
According to the 1991 statute of the PDS the Seg-
retario Regionale is directly elected by Regional 
Committees, but also the National Direction can 
propose candidatures. Since the National Direc-
tion does not have any decisive role in the final 
decision, its role can be interpreted as a consul-
tative one. Thus, this function is scored 2. In 
2005 the statute gives complete autonomy to the 
Regional Unions of the DS in choosing their own 
statutes and thus their own methods in perform-
ing such a function. This means that any choice in 
this field – i.e. giving or not giving some roles to 
the national level – is an exclusive prerogative of 
the regional party.
The 1995 statute of the PPI states that the Segre-
tario Regionale is elected by the Regional Con-
gress. Moreover it is also foreseen that members 
of the National Council of the party are ex offi-
cio members of the Regional Congress, without 
voting rights. Thus this function is clearly scored 
3. The 2006 statute of the party heir of PPI, the 
DL, indicates that in every region the party must 
adopt a specific statute. However, the national 
party produces a model statute for the regional 
entities. According to this model the Coordinatore 
Regionale is elected by the Regional Congress of 
which however national and European parliamen-
tarians, elected in the region, are ex officio mem-
bers of the Congress (score 4).
In the statute of 2008, the election of the Segre-
tario Regionale of PD is regulated by regional by-
laws, as it is stated by the national statute, but the 
direct election through open primaries is a bind-
ing principle. Thus the regional bodies do not play 
any role in electing their regional leaders and the 
regulation in, in practice, decided by the national 
statute. The value – as explicated above – is 5. The 
same procedures are applied according to the stat-
ute of 2010 and thus the value still is 5. 
The 1998 and 2012 statutes of LN assign to the 
National Congress the prerogative to elect the 
Segretario Nationale. Parliamentarians and the 
Federal Leader of the Party are ex officio member 
of the Congress, and thus the variable receives 
the score 4. The 1998 and 2004 statutes of FI and 
the 1995, indicates that the Regional Leaders are 
directly nominated by the National Leaders. Thus, 
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none role is foreseen for the regional levels and the 
variable scores 5. In 2006 the new statute of AN 
introduces the election of the Coordinatore Regio-
nale by the Regional Assembly. Of this many offi-
cers of the national level party are ex officio mem-
bers (score 4). The new party of the right, the PDL, 
seems to adopt the FI’s organizational scheme, 
rather than the AN’s one, and assigns to the party 
President the power to choose the Regional Coor-
dinator, thus assuming value 5. 
Composition of the Regional Executive Organ 
In Rifondazione Comunista the executive body of 
the regional level is the Segreteria Regionale. This 
is elected by the Regional Political Committee 
and does not have any ex officio members of the 
national level (value 1). Thus the value is 1 both 
for the 1996 and the 2011 statute (Tab. 8). Also the 
PDS and the DS follow the same organizational 
principle and their Direzione Regionale does not 
include ex officio national officers (value 1). 
This is not the same for the PPI and the DL, where 
national parliamentarians, whereas elected in the 
region, are members, without voting rights, of the 
regional executives (score 3). The party originated 
by the merger between DS and DL, the PD, is more 
similar to the DL structure. Indeed, also in the PD 
the parliamentarians are ex officio members of 
the regional directions, but, in this case, with full 
voting rights (score 4). Thus, it can be noted that, 
with respect to this variable, the PD seems to have 
adopted a more centralized approach than those of 
its “founding fathers”. An opposite process seems 
to have characterized the parties of the right. In 
fact, the PDL foresees the presence of parliamen-
tarians within its regional executive organ, as also 
FI and AN were doing. But differently to its pre-
decessors, the PDL does not guarantee any voting 
rights to MPs, thus it scores 3 and AN and FI 4. 
The LN appears to be consistent with its demands 
for autonomy and does not grant any role to the 
national bodies in defining the composition of the 
regional executive (value 1).
Selecting Regional Candidates
The heir parties of the Italian Communist Party 
(PRC and PDS-DS) share the same method in 
choosing their candidates for the regional elec-
tions, which has been unmodified for the whole s.c. 
Second Republic (Tab. 9). The national level does 
not play any role on this function, and the regional 
levels, through their regional committees have the 
monopoly in performing this function (score 1). 
For the post-Christian Democrats parties, the PPI 
assigns to the Regional Committees, which are also 
composed by members of the National Council, 
the role of selecting the candidates. In 2006 the DL 
statute, foresees the establishment by the Regional 
Committee of an ad-hoc Regional Commission 
with the only purpose of determining the candi-
dates. In the first case the score is 3, in the second 1.
According to the 2008 and 2010 statutes of PD, 
the candidates to representative assemblies (as the 
regional ones are) are chosen through open pri-
maries. This method is foreseen by the national 
statute of the party and no role is assigned to 
the regional levels. Thus, comparing the power 
assigned to the national and to the regional level, 
it is clear as it is concentrated only in the national 
bodies of the party, justifying the assignment of 
value 5 for this function.
The parties of the right present a high diachronic 
and synchronic variance, once again showing 
that they do not share the same genetic origins. 
In 1998 in the LN the regional leaders play only 
a consultative role, while the right to select the 
candidates belongs to the Federal Council (value 
4). This completely changes in 2012 when the 
new statute assigns to the Consigli Nazionali - as 
already said above, the regional assemblies of the 
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LN - the power of selecting candidates for the 
regional elections (score 1).
According to the 1995 and 2006 statutes of AN, 
the Regional Coordinators can propose some 
names, but the final lists of names are accepted 
by the Direzione Nazionale, which is composed ex 
officio representative of the regional levels, with-
out voting rights (score 3). 
In Forza Italia the statutes of 1998 and 2004 indi-
cate that the regional candidates are proposed by 
the Regional Coordinators and finally approved 
by the Conference of Regional Coordinators, 
which is a national party body and chaired by the 
President of the Party (value 4). 
In the PDL the procedure of selecting regional can-
didates is differentiated between the majority and 
the proportional portion of the lists. For what con-
cerns the most important part of the lists, i.e. the 
majoritarian portion, the decision is taken by the 
Office of Presidency, which is a national organ, after 
a consultation with regional coordinators (score 4).
Amending Regional Statutes
Few Italian political parties foresee the presence of 
regional statutes. In practice, they are the Partito 
Democratico and its founding parties (Tab. 10). In 
the PDS-DS the every Unione Regionale performs 
an autonomous role in defining its regional stat-
ute, but in in the PDS it was foreseen a consulta-
tive role for the National Direction. In the PPI the 
responsibility of approving the carta regionale is 
to the Regional Committees, to which also mem-
bers of the national council of the party participate 
without voting rights (value 3). In the DL this pre-
rogatives has been shifted from the Regional Com-
mittees to the Federal Assembly, which is clearly a 
national organ of the party. Thus DL scores 5 on 
this variable. In the new centre-left party, the Par-
tito Democratico, the Regional Assemblies (which 
are composed of regional officers) have the power 
to determine the regional statutes (value 1). 
None of the statutes of all the other political par-
ties specifies the presence of regional statutes. Even 
if such a provision is out of our coding scheme we 
can interpret this organizational choice as a mani-
festation of centralization. Thus, in this variable, 
PRC, LN, AN, FI and PDL score 5. 
Regional Campaigning Strategies (RCS)
The definition of the political strategies is a core 
function for all the levels of political parties. For 
all the analyzed political parties this crucial power 
is assigned (at least formally) to the regional execu-
tive organs. Thus, the composition of the organ 
(at least formally) in charge of setting the “line” of 
the organization is a predictor of its hierarchical/
stratarchical tendencies. As the analysis of the stat-
utes shows, the Regional Executive Organs are the 
organs which define the RCS: thus the scores are 
the same as those assigned for the variable REO 
(Tab. 11). This is also a variable without any rele-
vant diachronic variance, since none party changes 
its REO’s composition in the analyzed time-span.
Conclusions
The aim of this contribution was to analyze to what 
extent Italian State-wide parties have followed 
patterns of organizational change towards more 
decentralized party models and/or have experi-
enced significant shifts of intra-organizational 
power in terms of reciprocal autonomy between the 
central (national) and the sub-national (regional) 
level. As Italy – like most European countries – 
has experienced institutional reforms oriented to 
the regionalization of relevant functions and poli-
cies, the “denationalization” of party politics has 
become a crucial research field. The Italian case 
is particularly interesting as the process of insti-
tutional regionalization ran parallel to other rel-
evant changes in institutional regimes and the 
entrance of brand new political parties in the 
political arena, after the collapse of the s.c. First 
Republic. By drawing on a new-institutionalist 
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approach, we tried to verify if and to what extent 
a weakly institutionalized political system has ori-
ented, through isomorphic pressures towards the 
denationalization of party politics, changes in the 
organizational profile of the new parties. Our pur-
pose was to verify empirically – through the cod-
ing of party statutes – whether the most relevant 
Italian parties have modified their formal organi-
zational architecture toward less hierarchical/cen-
tralized settings.
By aggregating the values assigned to the differ-
ent parties analyzed, it is possible to notice which 
variables present the highest level of involvement/
autonomy of the regional level (values closer to 1) 
and those with the lowest level of involvement/
autonomy (values closer to 5). The ideal-typical 
stratarchical party should be scored 5 for the vari-
ables on the involvement dimension and 1 for the 
variables on the autonomy dimension. 
The analysis of the results for both dimensions 
gives us a snapshot of the formal organizational 
profile of the Italian parties that does not fit with 
the hypothesis of stratarchy. 
For what concerns the Involvement of regional 
delegates/officers at the national level, the mean 
value of the variables is 2,86. Table 12 shows that 
the selection of candidates for national elections 
(SNC) is the only variable which presents a value 
in line with the stratarchical model. On the con-
trary, amending the national statutes is the proce-
dure which registers the highest level of involve-
ment of regional level. The other three variables 
assume half-way values.
Tab. 12: Involvement - Mean Values
Involvement MV
SNL 2,81
SNC 3,69
NEO 2,81
ANS 2,19
NCS 2,81
Also the analysis of the variables along the dimen-
sion autonomy seems to not confirm the hypoth-
esis of stratarchy. Three variables out of five pres-
ent values that indicate a strong control of the 
national level on the regional level (Tab. 13). 
Tab. 13: Autonomy – Mean Values
Autonomy MV
SRL 3,69
REO 2,50
SRC 2,81
ARS 3,94
RCS 2,63
However, by analyzing the organizational evolu-
tion of each party considered, some differences 
emerge (Tabs. 14 and 15). In fact, the left-wing 
parties (PRC and PDS-DS) have shown, in time, a 
tendency to stratarchy – by increasing the mutual 
autonomy of the national and the regional levels. 
This tendency is shared also by some right-wing 
and centrist parties (e.g. LN, AN and PPI-DL) but 
the actual values are still far from the expected 
ones. It is also interesting to analyze the similari-
ties/differences between the organizational pro-
files of the PD and the PDL – the parties born after 
the merger of DS and DL and FI and AN respec-
tively – and those of their founders. The PDL pres-
ents an organizational profile in line with those of 
its predecessors, as FI and AN had similar formal 
rules. The organization of the PD is closer to that 
of the DL, even if the new party “inherited” from 
the DS the mechanism of primary elections to 
elect the national leader. 
The variance amongst the organizational profiles 
of Italian political parties is well exemplified by 
the Fig. 1. Parties which have values closer to 5 on 
the Involvement dimension and 1 on the Auton-
omy are those closer to adopt a stratarchical orga-
nizational distribution of power. As it is showed 
by the figure, these are the heirs of the Commu-
nist party (PDS-DS and PRC). Parties which have 
lower values for both the dimensions (i.e. only the 
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Lega Nord) are those which assign more powers 
to the regional levels and thus are the most decen-
tralized parties. On the contrary, parties which 
have values higher than 3 in both the dimensions 
– only PDL 2011 – are those which do not assign 
a relevant weight to regional parties and thus are 
the most centralized ones. The vast majority of 
the Italian parties (the centre-left PD and PPI-DL 
and the right-wing FI and AN) grant low degrees 
of autonomy to their regional branches but foresee 
high degrees of involvement of regional officers/
delegates in the national organs or in performing 
the national functions. This fourth type of parties is 
the one which consents higher levels of cooperation 
between the national and the regional levels and 
can be thus interpreted as most integrated party. 
In conclusion, Italian political parties have been 
only partially influenced, at least in their formal 
organizational profiles, by changes occurred at the 
institutional level: only the heirs of the commu-
nist tradition have proved more incline to adapt 
their organizations to the process of denational-
ization of party politics. With the exception of 
Tab 14: Left parties - Mean Values
PRC 1996 PRC 2011 PDS 1991 DS 2005 PPI 1995 DL 2006 PD 2008 PD 2010
Involvement 3,4 4 3 3,8 2 3 3 3
Autonomy 1,8 1,8 1,4 1 3 3,2 3,8 3,8
Tab. 15: Right parties - Mean Values
LN 1998 LN 2012 AN 1995 AN 2006 FI 1998 FI 2004 PDL 2009 PDL 2011
Involvement 2 2 2,8 2,8 2,4 2,4 2,6 3,2
Autonomy 3 2,4 4,2 3,6 4,4 4,4 4 4
Graph. 1: Positioning of Italian Parties along the Involvement/Autonomy Dimensions
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the LN (coherently with its declared federal pro-
file), the other parties, albeit recently founded and 
institutionally weak, have adopted organizational 
strategies in line with their predecessors (AN and 
PPI) or, in any case, oriented to top-down institu-
tionalization strategies (FI, PDL, DL, PD).
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Introduction 
Strong in US and western Europe, research on 
the role of macroeconomic parameters as deter-
minants of vote choice and the success of incum-
bents post-communist countries remains incon-
clusive and contradictory. Particularly, economic 
voting in the nations of the Western Balkans 
has been the subject of very few academic stud-
ies, with .almost no comparative research on the 
effects of macroeconomics on vote choice. There-
fore, in this paper, I examine economic voting in 
the former Yugoslav countries of Slovenia, Croa-
tia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, 
Macedonia and Kosovo. Through an analysis of 
aggregate level data from the period of the fall of 
communism and breakup of Yugoslavia until the 
most recent elections, I will test the basic postu-
lates of the economic voting theory for a new set of 
countries, investigating the role of the macroeco-
nomic parameters in explaining the incumbents 
vote share. 
Despite similar historical developments, the coun-
tries of the former Yugoslavia have experienced 
different trends of economic development and 
transition processes. While Slovenia has shown 
significant economic progress, which resulted in 
EU integration and engagement in the European 
Monetary Union (Crnigoj 2007), other countries, 
such as Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Macedonia, have very high unemployment and 
low GNP growth. Consequently, this paper exam-
ines how economy shapes electoral behavior of 
citizens of these seven countries of former Yugo-
slavia. Macroeconomic parameters ostensibly 
influence electoral processes in these countries as 
with other post-communist countries of Eastern 
Europe, however the specific severe consequences 
of the breakup of Yugoslavia and the bloodshed 
in the early phase and cooperation with ICTY 
(International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia) as a consequence of the war in the 
later stage might also have exerted a very strong 
explanatory effect on voter decisions. The numer-
ous inter-ethnic conflicts and inter-related com-
plex and still on-going process of state formation 
in this region continues to strongly shape domes-
tic political scenes and the influence of the econ-
omy as a determinant of vote choice.
The economy, as I will show below as considered 
by scholars, has been a determinant of vote choice 
in post-communist countries. However, the find-
ings differ and are often controversial, so there-
fore the effect of the economy on the electoral suc-
cess of incumbents is not as clear when compared 
with the findings for established democracies. As 
a result and in line with similar post-communist 
backgrounds, the role of the economy should be 
limited to explaining voting behavior in Western 
Balkan countries. Moreover, the rise of national-
ism leading to a civil war and ethnic conflicts and 
the strong transnational pressure through differ-
ent forms and tools have also strongly influenced 
voter preferences and have thus shaped party 
behavior. Hence, constructing a general model 
that predicts voting behavior in these seven coun-
tries is a demanding and adventurous task because 
it is a dynamic period of more than twenty years 
including the breakup of the federation, ethnic 
conflicts, the rise of new states, disputes among 
neighbors and strong transnational influence.
The paper is organized into six sections. The fol-
lowing section offers a theoretical explanation 
of the main postulates of economic voting and 
empirical evidence of the role of macroeconomic 
parameters on the vote share of incumbents in 
post-communist countries. Additionally, this sec-
tion presents specific characteristics of the West-
ern Balkan countries and their role as explanatory 
variables of vote share. In the fourth section, I will 
present my research question and hypotheses, 
then discuss the dataset and statistical model that 
I am testing and its variables in section five. The 
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ies have shown that poor economic performance 
does not hurt the fortunes of incumbent govern-
ments (Lewis-Beck, 1988; Paldam, 1991; Przewor-
ski and Cheibub, 1999; Wilkin et al., 1997). Using 
both micro- and macro- level data from eleven 
newly established democracies in East Central 
Europe, Tverdova (2007) also finds that national 
economic perceptions are disconnected from the 
objective economic reality, instead mostly driven 
by personal economic evaluations and political 
attitudes or “retrospective and prospective” eco-
nomic voting.
In another study examining 34 elections in ten 
Central and Eastern European countries, Roberts 
(2008) identifies a phenomenon that he refers to 
as hyperaccountability. Accordingly, voters hold 
incumbents accountable for economic perfor-
mance, particularly for unemployment, although 
distinguishing between large and small losses 
rather than vote losses and gains. This result is 
significant in several respects considering other 
studies. Governments that preside over high 
unemployment rates lose votes, all else equal, and 
the effect is substantively large. The result may 
partly placate the fears of many observers that 
these new democracies are of ‘‘low quality’’. Vot-
ers seemingly are quite capable of holding poli-
ticians accountable for economic performance 
early in the transition (Roberts 2008). However, 
the hyperaccountability effect might negatively 
influence government performance and efforts to 
be accountable because no matter what, it will be 
punished by the voters. This might be one of the 
explanations for the high level of corruption in the 
region (Krastev 2004, Grzymala-Busse 2003).
Contrary to the hyperaccountability hypothesis, 
the reward-punishment hypothesis contends 
that voters evaluate government performance on 
major economic indicators, such as inﬂation or 
unemployment, and reward or punish the incum-
bent based on the ability to maintain these mac-
main findings of my analysis and interpretation of 
the results are presented in section six. The chap-
ter ends with some concluding remarks on the 
results and a discussion of methodological issues.
Theoretical background
Economic Voting in post-communist countries
Numerous research has shown that voters con-
sider governments accountable when deciding 
to reward or punish the parties in power at elec-
tions. Electoral accountability is typically equated 
with retrospective economic voting. Voters pun-
ish incumbents when the economy is doing poorly 
and reward them when the economy is doing well. 
Although not the only measure of government per-
formance in ofﬁce, the economy is highly salient to 
most voters (Roberts 2008). Retrospective voting 
and economic accountability have been understud-
ied for countries of the Western Balkans. There is 
a lack of comparative research on the influence of 
macroeconomics on the vote share of incumbents, 
and, furthermore, only sporadic research includes 
economic determinants correlated with vote choice 
at certain elections in a Western Balkan country. 
Therefore, the theoretical expectations for this 
paper are derived from research conducted on eco-
nomic voting in the post-communist countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe.
However, findings contradict strong expectations, 
with Harper (2000) concluding that economic fac-
tors had at best a modest effect on party choice 
in some post-communist countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Analyzing early elections in three 
post-communist countries, including Bulgaria, 
Lithuania and Hungary, Harper (2000) claims 
that the return to parliamentary power of ex-com-
munist parties in these societies was not simply a 
function of economic voting. Vote shares for gov-
ernments do not respond in the expected ways to 
standard economic indicators. A number of stud-
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roeconomic indicators at desirable levels (Sanders, 
2000). In other words, the government is account-
able for economic policymaking. However, this 
reward and punishment is not symmetrical. One 
exception to the above mentioned hypothesis 
comes from what is know in the literature of eco-
nomic voting as “grievance asymmetry”, a psycho-
logical mechanism whereby people appreciate an 
improvement in the economy less than they dis-
like the corresponding deterioration (Nezi 2012). 
Pioneering findings on the “grievance asymme-
try” hypothesis show that unemployment growth 
is one of these asymmetric determinants of eco-
nomic voting (Mueller 1970).
Another problem with the reward – punishment 
hypothesis, especially characteristic for post-com-
munist countries of the Western Balkans with 
party pluralism and electoral volatility, is that it 
is much more difﬁcult for voters to assign respon-
sibility to the government in some systems than 
in others, with Anderson (2000) writing that “the 
Responsibility Hypothesis is “perfectly” suited to 
explain economic voting in two party-systems 
where the government is the one with the major-
ity, but once there are minority governments 
with shifting coalitions, responsibility is illu-
sive.” Although Anderson (2000) explores several 
closely related theories using vote intention data 
from thirteen Western European democracies, 
the limitation of the reward-punishment hypoth-
esis is very clear for Western Balkan countries too.
Economic parameters do not equally affect parties 
from different ideological families. Party affili-
ation has an important role in economic voting, 
and consequently parties with different ideologi-
cal positions face different consequences. This is 
a result of the different preferences of voters and 
the strength of their party identification. In post-
communist countries, the nature of political par-
ties, their ideological positions and relationship 
with the communist regime are factors considered 
by scholars as influencing vote choice. In one such 
study using an original data set of regional level 
economic, demographic, and electoral variables 
across twenty national presidential and parlia-
mentary elections from Russia, Poland, Hungary, 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic, Tucker (2006) 
demonstrates that there is substantially stronger 
empirical evidence for the Transition Model that 
predicts that New Regime parties will perform 
better in areas of the country where the economy 
is stronger and Old Regime parties will perform 
better where the economy is weaker. Moreover, 
Tucker (2006) shows that the effect of the economy 
on Incumbent parties is largely conditional on 
their status as New Regime parties, Old Regime 
parties, or neither type of party.
Previous research on economic determinants 
of vote share in Western Balkan countries show 
that determinants other than the economy drive 
voting behavior. Drawing upon survey data from 
the 2007 elections, Henjak (2007) argues that eco-
nomic issues, notably the division between transi-
tional winners and losers, do not play an impor-
tant role in determining support for the two main 
political parties in Croatia. Henjak (2007) also 
shows that voter opinions on economic issues are 
more salient in recent elections and political party 
affiliations most structure voter evaluations of 
economic conditions. However, economic issues 
are less relevant in structuring voting behavior in 
Croatia than issues related to culture and history, 
and unless a major realignment takes place, party 
statements will largely condition supporter evalu-
ations of economic issues (Henjak 2007).
Examining the basis of political divisions in Mace-
donia, Panov and Taleski (2013) similarly find that 
economic perceptions and socio-economic status 
do not shape the political divisions among voters 
in the Republic of Macedonia. Perception of the 
communist past and consequently the percep-
tion of the economy during communism is the 
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strongest explanatory factor of the determinants 
of political divisions in Macedonia. Voters that per-
ceive the communist past positively and believe that 
there was higher economic performance during 
that period are more likely to support the left, while 
voters with strong opposite views of the communist 
past and economy tend to support the right. The 
economy tested through different socio-economic 
statuses and economic preferences has a very lim-
ited effect on political divisions in Macedonia.
The “Balkan powder keg” and the influence of 
wars on vote choice
Analyzing determinants of electoral behavior in 
countries of former Yugoslavia should take into 
account the specific circumstances caused by the 
breakup of Yugoslavia and the biggest and most 
tragic bloodshed in Europe since the Second 
World War. In this sense, determinants influenc-
ing vote choice in the Balkan “powder keg” might 
significantly differ when compared with the influ-
ence of the economic parameters in post-commu-
nist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. “The 
Yugoslav loose federation, built with the predomi-
nate concern to promote -brotherhood and unity- 
of the post-war Yugoslavia (Cviic, 1995: 823) failed 
to resolve economic problems and political antag-
onisms polarized around national issues. The cri-
sis came to a head after the Cold War when Yugo-
slavia lost much of its geopolitical importance to 
the United States. In a process of dissolution, the 
independent states of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Macedonia were created” 
(Delevic 1998). Hence, the breakup of Yugoslavia, 
the wars and consequences of these wars should 
seriously be considered when analyzing voter and 
party behavior. Hibbs Jr (2000) claims that the 
best predictor of electoral outcomes in the US is a 
model that incorporates basic economic parame-
ters combined with cumulative numbers of Amer-
ican military personnel killed in action. Hibbs’ 
“bread and peace” basically combines the effect of 
the economy and wars on vote share, which effec-
tively corresponds with the situation in Western 
Balkan countries and the consequences of the 
civil war and ethnic conflicts. “Previous stud-
ies of domestic aspects of the American military 
involvement in Korea and Vietnam deliver two 
conclusions that guided Hibbs’ investigation of war 
effects on presidential voting outcomes: (i) Declin-
ing political support for the wars per se, as well as 
war-induced deterioration of presidential approval 
ratings in the polls, are best explained by cumula-
tive growth of American casualties, particularly 
cumulative numbers of American military person-
nel killed-in-action, and (ii) The political costs were 
born primarily by the party initiating American 
participation (the “war party”; in both cases the 
Democrats)”(HIbbs 2000). The findings of the anal-
ysis of Hibbs are consistent with these conclusions. 
The vote losses associated with conflicts in Korea 
and Vietnam are best tracked by the cumulative 
numbers of American military personnel killed-in-
action (CUM KIA) during each four-year term pre-
ceding the elections of 1952, 1964, 1968 and 1976 
(Hibbs Jr. 2000).
Nevertheless, the military situation for all cases 
of war in Western Balkan countries significantly 
differ from the case of the US and consequently 
it is unclear whether the “Bread and Piece” model 
would have the same influence and predictive 
power for Western Balkan countries. Moreover, 
it is expected that the war and its consequences 
will significantly influence the vote share and that 
the economy is pretty much limited as a determi-
nant of the electoral success of incumbents. Addi-
tionally, the economy during such a time period 
is at the service of the war needs. The case of the 
Western Balkan countries confirms this to a great 
extent and it is particularly clear in the case of Ser-
bia in the early nineties for the economy.
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Political context and International pressure as 
determinants of vote choice in Western Balkan 
countries
With the escalation of the conflict in the early 
1990s as a result of rising nationalism, the role of 
international actors has significantly increased. 
While seeking to encourage stabilization, integra-
tion and peace building, the intervention of inter-
national organizations had different outcomes and 
and thus different consequences on vote choice. 
Also tools utilized by international actors during 
the constant presence and influence on domestic 
political processes in the last twenty years have 
differed across countries and time.
Given the significant percentage of the Serbian 
population in Croatia and Bosnia (12% and 33% 
respectively) as well as Milosevic’s rise to power 
based on Serbian nationalism, the outbreak of 
the war was seemingly unavoidable. Nationalism 
proved to be winning card in the newly indepen-
dent states as well. In such a setting, sanctions 
were a tool for stopping the war by containing the 
pan-Serbian policy of Milosevic (Delevic 1998).
However, Delevic (1998) contends that while the 
sanctions, aided to a great extent by pre-existing 
economic difficulties and macroeconomic mis-
management, had a devastating effect on the 
Yugoslav economy, thus helping make Serbian 
President Milosevic more cooperative, they were 
of no decisive importance for stopping the war 
in Bosnia. From data initially available, Yugosla-
via experienced hyperinflation, with its peak of 
313,000,000% in January 1994 (Hanke and Krus 
2012). Because the BH dinar and the RS dinar 
were both initially pegged to the Yugoslav dinar, 
and based on the available annual inflation data, 
scholars know that the Republika Srpska and Bos-
nia and Herzegovina experienced hyperinflation 
with its highest peak of 322% in June 1992 (Brown 
et al., 1996). Croatia also experienced high rates of 
inflation, but did not reach the level of hyperinfla-
tion of Yugoslavia (CNB, 2012). “Moreover, pov-
erty, which increased as a result of the sanctions, 
made people more receptive to authoritarian and 
totalitarian regimes, making democratization 
ever more difficult to achieve” (Delevic 1998). 
Hence, the presence of the international factor 
as a condition of the pre-existence of dangerous 
nationalism and media control have been used 
as a tool by parties in power to increase support 
and justify policies for the protection of their own 
people. The notion of “us against them” and the 
presentation of the foreign factor as an actor sup-
porting the others and trying “to take a part of 
us” is present from the beginning until the most 
recent developments. Even after the end of the 
war, the international factor has played a crucial 
role regarding the cooperation of the countries 
involved in the war in Bosnia with the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
This issue, as a consequence of the war, has shaped 
or still shapes political behavior in Serbia, Croatia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and has been one of 
the main sources of the resurrection or continua-
tion of nationalism. The European Union, in this 
sense, using conditionality, has played the most 
important role as an international factor influenc-
ing domestic political processes and consequently 
vote choice.
Even in countries that did not participate in 
the bloodshed in Bosnia and have transitioned 
through a peaceful transformation in the early 
nineties, such as Macedonia, international fac-
tors have still played an important role in resolv-
ing subsequent disputes between neighboring 
countries and inter-ethnic conflict in 2001. For 
example, the dispute between Greece and Mace-
donia concerning the official name of the latter 
during membership talks for NATO in 2008 led 
to a rise in nationalist sentiments and blame shift-
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ing problems,including the economic situation, to 
the other country.
The mechanism of influence of the international 
factor and presence of international pressure, 
thus, is complex and interdependent on the char-
acter of the parties in power and the outcome of 
the pressure. Whether parties share nationalistic 
political views and the outcome of the pressure 
includes the acceptance of international positions 
and compromising influences whether the effect 
of international pressure is positive or negative on 
the vote share for incumbent parties or coalitions.
Research question and 
Hypotheses
The main aim of this paper is to investigate the 
relationship between retrospective economic vot-
ing and the incumbent vote share in post-commu-
nist countries of the Western Balkans. As I have 
mentioned above, there is lack of empirical evi-
dence regarding the influence of the economy on 
vote choice in Western Balkan countries, although 
the experience of other post-communist countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe have shown mixed 
findings. While Anderson et al. (2003) and Duch 
(2001) find evidence of economic voting in Hun-
gary in 1994 and 1998, Duch (1995) concludes that 
economic difﬁculties reduce support for govern-
ments in four countries and Przeworski (1996) 
shows that government popularity varies with 
the unemployment rate in Poland, Harper (2000) 
contends that there is only a modest effect of the 
economy on voting and Henjak (2007) did not 
find an influence of economic determinants on 
vote choice in Croatia. Hence, the first hypothesis 
to be tested in this paper is:
H1 The economy has a limited influence on 
incumbent vote share
Previous research on established democracies 
or the post-communist countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe also shows that there is a varia-
tion of the influence of different macroeconomic 
parameters on vote choice. GDP annual growth 
percentage, inflation rates and employment rate 
changes are the most frequently considered deter-
minants of economic voting. The influence of 
unemployment change has been widely identified 
in various environments as a strong explanatory 
factor of voting (Przeworski 1995, Roberts 2008) 
and I expect that unemployment growth will 
also negatively influence incumbent vote share 
in the countries of the Western Balkans. While 
my expectations about the influence of inflation 
rates is very modest, the percentage of foreign 
investments should be considered as a possible 
explanatory factor of vote choice in Western Bal-
kan countries. Foreign investment, according to 
Henjak (2007), is one of the most important eco-
nomic strategies of almost every government in 
these countries therefore necessitates inclusion in 
testing . 
H2 The higher the percentage of unemployment 
growth, the lower the vote share of incumbent 
parties
Taking into account specific circumstances in 
Western Balkan countries, I also consider the 
consequences of the war and subsequent inter-
national pressure as determinants of vote choice. 
Following the Hibbs (2000) approach, I will also 
test whether the number of civil war causalities 
influences the vote share of incumbents. Taking 
into account that most of the victims in the wars 
emanate from Bosnia, it is expected that this vari-
able has specific importance for voting behavior 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As previously men-
tioned, the direction of the effect of the transna-
tional pressure is more difficult to identify.
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H3 The number of human causalities during the 
wars negatively influences incumbent vote share
Building on the arguments of Tucker (2006) in 
post-communist countries that the main con-
ditional economic voting effects distinguish 
between old and new regime parties, or parties 
connected with the former communist regime 
versus those associated with the opposition to 
communism similarly to Roberts (2008), I will 
also test the influence of party origin on vote 
share. According to Tucker (2006), new regime 
parties should do better when circumstances are 
positive and less well when they are negative, since 
voters may associate these parties and hold them 
responsible for the changes during the transi-
tion. “If these changes are successful, the parties 
are rewarded; if not, they are punished. Standard 
retrospective voting thus applies to these parties, 
though unusually without regard to incumbency. 
Old regime parties should be treated in the reverse 
way” (Roberts 2008).
H4: Improved economic conditions will increase 
the vote share for new regime incumbent parties 
and decrease the vote share for old regime par-
ties
Finally, taking into account the influence of the 
economic and financial crisis on the economies 
throughout the world, I will test whether the crisis 
has caused voters to use retrospective economic 
voting when voting in Western Balkan countries. 
This idea is in line with the claims of Duch (2001) 
that voters become aware of economic conditions 
only later in the transition, and by that time, eco-
nomic parameters become stronger predictors of 
vote share. In the case of Western Balkan coun-
tries, these expectations should be even stronger 
taking into account the specific history, includ-
ing the breakup of Yugoslavia and bloodshed in 
the nineties. It is expected that the economy more 
influences vote share in the later phase of the tran-
sition than in the dynamic and turbulent early 
phase of the nineties. Roberts (2008) has also finds 
similar results on the ground in ten post-commu-
nist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, so 
testing the same hypothesis in Western Balkan 
countries could shed additional light on the claim 
that time is an important indicator of economic 
voting. While the analysis of Roberts (2008)
included electoral cycles until 2006, this research 
goes further by taking into account the effect of 
the most recent global crisis on economic voting.
H5 The influence of economic parameters will 
be stronger during than before the most recent 
global economic and financial crisis
Data and methodology
Even after more than twenty years of democratic 
elections in countries of the Western Balkans, data 
remains a serious obstacle in conducting research 
on economic voting. While there is already a suf-
ficient number of electoral cycles in the seven coun-
tries, the reliability of the economic data remains 
a serious problem. Accordingly, data is missing 
for the early stage of democracy in the nineties, so 
therefore the ﬁrst elections in each country after the 
fall of communism are not included in the dataset. 
Furthermore, the incumbent communist party 
received nearly 100% of the vote in previous elec-
tions held in uncontested circumstances, so only 
pluralistic and democratic and free elections are 
included in the analysis. While, electoral fraud and 
irregularities have hampered democratic legiti-
macy, the elections included in the sample satisfy 
the minimum criteria for free and fair elections. 
Different sources have been utilized to construct 
the dataset. Electoral data is from the Parties and 
Elections Project, a comprehensive database on 
parliamentary elections in European countries 
and autonomous subdivisions since 1945, includ-
ing Western Balkan countries since 1990, and 
additional information on the political parties, 
Elections in Europe in Times of Crisis                                   CONTENTS á65
political leaders, composition of governments and 
electoral laws. For a robustness check, the results 
are compared and upgraded with official electoral 
results from state electoral commissions.
World Bank data and early stage data from domes-
tic official sources constitute the economic data 
for this analysis. As I have previously mentioned, 
despite the additional effort to collect information 
for inflation rates or unemployment data from the 
early nineties, there are few elections for which this 
data is not provided in the dataset. The data about 
war victims has been collected via the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and International 
Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) Conflict 
Dataset and World Bank information about vic-
tims in the wars.
The dataset consists of vote shares at each pair of 
elections for the incumbent parties represented 
in parliament in these countries. The analysis is 
focused on parliamentary elections because all of 
these countries are parliamentary democracies. 
While direct presidential elections are held in 
most of the countries expect Kosovo, parliamen-
tary governments have executive branch power. 
Already discussed, party pluralism and electoral 
volatility characterize the communist countries of 
the Western Balkan, with a majority of the gov-
ernments in the all countries during these twenty 
years of democratic elections having been coali-
tion governments. Therefore, it is more difﬁcult to 
assign responsibility to the government in some 
systems than in others because “The Responsi-
bility Hypothesis is “perfectly” suited to explain 
economic voting in two party-systems where the 
government is the one with the majority, and once 
there are minority governments with shifting 
coalitions, responsibility is illusive” (Anderson 
2000), thus also complicating the data collection 
process. For the purposes of this paper, incumbent 
vote share is calculated as a cumulative vote share 
of all parties included in the government. The ide-
ological position of the government or its connec-
tion with the old regime has been identified on the 
basis of the position of the biggest political party 
on the political spectrum which holds the post of 
the Prime Minister in most cases although with 
some exceptions, The effective number of parties 
has been calculated using the formula offered by 
Laakso and Taagapera (1979). 
Cognizant that voters are myopic and capable of 
focusing only on the most recent economic devel-
opments (Bartels 2008), I am using the economic 
information only for the last year of the electoral 
term. The variables that include change are opera-
tionalized by subtracting the rates of the specific 
economic parameters for all years of current and 
previous electoral cycle. International Pressure is 
coded as a dummy variable providing informa-
tion on whether there was or was not international 
pressure. Various actions, such as sanctions, EU 
conditionality, ICTY cooperation pressure or 
vetoes of NATO membership have been consid-
ered as form of international pressure.
The dependent variable is the vote share of incum-
bent parties, and, bearing in mind that it is a con-
tinuous variable, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
will be used to test theoretical claims I explained 
before. In order to test all offered hypotheses, dif-
ferent models will be examined for different data 
subsets.
Empirical findings and discus-
sion of results
The main economic parameters, such as GDP 
growth, inflation and change of unemployment 
rates, have been most frequently taken as deter-
minants of economic voting, while I additionally 
include the percentage of foreign investments and 
Consumers Price Index (CPI). I consider these two 
economic variables important for Western Balkan 
countries because (i) attracting foreign invest-
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ments is one of the most important economic 
strategies of almost every government in these 
countries and (ii) CPI defined as “a measure of 
the average change over time in the prices paid by 
urban consumers for a market basket of consumer 
goods and services” sufficiently captures the eco-
nomic capacities of ordinary citizens. Since, to the 
best of my knowledge, there is a lack of compa-
rable quarterly data for all of the countries, which 
would have allowed me to examine the months 
immediately preceding each election, only annual 
data is available, so for each country, I use values 
from the year of the election if the election was 
held in the second half of the year and values from 
the previous year if the election was held in the 
ﬁrst half of the year. Model 1 in Table 1 includes 
only these economic variables plus the vote share 
from the previous elections for incumbent parties. 
Results show that the model with only economic 
variables fits well in explaining almost half of the 
variation of the incumbent vote share. While tak-
ing into account the reasonably small number of 
observations, statistical significance should not be 
interpreted with special attention, still Unemploy-
ment change and Consumers Price Index are the 
only variables which are statistically significant. 
This is not surprising, since a change of unemploy-
ment rates has been identified by numerous pre-
vious research as one of the strongest indicators 
of economic voting in post-communist countries 
and in general (Przeworski (1995), Roberts 2008, 
Lewis –Beck & Nadeau 2012). Even further, the 
strongest evidence in favor of the grievance asym-
metry hypothesis has been based on unemploy-
ment growth (Mueller 1970). Therefore, its effect 
on electoral outcome has been confirmed even 
on the ground in countries from former Yugosla-
via. Nevertheless, comparing with the finding of 
Roberts (2008) for post-communist countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe, the effect of unem-
ployment is not even closely as strong as in the 
Western Balkans. Moreover, we do not observe 
Table 1 Economic Voting in Western Balkan Countries 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Previous Vote  0.21(0.16) 0.02(0.17) -0.05(0.18)
GDP Growth  0.34(0.63) 0.11(0.50) -0.17(0.51)
Unemployment -0.50**(0.24) -0.86**(0.30) -0.90**(0.32)
Inflation -0.05(0.07) 0.02(0.35) 0.04(0.35)
Consumer Price Index  0.14**(0.06) 0.12**(0.05) 0.11*(0.06)
Foreign Investments  -0.17(023) 0.24(0.32) 0.24(0.31)
International Pressure -0.50(3.9) 1.47(4.3)
Government’s ideology -1.9(1.9) -5.4(4.5)
Government’s Stability -3.9(4.8) -2.47(1.9)
Effective Number of Parties  3.2**(1.5) 3.0*(1.5)
Civil War Losses -0.16*(0.08)
Constant 19.03** 17.9* 26.2**
N 27 27 27
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.72 0.75
*** p< 0.001, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (Robust St. Errors)
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the hyperaccountability effect in Western Balkan 
countries. The change of unemployment rates 
influences voters to hold governments account-
able for their economic performance, but do not 
even closely negatively affect governments as in 
the case with CEE countries (Roberts 2008). The 
other statistically significant variable is Consumer 
Price Index. Taking into account the changes that 
citizens in these countries have faced during the 
last more than twenty years, it is not surprising 
that this variable together with unemployment 
rates influence the vote choice of citizens. CPI as 
Table 2 Economic Voting and the effects of old regime and new regime parties
Model 4 Model 5 
New Regime Party Old Regime Party
Previous Vote -0.05(0.26) 0.18(0.03)
GDP Growth 0.83(0.87) 0.71*(0.08)
Unemployment -1.00**(0.38) -0.27*(0.03)
Inflation -0.52(0.56) 1.28**(0.13)
Consumer Price Index 0.17(0.17) 0.17**(0.06)
Government’s Stability -3.17(8.3) -8.19(1.32) 
Effective Number of Parties  3.8(2.5) -1.27(0.39)
Constant 8.15 23.7**
N 16 11
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.92
*** p< 0.001, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (Robust St. Errors)
Table 3 Economic Voting and the effects of Economic Crisis
Model 6 Model 7 
Before the Crisis 2008 After the Crisis 2008
Previous Vote -0.21(0.26) 0.10(0.51)
GDP Growth 1.16(2.15) -0.02(0.98)
Unemployment -1.38**(0.37) -0.98(0.79)
Inflation 0.31(0.68) -1.87(1.24)
Consumer Price Index 0.03(0.09) 0.20**(0.03)
Government’s Stability 0.62 (7.01) -7.14(7.74) 
Effective Number of Parties  5.9**(2.6) 1.2(2.3)
Constant  9.4 19.67
N  16 11
Adjusted R2    0.76 0.87
*** p< 0.001, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (Robust St. Errors)
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a measurement expresses the economic capac-
ity of the citizens more closely than inflation, for 
instance, and these findings show that personal 
economic interests and capacities influence vot-
ers when making the decision to hold the govern-
ment accountable for the economic situation in 
their country. As I mentioned, inflation effects on 
vote share are statistically insignificant and abso-
lutely minor. Having taken into consideration the 
special circumstances of the countries and not 
only hyperinflation in Serbia, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina and Montenegro in the early nineties 
and high inflation in Croatia because of the war, 
voters did not punish governments for their bad 
performance in this aspect. Lately, inflation rates 
are more stable, but also do not drive voter behav-
ior. Surprisingly, the level of foreign investments 
does not play any role in influencing incumbent 
vote share. This goes against the strong empha-
sis of governments on this economic parameter. 
However, on the other side, voters do not directly 
feel the effect of foreign investments on their own 
pocket and this most probably therefore dimin-
ishes the effect on voting decisions. The same logic 
applies when explaining the lack of effect of GDP 
growth on vote choice.
Political variables are also included in Model 2 
in addition to economic ones. The effective num-
ber of parties, stability and ideological position of 
governments, and the presence of international 
pressure importantly contribute to the explana-
tory power of the model. The model explains 72 
% of the variance of the incumbent vote share. We 
observe, once again, the same trends with the eco-
nomic determinants. Moreover, the coefficient for 
employment change is bigger than in the previ-
ous model. The effective number of political par-
ties seems to play an important role in explaining 
incumbent vote share, or is statistically significant 
and the coefficient is strong. Although statistically 
insignificant, government stability and ideological 
position are substantially important. Results show 
strong evidence that the instability of governmen-
tal coalitions is one of the reasons for citizens to 
punish parties. Regarding ideology, results show 
that voters are more eager to punish left-wing 
than right-wing governments, something eas-
ily explained as related to the rise of nationalism 
more closely associated with right-wing govern-
ments in these countries. International pressure is 
apparently not a factor influencing vote share, but 
this can be, to a great extent, the result of the poor 
operationalization of the variable. 
Finally, Model 3 includes the number of victims 
during civil wars and conflicts to test H3 deal-
ing with the influence of armed conflicts on vote 
share in Western Balkan countries. Results show 
clear patterns, as voters punish governments for 
every causality during the wars and conflicts. This 
is an important finding considering that each of 
the seven countries in the Western Balkans in one 
way or another has been involved in armed con-
flicts and bloodshed with casualties. 
Building on the argument of Tucker (2006) that 
the effect of the economy on Incumbent parties is 
largely conditional on their status as New Regime 
or Old Regime parties, empirically confirmed with 
a regional dataset on five post-communist countries 
and additionally by Roberts (2008) for 34 elections 
in ten post-communist countries, Table 2 shows the 
results of models 4 and 5 testing this hypothesis for 
the seven post-communist ex-Yugoslav countries. I 
have limited the number of independent variables 
only to the main economic parameters and the 
most important political variables.
While I am very careful to substantially inter-
pret these results because of the very small sub-
samples especially problematic in the case of the 
old regime party governments, we can still iden-
tify some interesting and controversial findings. It 
seems that citizens indeed hold old regime parties 
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more accountable, findings in line with Tucker 
(2006) and Roberts (2008). Surprisingly, all eco-
nomic parameters are statistically significant and 
influence the vote share for old regime parties, 
while both political parameters are statistically 
insignificant. Nevertheless, comparing with the 
results for new regime parties, the coefficient for 
change of unemployment rates in the subsample 
with new regime party governments is substan-
tially higher and statistically significant. This 
indicates that while other factors shape the vote of 
the incumbents for old regime party governments, 
the strongest indicator of economic voting for the 
entire sample has almost a four times higher coef-
ficient for new regime party governments. 
At the end, the financial and economic crisis has 
shook the entire world, with most of the countries 
around the globe affected by the devastating con-
sequences. Parties in power face serious conse-
quences in neighboring countries strongly hit by 
the crisis, such as Greece and Italy, (Nezi 2012). 
Additionally, building on claims by Duch (2001) 
that “voters become aware of the economic condi-
tions only later in the transition and that by time 
economic parameters become stronger predictors 
of vote share”, Table 3 shows the results of the tests 
on H5 concerning the effects and timing of the 
crisis on incumbent vote share.
The results, which once again should be inter-
preted with reservations because of the small sub-
samples, do not show strong evidence in favor of 
the hypothesis about the effect of the economic 
crisis on voting. While, indeed the explanatory 
power of Model 7 concerning elections in times 
of crisis is stronger, only the CPI is statistically 
significant, with the change of unemployment 
rates having a smaller coefficient and being insig-
nificant. Actually, no other variable except CPI is 
statistically significant. The results for elections 
before the crisis are also not encouraging since 
only the unemployment rate and effective num-
ber of parties are strong indicators of vote choice 
during this period. There are several explanations 
as to why there is no evidence of support for the 
claims of the effect of time and crisis on economic 
voting. Most of the countries in the sample, with 
exception of Slovenia and to some extent Croa-
tia, faced serious economic problems concerning 
levels of macroeconomic parameters even before 
the crisis. The unemployment rates have been con-
sistently high and above 30% in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia and lower, but 
still considerably high in Serbia and Montenegro. 
Serbia faces constant higher rates of inflation of 
their currency and foreign debt has been increas-
ing in all countries during last twenty years of the 
transition (Delevic 2009). Therefore, the economic 
and financial crisis did not directly cause such 
devastating consequences because the economies 
of these countries were already in a poorer state. 
Secondly, domestic problems leading to the rise 
of populism and nationalistic feelings, such as 
current developments with the independence of 
Kosovo, the separation of Montenegro from Ser-
bia, the veto by Greece of Macedonia membership 
to NATO because of the name dispute, and con-
stant ethnic tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
could also strongly influence vote choice. Thirdly, 
the high level of corruption could also be a possi-
ble explanation for electoral outcomes. In general, 
the findings from Models 6 and 7, although not 
expected, are not surprising. 
Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to investigate the role 
of macroeconomics on incumbent vote share in 
post-communist countries of former Yugoslavia. 
While previous research shows that the economy 
has a very strong explanatory power of electoral 
outcomes, research on the countries of the Western 
Balkans offer new cases to investigate these postu-
lates. Countries of former Yugoslavia have passed 
through specific and significantly different transi-
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evidence that the economic crisis and timing have 
caused voters to focus more on economic deter-
minants when deciding to punish or reward the 
parties in power.
The voting behavior picture of countries of former 
Yugoslavia is not only explained by the economy, 
since nationalism is a significant factor. Empirical 
analysis is not necessary to question how Milos-
evic, besides electoral fraud, won elections dur-
ing times of astronomic hyperinflation and the 
demise of the economy. Perceptions of the past 
still shape the political behavior of the countries 
of Western Europe. Political parties and voters 
are captured in the shadow of communist past. 
Perceptions of the communist past have been 
identified as strong indicator of voting in most of 
the countries (Siber 2005, Henjak 2007, Panov & 
Taleski 2013). However, this paper also shows that, 
besides specific circumstances, general theories of 
voting established and tested in western democra-
cies, although very modest, apply for the countries 
of former Yugoslavia as well. 
Testing electoral behavior in Western Balkan 
countries still faces the serious problem of the lack 
of sufficient data. While there are already consid-
erably enough electoral cycles even after elimi-
nating the first plural elections and the ones that 
did not meet the minimum democratic criteria of 
fair and free elections, a problem remains regard-
ing coherent economic data for early elections in 
some of the countries, which reduces the sample. 
Further research in this area should focus on this 
problem as well as improving the operationaliza-
tion and explanation of the mechanisms of the 
influence of nationalism in the political processes. 
Even with these limitations, this paper certainly 
still contributes to research on the state of voting 
behavior in Western Balkan countries.
tions compared with other post-communist coun-
tries. Even with communist rule in Yugoslavia con-
sidered as more liberal, having had a significantly 
better economic situation and with the concept of 
brotherhood and unity as the main paradigm of 
the socialist ideology (Cvijic 1995), the breakup of 
Yugoslavia resulted in the most tragic bloodshed 
in Europe since WWII. These circumstances have 
influenced political transformation and shaped the 
political behavior of individuals. 
Even with these aggravating circumstances, sev-
eral results stand out from this paper. Economic 
voting takes place in the countries of Western 
Balkan, although to a limited extent. In line with 
previous research on other post-communist coun-
tries, unemployment change has the strongest 
explanatory power among economic parameters. 
Results also show that the Consumers Price Index 
influences vote support for incumbent parties. 
This is an important finding considering that the 
CPI captures the consumer capacity of ordinary 
citizens. Results show that voters indeed con-
sider their well-being when deciding to punish or 
reward the government. Nevertheless, results do 
not show evidence of hyperaccountability iden-
tified by Roberts (2008) in ten post-communist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The 
effects of the economy are more limited in shaping 
electoral outcomes in Western Balkan countries, 
likely the result of the specific consequences of the 
transformation and political context.
This paper shows that wars influence electoral 
outcomes, as voters hold governments account-
able for casualties. The results also show that the 
stability and ideological positions of governments 
influence electoral outcomes. Voters more severely 
punish unstable governments with left-wing ide-
ologies, in line with the findings that old regime 
party governments are held more accountable 
than new regime party governments. Unexpect-
edly but also not surprising, there is no strong 
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Appendix
Table 1 List of Elections included in the sample
Country Election Year
Slovenia 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011
Croatia 2000, 2003, 2007, 2011
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002, 2006, 2010
Serbia 2003, 2007, 2008, 2011
Montenegro 2009, 2012
Kosovo 2004, 2007, 2010
Macedonia 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2008, 
2011
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Beyond the quintessential literature on economic 
voting, that dealt with the question whether eco-
nomic conditions influence party-choice and turn-
out (Anderson 2007; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 
2000; Radcliff 1992), surprisingly little attention 
has been paid to the link between macro-economic 
conditions and other modes of political involve-
ment such as demonstrating and petitioning. 
The Netherlands, a country with traditionally 
high levels of political and community participa-
tion (Gesthuizen et al. 2013; Linssen and Schmeets 
2010) makes an interesting case in this respect. The 
once stable Dutch pillarized political landscape 
saw no less than 5 general elections between 2002 
and 2012. The three most recent Dutch Parliamen-
tary Elections were held in 2006, 2010, and 2012 
and coincided with the rise of the global financial 
and economic crisis. In 2006, the election came 
shortly before the global financial crisis. In 2010, 
the parliamentary elections coincided with the 
onset of the Eurocrisis and the global economic 
crisis. Finally, in 2012 after prolonged periods of 
recession in the Netherlands, the administration 
lead by Mark Rutte collapsed while negotiating 
on harsh austerity measures. The timing of these 
elections and thereby the timing of the election 
studies, provides a unique ‘natural experiment’ to 
explore the effect of economic downturn on levels 
of political participation, both for privileged and 
deprived strata in society. 
We attempt to explore the link between macro-
economic conditions in recent years in the Neth-
erlands and levels of political participation. Did 
the financial and economic crises induce political 
participation or do citizens refrain from partici-
pating in politics during economic hardship? We 
set out to assess competing and complementary 
theoretical propositions concerning the effect of 
economic conditions on political participation in 
the Netherlands. Using the Dutch Parliamentary 
Election Studies, we aim to assess to what extent 
Introduction & research 
question 
After financial and economic crises hit Europe in 
2008, various protest movements took the stage 
in the media, the political, and societal realm. 
Europe (and beyond) witnessed the uprising of a 
wide variety of protest movements, for instance 
protests against austerity measures in Greece, the 
‘15M- movement’ in Spain and the global ‘occupy 
movement’. These protests are indications that 
hard economic times might induce people to par-
ticipate in (protest) politics (Muñoz et al. 2013; 
Ponticelli and Voth 2011). 
In cross-national comparative studies that focus 
on the relationship between economic adver-
sity and political participation, it is often argued 
that deprivation due to economic adversity fuels 
discontent and increases political participation, 
such as protests. This (political) discontent might 
go as far as to destabilize regimes (Haggard and 
Kaufman 1995) or even increase the likelihood 
of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). How-
ever, this is in sharp contrast with studies at the 
individual-level that aim to explain who is more 
likely to participate in politics. When studying 
the socio-economic situation and attitudes that 
motivate people to engage in political actions, 
many scholars argue that discontent (Norris et al. 
2006), grievances, and relative deprivation (Dal-
ton 2008) do not motivate citizens to participate 
in the political domain. Rather, individuals with 
higher socio-economic resources are persistently 
more likely to politically participate whereas peo-
ple with less socio-economic resources continue to 
refrain from participation (Brady et al. 1995). This 
provides an interesting theoretical and empirical 
puzzle. At the macro-level, it is argued that eco-
nomic downturn fuels grievances which mobilize 
people to participate politically whereas at the 
micro- or individual-level, it is usually found that 
the relatively well to do, rather than the relatively 
deprived, participate politically.
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Competing perspectives: resources versus incen-
tives. 
Various studies have empirically demonstrated 
that political participation, both conventional and 
unconventional modes, is more prevalent among 
higher educated and higher-class individuals 
(Dalton 2008; Desposato and Norrander 2009; 
Norris et al. 2005). Higher status and higher edu-
cated people possess more skills needed for partic-
ipation (Brady et al. 1995), have greater confidence 
that they understand politics and that their efforts 
to participate in the political arena will bear fruit 
and facilitate political action (Klandermans et al. 
2008; Lassen and Serritzlew 2011; Morrell 2003). 
Moreover, the higher educated and those in higher 
social classes are also more likely to be involved 
in civic associations that act as ‘schools of democ-
racy’ (Van der Meer 2009) which might reinforce 
the associations between skills, resources, and 
political participation. 
Grievance theories, on the other hand, argue that 
those with (relatively) few resources are more likely 
to participate politically. Following the grievance 
argument, poor people are more likely to feel that 
they have been wronged (Seybolt and Shafiq 2012), 
experience a gap between their expectations and 
reality and thus suffer from invidious comparisons 
(Gurr 1970; Gurr and Moore 1997; Opp 2009; Pat-
tie et al. 2004). These feelings of deprivation might 
spill over into the political arena and spur political 
action, especially since the deprived have little to 
lose and more to gain by challenging the existing 
political status quo. The poor would therefore be 
more likely to engage specifically in unconventional 
political participation (Macedo 2005). Uncon-
ventional political actions, such as demonstrating 
ing ‘unconventional’, ‘non-institutionalized’ or ‘pro-
test participation’ are identical since they still refer 
to non-legally-embedded political actions such as 
petitioning and demonstrating whereas conventional 
action still refer to legally-embedded modes such as 
attending hearings and writing to government officials. 
economic conditions affected individual level 
political participation in the 2006-2012 period 
among the general population as well as among 
subpopulations with higher and lower resources. 
Therefore, our research question reads: 
To what extent are levels of political participation 
affected during times of economic downturn in 
the Netherlands between 2006-2012 in general, 
and in particular societal groups of privileged 
respectively deprived people more specifically?
Theory and hypotheses
Political participation
Political participation is broadly defined as those 
activities aimed at influencing the political deci-
sion making process. To take into account a wide 
range of political actions, we distinguished con-
ventional from unconventional modes of political 
participation. Conventional political participa-
tion refers to all modes of participation directly 
embedded in legal institutional frameworks, or 
directly referring to the electoral process and 
representational system, such as voting, contact-
ing politicians or attending hearings (Barnes and 
Kaase 1979). Unconventional political participa-
tion includes all modes of political participation 
not directly linked to the electoral process such 
as petitioning, demonstrating, and boycotting 
products(Barnes and Kaase 1979)15. 
15. Unconventional political participation has been 
labelled differently throughout time. One might 
argue that unconventional activities are increasingly 
accepted and regarded as ‘normal’ modes of (Dal-
ton, 2008; Lamprianou, 2013; Norris, Walgrave, & 
van Aelst, 2005). Thus, some of the activities such as 
attending a demonstration lost its ‘ unconventional’ 
connotation. This renders the term ‘unconventional’ 
political participation somewhat old-fashioned. How-
ever, other labels used such as ‘extra-institutional’ 
participation, ‘emerging forms of political participa-
tion’, and ‘non-electoral participation’ still refer to 
the same political actions empirically. Thus, although 
labelled differently, the acts referred to when describ-
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ung’, who argued that in deteriorating economic 
conditions citizens will resort to protest to voice 
their political concerns. In the same vein, Davies’ 
(1962) J-curve hypothesis argued that economic 
conditions mobilizes political participation and 
might even overthrow regimes if a period of eco-
nomic prosperity is followed by a (short) period 
of sharp economic decline. This sharp economic 
decline would lead to dissatisfaction that induces 
political action. Hence, during times of economic 
decline, citizens would be more likely to partici-
pate in both conventional and unconventional 
modes (hypothesis 3). 
Following grievance theory, discontent among 
the lower educated and lower social classes would 
fuel political participation, especially in uncon-
ventional, modes of political action. Since we 
expect that those in low social classes and the 
lower educated are most affected by the economic 
downturn, these relatively deprived are even more 
incentivized to participate since the gap between 
expectations and reality increased, especially in 
comparison with the resource rich. Hence, we 
hypothesize that the resource poor will partici-
pate more in comparison with the resource rich in 
times of economic hardship (hypothesis 4).  
The competing perspective argues that economic 
adversity does not provide an incentive to par-
ticipate but instead depresses political participa-
tion. Citizens are more preoccupied with their 
personal situation in a sour economy and less able 
and willing to connect to the remote concerns 
of politics (Rosenstone 1982)17. Thus, in times of 
17. A third perspective argues that there is no effect from the 
economy on political participation by applying Olson’s 
(1965) logic of collective action. Macro-level economic 
downturn would be inadequate as a motivating factor to 
participate politically. A desire for change in the provi-
sion of public goods brought about by macro-economic 
change is not a satisfactory motivation to participate in 
politics, unless selective benefits will be offered to those 
who participate. Since all citizens are under economic 
duress, regardless of their participation, the individual-
are less skill-intensive compared to conventional 
activities such as lodging a complaint or attend-
ing a hearing. Unconventional political actions are 
therefore considered a ‘weapon of the weak’.
These two theoretical perspectives, allow us to 
derive two rivalling hypotheses at the individual 
level. Given the resource-based perspective we 
expect that the resource rich are more likely to 
participate in both conventional and unconven-
tional modes (hypothesis 1) compared to poor 
people. Based on the notion of grievance we 
expect resource-poor people to participate politi-
cally more compared to resource-rich people, 
however, especially in unconventional political 
actions (hypothesis 2). 
Macro economic conditions
From the economic voting literature, we derive 
propositions that we transpose to other conven-
tional and unconventional modes of political par-
ticipation. The effect of macro-economic condi-
tions on political participation may take several 
directions. First, economic adversity might fuel 
political participation. During economic hard-
ship, governments are forced to resort to retrench-
ments that cause a gap between what electorates 
expect and what governments are able to offer 
(Thomassen 1990). Governments are blamed for 
economic duress and this blame spurs political 
action16. This argument is very close to the rela-
tive deprivation argument presented above and 
can be traced back to Marx’ concept of ‘Verelend-
16. The prime assumption behind these theories is that 
electorates actually blame governments for economic 
hardship. Although these theoretical propositions 
heavily rely on this assumption, this link is far from 
clear, as shown by the divergent findings in the eco-
nomic voting literature (Anderson, 2007). However, 
Radcliffe (1992) as well as Thomassen (1990) sug-
gests that in states such as the Netherlands, it is more 
likely for electorates to blame their governments, since 
they interfere more directly in their electorates’ lives 
trough their comprehensive welfare systems. 
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six weeks before, and shortly after Election Day. 
We will only use the post-election waves of the 
DPES as these contained the items on political par-
ticipation. In 2012, due to budgetary constraints, 
only a post-election survey was carried out within 
a six-week time frame after Election Day. The post-
election waves for the DPES were primarily col-
lected by Computer Assisted Personal Interview-
ing (CAPI). Additionally, in 2006 and 2010 non-
contacts and refusals were re-approached with a 
shortened questionnaire by telephone or mail. This 
resulted in response rates of 64.3 % and 57.0 % in 
the second wave (compared to the initial sample) 
in 2006 and 2010, respectively (Schmeets 2011). In 
2012 no refusal conversion techniques were applied 
and all interviews were carried out using CAPI. 
This resulted in a response rate of 61.9%.
Dependent variables: conventional and uncon-
ventional political participation. 
We distinguished between unconventional and 
conventional political participation (Barnes and 
Kaase 1979). Our measure for unconventional 
political participation referred to participation in 
political discussions on the internet, participating 
in action groups and participation in demonstra-
tions or protest meetings. We used involving politi-
cal parties or organisations, attending hearings, 
and contacting politicians or civil servants as indi-
cators of conventional political participation. See 
Table 1 for the exact question wording in the DPES. 
Scale construction: conventional and unconven-
tional political participation
We constructed separate scales for conventional 
and unconventional political participation that 
represent the average score on the relevant dichot-
omous indicators18. We assessed the scalability of 
18. We left voting out of our analyses since this is a dif-
ferent kind of political activity compared to the con-
ventional and unconventional activities studied here. 
Voting is done once every few years while most of the 
economic hardship, political participation will 
decline (hypothesis 5). Again, we expect that eco-
nomic adversity will disproportionally affect the 
resource poor. Following the resource based the-
ory, we argue that lower class and lower educated 
citizens do not have the resources to participate in 
politics, to begin with. Therefore, we hypothesize 
that the resource poor will participate even less in 
comparison with the resource rich in times of eco-
nomic hardship (hypothesis 6).
Control variables
We controlled for the following socio-demo-
graphic characteristics in our analyses: country of 
origin, gender, and age. People of non-Dutch ori-
gin participate less in modes of conventional and 
unconventional political participation (Fennema 
and Tillie 1999). Younger people are less likely to 
participate in politics (Brady et al. 1995; Verba et 
al. 1978), therefore we include age as a control vari-
able in our analyses. The direction of the effects of 
gender on political participation is also still up for 
debate as the effect of gender varies with the inclu-
sion of other control characteristics, especially for 
the Dutch case (Van Egmond et al. 1998). We use 
this variable as control variable in our analyses 
without making prior assumptions on the direc-
tion of this effect. 
Data & measurements
To test these hypotheses we used the Dutch Par-
liamentary Election Studies (DPES 2006; 2010; 
2012) carried out during each general election in 
the Netherlands. The DPES’ aim is to collect high-
quality data on the backgrounds of voting behav-
iour of the Dutch electorate. The sampling frame 
of the DPES covers the Dutch electorate eligible 
to vote in parliamentary elections (Dutch citizens 
aged 18 or older). In 2006 and 2010, respondents 
were interviewed in a pre-election survey within 
level rational choice would be to free-ride and refrain 
from political participation. 
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the context of Item Response Theory, this means 
that the probability of a positive response to 
an item (specific acts of political participation) 
increases in concordance with the value of a sub-
ject’s latent trait (conventional or unconventional 
political participation). Applied to political par-
ticipation this means we test whether individu-
als that engage in a more difficult (less popular) 
activity (e.g. attending a demonstration), thereby 
having a higher score on the ‘latent trait’ political 
participation, also engage in easier (more popular) 
activities (e.g. engaging in political discussion via 
the internet).
In terms of comparability of measurements, or 
equivalence, we analyse the extent to which the 
ordering in terms of difficulty of the items are 
similar over time and between the resource rich 
and the resource poor. If the ordering in modes 
of political participation is similar over time and 
across groups, measurements are equivalent and 
the scale-scores can be compared. 
The cumulative nature of the response on the 
items for political participation also has impor-
tant theoretical implications that are neglected 
when analysing these items separately. It is theo-
ably larger compared to the proportion of people who 
attended a demonstration. 
these items using probabilistic scale analysis tech-
niques (Mokken 1971; van Schuur 2003). Mok-
ken scale analysis is the probabilistic version of 
the deterministic Guttmann scale. Mokken scale 
analysis uses a set of dichotomous indicators (e.g., 
involving a political party yes/no), and evaluates 
whether some items (e.g. political discussion on 
the internet) may be easier, more popular, activi-
ties compared to others (e.g. attending a demon-
stration). The decisive notion is that those who 
engage in more difficult, i.e. less popular, activities 
(e.g. attending demonstrations) will probably (not 
necessarily, like in the deterministic Guttmann 
scale) also engage in easier or more popular activi-
ties (e.g. political discussion in the internet)19. In 
conventional and unconventional political activities 
studied here, such as attending a demonstration or 
writing to government officials, requires more pro-
longed time commitments.
19. Mokken scale analysis has numerous advantages over 
more mainstream scaling methods, such as factor 
analyses and measurement models specified in struc-
tural equation modeling. These methods are based on 
the decomposition of covariances and assume that 
frequency distributions of the items can be regarded 
as ‘parallel’ and the items have more or less the same 
mean and standard deviation. Thus, all items need to 
be equally ‘popular’ to be adequately used for scal-
ing (van Schuur, 2003). Distribution of the items for 
political participation clearly demonstrate that this is 
not the case, e.g. the proportion of people who engage 
in political discussion on the internet, is consider-
Table 1 Question wording political participation Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies 2006-2012
Item Answer categories
There are several ways to influence politicians, civil servants or the 
government. Please list which one you used during the previous five 
years.
Unconventional political 
participation
Participated in a political discussion on the internet, via sms or 
e-mail.
Yes / No
Participated in an action group. Yes / No
Participated in a demonstration or protest meeting. Yes / No
Conventional political 
participation
Contacted a politician or government official. Yes / No
Participate in a hearing or consultation meeting organized by the 
government.
Yes / No
Tried to involve political party or organisation. Yes / No
Elections in Europe in Times of Crisis                                   CONTENTS á79
For each act of political participation the propor-
tion of people that engaged in these acts the past 
five years is shown for conventional and uncon-
ventional modes. In the context of Mokken scale 
analyses, these proportions represent the ‘item dif-
ficulties’. We find that for unconventional modes 
of political participation the item ordering, from 
most popular – or easiest- activity to least popular 
activity is political discussion on the internet, par-
ticipation in an action group, and demonstrating 
respectively. For conventional modes of political 
participation, Table 2 shows that contacting a pol-
itician or government official is the most popular 
activity, followed by attending a hearing. Involv-
retically (implicitly or explicitly) assumed that 
people specialize within either conventional or 
unconventional modes of participation and that 
participation is cumulative (c.f. Millbrath 1965; 
Verba et al. 1978; Zukin 2006). Mokken-scaling 
incorporates the respective ‘difficulty’ of certain 
acts of political participation vis-à-vis other, easier 
or more mainstream acts of political participa-
tion. By assessing the respective difficulty of acts 
of political participation using Mokken scaling, 
we acknowledge this cumulative nature of partici-
pation. 
The results of the Mokken scale analysis are pre-
sented in Table 2. 
Table 2 Mokken scale analysis: Item difficulties (proportion positive responses) and Loevinger’s H, by years and subgroups
Unconventional political participation
Proportion positive responses (item popularity)
Item Participated in political 
discussion on the internet, 
via sms or e-mail.
Participated in an action 
group.
Participated in 
demonstration or protest 
meeting. Loevinger’s H
Years     
 2006 0.19 0.08 0.04 0.32
 2010 0.22 0.05 0.03 0.31
 2012 0.24 0.07 0.04 0.33
Total 0.21 0.07 0.04 0.32
Conventional political participation
Proportion positive responses (item popularity)
Item Contacted a politician or 
government official.
Participate in a hearing 
or consultation meeting 
organized by the 
government.
Tried to involve political 
party or organisation.
Loevinger’s H
Years     
 2006 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.42
 2010 0.13 0.12 0.05 0.45
 2012 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.45
Total 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.44
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dents do engage in more difficult acts (for instance 
demonstrating), but do not engage in easier more 
popular acts (for instance joining a political dis-
cussion on the internet). The Loevinger’s H coef-
ficients are above the cut-off value of 0.3 (Sijtsma 
and Molenaar 2002). Based on the results of these 
Mokken-scale analyses, we construct a scale that 
consists of the average score on the items pertain-
ing to conventional and unconventional political 
participation that ranges between 0 and 1.
ing a political party is the least popular conven-
tional political activity. 
In Table 2 we find that the item ordering pat-
tern similar across time and thus longitudinally 
equivalent. This is represented in the Loevinger’s 
H coefficients. These represent the scalability of 
the Mokken scale based on the number of viola-
tions of the item-ordering pattern. A violation of 
the item ordering pattern would occur if respon-
Table 3 Descriptive statistics
 Min Max Mean S.D.
Conventional political participation 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.20
Unconventional political participation 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.19
Income 1.00 20.00 10.92 5.67
Age 18.00 96.00 47.55 17.56
Highest education completed % n
Elementary 6.6 300
Lower vocational 16.6 759
Secondary 8.3 377
Middle level vocational 
/Higher level secondary 41.8 1,907
Higher level vocational/University 26.7 1,216
Social class
Working class 18.7 854
Upper working class 12.9 588
Middle class 49.1 2,239
Upper middle class 17.2 782
Upper class 2.1 96
Gender
Male 50.9 2,296
Female 49.1 2,312
Origin
Dutch origin 85.4 2,321
Non-Dutch 14.6 2,238
Total 4,559
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to the Dutch population. For reference, the low-
est vigintile in 2006 represents spendable incomes 
lower than € 9,530 per annum whereas the highest 
category represents spendable incomes of € 41,243 
and higher. To take into account non-linear asso-
ciations between income and political participa-
tion we included a quadratic term for income. 
As mentioned before, we controlled for age, gen-
der, and country of origin. Age was defined as 
age at Election Day. In the Netherlands, the age 
threshold for participating in elections is 18 years. 
To control for possible non-linear effects of age we 
included a quadratic term for age as well. For ori-
gin we distinguished between Dutch origin and 
non-Dutch origin. Respondents who were born in 
the Netherlands and have parents that were born 
in the Netherlands were classified as of Dutch ori-
gin. Those who were born outside the Netherlands 
themselves or their parents were classified as non-
Dutch. The descriptive statistics for all relevant 
variables are presented in Table 3.
Analyses
In our analyses we distinguish between conven-
tional and unconventional modes of political 
participation in using a similar estimation strat-
egy for both conventional and unconventional 
modes of political participation. The results for 
conventional political participation are displayed 
in Table 4. In Table 5,we present the results of the 
analyses for unconventional modes of participa-
tion. In the first model, we include dummy vari-
ables for the years 2006, 2010, and 2012 to assess 
whether there is significant longitudinal varia-
tion in political participation in the Netherlands 
in times of economic crises. Model 2 includes the 
main independent variables referring to resources 
and grievances (education and social class) as well 
as the control variables. In model 3 and model 4 
we assess whether the effects of social class and 
education on political participation systematically 
Resources and grievances
We operationalized resources in three differ-
ent ways. First, we used education as a proxy for 
someone’s civic skills and resources. Education is 
measured in 5 categories: elementary education, 
lower vocational education, secondary educa-
tion, middle level vocational education or higher 
level secondary education, and, finally higher 
level vocational education or university. We will 
include education as dummy variables in our 
analyses. Second, we used social class as a proxy 
for resources and relative deprivation. Respon-
dents’ were asked which social class they perceived 
themselves to be a member of: “One sometimes 
speaks of the existence of various social classes 
and groups. If you were to assign yourself to a 
particular social class, which one would that be?” 
Respondents could choose between upper class, 
upper middle class, middle class, upper working 
class, and working class. Social class is included 
as having a linear relationship with our dependent 
variables in our analyses20. 
Control variables
The DPES data was enriched with registry-based 
information on income drawn from the Dutch 
tax office. We used the standardized disposable 
annual income. The disposable income is com-
posed of wages, profits (for self-employed persons) 
and other allowances minus social contributions 
and taxes, standardized for household size and 
composition. To arrive at a longitudinally compar-
ative measure of income the standardized house-
hold income was classified in vigintiles according 
20. We assessed whether social class can be modelled as a 
pseudo-interval variable by testing to what extent the 
association between social class and conventional and 
unconventional political participation can be modelled 
with linear terms only. We ran models including social 
class as a set of dummy variables and compared these 
with models using social class as a linear effect. The 
difference in fit between the two models was hardly 
detectable (r-square change = .001, with p= .459). 
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negative effect. For conventional modes of politi-
cal participation, we find that those with higher 
levels of education and those who consider them-
selves belonging to higher social classes consis-
tently participate more in conventional modes of 
political participation. This lends support to the 
well-known resource based models (hypothesis 1) 
of political participation and refutes the alterna-
tive grievance based explanation (hypothesis 2). 
As already mentioned, conventional political par-
ticipation is slightly in decline, at least in 2012, as 
shown in Table 4. This suggests that in times of 
economic duress, people participate less in con-
ventional modes of politics and is in line with 
hypothesis 3 and rejects hypothesis 5. Addition-
ally, combining the theoretical propositions from 
hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 and the supposed 
effect of the economic crisis on political partici-
pation, we argued that the economic crisis would 
disproportionally affect the resource poor com-
pared to the resource rich. The interaction terms 
in model 3 demonstrate that the economic crisis 
does not influence the strength of the effect of edu-
cation on conventional political participation24. 
This rejects both hypothesis 4 and hypothesis 6. 
However, for social class we find that the positive 
effect of social class on conventional political par-
ticipation is smaller in times of economic crisis as 
demonstrated by the negative interaction term in 
model 4. This suggests that the levels of conven-
tional political participation for higher and lower 
social classes converge. 
For unconventional political participation we 
also find support for the resource-based theory in 
favour of grievance-based explanations as shown 
24. Additionally, we included the interaction terms for 
education and year as pseudo-interval variable to gain 
statistical power in these models that include a sub-
stantial number of interaction terms. There is no dif-
ference in model fit (r-square change =0.000, with p = 
.528) when comparing the model with pseudo-inter-
val and dummy variables. Hence, the results do not 
substantially differ from the findings presented here. 
diverge in times of economic crises by including 
interaction terms. We ran OLS-regression analy-
sis with the Mokken scales for conventional and 
unconventional political participation presented 
above as dependent variables21,22,23. 
Results
Let us first look at conventional political partici-
pation in Table 4. In model 1 we find that there is 
no significant difference in levels of political par-
ticipation between 2006 and 2010 whereas a sig-
nificant (albeit small) decline is observed in 2012 
compared to 2006 (and also in comparison with 
2010 if the reference category is changed). This 
suggests that levels of conventional political par-
ticipation are in decline in times of prolonged eco-
nomic hardship. Moreover, this effect also holds 
after including all predictor variables. 
We formulated contrasting expectations the effect 
of resources and grievances on political partici-
pation in hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2. Follow-
ing the resource based model, we hypothesized 
a positive effect of resources on political partici-
pation. Contrastingly, in the vein of grievance 
based political participation, we hypothesized a 
21. Given the ordinal and very skewed nature (most peo-
ple do not participate politically) one might argue that 
we should employ ordered logit regression analyses. 
We compared the estimates presented here with the 
estimates from ordered logit models; the results did 
not substantially differ from OLS results which are 
presented in this paper for ease of interpretation. 
22. These analyses presented here were performed on 
the unweighted sample. Analysis with the sample 
weighted according to age, gender, marital status, 
urbanization, region, origin, turnout (i.c. voted in 
most recent parliamentary elections yes/no), and vot-
ing behaviour did not differ from the results presented 
here for both conventional and unconventional politi-
cal participation.
23. There is no substantial difference between the models 
including all missing values on each variable as sepa-
rate categories and the estimates presented in Table 4 
and Table 5. 
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Table 4 Linear regression analysis: Conventional political participation (n = 4, 559)
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
b  s.e b  s.e b  s.e b  s.e
Intercept 0.080 *** (0.005) -0.134 *** (0.026) -0.143 *** (0.029) -0.152 *** (0.030)
2006 ref. ref. ref. ref.
2010 0.007  (0.007) 0.005  (0.007) 0.010  (0.027) 0.006  (0.030)
2012 -0.014 ** (0.007) -0.017 *** (0.007) 0.007  (0.026) 0.038  (0.030)
Education
Elementary ref. ref. ref.
Lower vocational 0.013  (0.013) 0.031 * (0.022) 0.030 * (0.022)
Secondary 0.023 * (0.015) 0.021  (0.024) 0.017  (0.024)
Middle level 
vocation/higher 
level secondary 0.027 ** (0.013) 0.039 ** (0.020) 0.035 ** (0.021)
Higher level 
vocational/ 
university 0.099 *** (0.014) 0.106 *** (0.022) 0.098 *** (0.023)
Social class 0.012 *** (0.003) 0.012 *** (0.003) 0.017 *** (0.005)
Income -0.003 * (0.002) -0.003 * (0.002) -0.003 * (0.002)
Income2 0.000 ** (0.000) 0.000 ** (0.000) 0.000 ** (0.000)
Female ref. ref. ref.
Male 0.030 *** (0.006) 0.030 *** (0.006) 0.030 *** (0.006)
Dutch origin ref. ref. ref.
Non-Dutch origin -0.002  (0.008) -0.003  (0.008) -0.003  (0.008)
Age 0.005 *** (0.001) 0.005 *** (0.001) 0.005 *** (0.001)
Age2 0.000 *** (0.000) 0.000 *** (0.000) 0.000 *** (0.000)
Interaction terms
Lower vocational 2010 -0.019  (0.031) -0.018  (0.031)
2012 -0.037  (0.031) -0.034  (0.031)
Secondary 2010 0.014  (0.035) 0.013  (0.036)
2012 -0.002  (0.036) 0.008  (0.036)
Middle level 
vocation/higher 
level secondary 2010 -0.011  (0.029) -0.012  (0.029)
2012 -0.026  (0.028) -0.015  (0.029)
Higher level 
vocational/ 
university 2010 0.007  (0.030) 0.005  (0.032)
2012 -0.027  (0.030) -0.004  (0.032)
Social class 2010 0.001  (0.008)
2012 -0.016 ** (0.008)
R2 0.002 0.076 0.077 0.078
* p < 0.1 **p< 0.05 *** p< 0.01 (two tailed)
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Table 5 Linear regression analysis: Conventional political participation (n = 4, 559)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
b  s.e b  s.e b  s.e b  s.e
Intercept 0.092 *** (0.005) 0.049 ** (0.024) 0.045 * (0.028) 0.037 * (0.029)
2006 ref. ref. ref. ref.
2010 -0.002  (0.007) -0.004  (0.006) 0.013  (0.026) 0.014  (0.029)
2012 0.018 *** (0.007) 0.018 *** (0.007) 0.006  (0.025) 0.030  (0.029)
Education
Elementary ref. ref. ref.
Lower vocational -0.009  (0.013) -0.006  (0.021) -0.007  (0.021)
Secondary 0.005  (0.015) -0.014  (0.023) -0.018  (0.023)
Middle level 
vocation/higher 
level secondary 0.016 * (0.012) 0.018  (0.019) 0.014  (0.020)
Higher level 
vocational/ 
university 0.084 *** (0.013) 0.090 *** (0.021) 0.083 *** (0.022)
Social class 0.013 *** (0.003) 0.013 *** (0.003) 0.017 *** (0.005)
Income 0.000  (0.002) 0.000  (0.002) 0.000  (0.002)
Income2 0.000  (0.000) 0.000  (0.000) 0.000  (0.000)
Female ref. ref. ref.
Male 0.005  (0.005) 0.004  (0.005) 0.004  (0.005)
Dutch origin ref. ref. ref.
Non Dutch origin -0.003  (0.008) -0.002  (0.008) -0.002  (0.008)
Age 0.001  (0.001) 0.001  (0.001) 0.001  (0.001)
Age2 0.000 *** (0.000) 0.000 *** (0.000) 0.000 *** (0.000)
Interaction terms
Lower vocational 2010 -0.016  (0.030) -0.015  (0.030)
2012 0.003  (0.030) 0.005  (0.030)
Secondary 2010 0.024  (0.034) 0.025  (0.034)
2012 0.038  (0.034) 0.046 * (0.034)
Middle level 
vocation/higher 
level secondary 2010 -0.023  (0.027) -0.022  (0.028)
2012 0.017  (0.027) 0.026  (0.028)
Higher level 
vocational/ 
university 2010 -0.025  (0.028) -0.023  (0.031)
2012 0.004  (0.028) 0.022  (0.030)
Social class 2010 -0.001  (0.007)
2012 -0.013 ** (0.007)
R2 0.002 0.078 0.079 0.080
* p < 0.1 **p< 0.05 *** p< 0.01 (two tailed)
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cal participation as proposed by Barnes & Kaase 
(1979). Conventional modes are political activities 
embedded within the legal institutional frame-
work and unconventional political participation 
refers to all extra-institutional modes of voicing 
political concerns. The Dutch Parliamentary Elec-
tions Studies in recent years provide an interesting 
test to assess the effects of the economic crises as 
these coincided with periods of relative economic 
prosperity (2006), the start of the economic cri-
sis (in 2010), and prolonged periods of economic 
recession (in 2012). Against the background of 
the recent economic crises, we argued that eco-
nomic downturn would either incentivize citizens 
to voice their concerns in the political domain 
(Thomassen 1990), especially in unconventional 
modes (Muñoz et al. 2013; Ponticelli and Voth 
2011) or that economic downturn induces politi-
cal apathy (Rosenstone 1982). We combined this 
with the expectations following from grievance 
theory with the expectations from the resource 
model. Grievance theory argues that the relatively 
deprived are more prone to participate politically 
(Gurr, 1970; Gurr & Moore, 1997: Opp, 2009; Pat-
tie et al., 2004) while the resource-model argues 
that the relatively well-to-do are more likely to 
participate (Brady et al. 1995). 
Using probabilistic scale modeling techniques 
(Mokken 1971; Sijtsma and Molenaar 2002; van 
Schuur 2003) we demonstrated that both conven-
tional and unconventional political participation 
is cumulative. Hence people that engage in more 
difficult political acts, such as demonstrating also 
engage in easier or more mainstream acts of polit-
ical participation such as joining political discus-
sion on the internet. Moreover, we demonstrated 
that the pattern in modes of both conventional 
and unconventional political activities does not 
change over time. 
Our results indicate that, first and foremost, being 
politically active is somewhat rare in the Nether-
by the positive terms for both social class and edu-
cation in Table 5. This corroborates hypothesis 1 
and rejects hypothesis 2 for unconventional politi-
cal participation. Concerning the effect of the eco-
nomic crisis on political participation we find that 
unconventional political participation is slightly 
on the rise. This rejects hypothesis 3 in favour of 
hypothesis 5 and is in contrast with conventional 
modes of political participation, which are slightly 
in decline in 2012. Moreover, we do not find that 
the association between education and uncon-
ventional political participation is affected by the 
economic crisis, as shown in Table 5 in model 3. 
In model 4, we do find a significant negative inter-
action term for the effect of social class. This sug-
gests that for higher and lower social classes, levels 
of unconventional political participation converge 
in times of economic crisis in the Netherlands.
Concerning our control variables we find that 
income does not affect conventional modes of 
political participation but does affect uncon-
ventional modes of participation. Moreover we 
demonstrate that men are more likely to partici-
pate in conventional modes but there is no dif-
ference between men and women in their level of 
unconventional political participation (c.f. Table 
4 and Table 5). Surprisingly, and in contrast with 
Fennema and Tillie (1999) we find that people 
from non-Dutch origin are no more or less likely 
to engage in political participation compared to 
the Dutch population in both conventional and 
unconventional modes. Finally, for conventional 
and unconventional modes of political participa-
tion, we find curvilinear effects for age. 
Conclusion and discussion
In this contribution, we attempted to explore the 
effects of the economic crisis on levels of politi-
cal participation in the Netherlands between 2006 
and 2012. We used the classic distinction between 
conventional and unconventional modes of politi-
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tie et al., 2004) as we consistently find that those 
with more skills and resources (higher educated) 
and people in higher social classes participate 
more in both conventional and unconventional 
modes of participation which is consistent with 
the resource based explanation of political partici-
pation (Brady et al. 1995). 
In times of economic crisis we find that lower and 
higher social classes convergence in their level of 
political participation. This result adds to the find-
ings of Marien et al. (2010) who demonstrate that 
inequalities in patterns of unconventional politi-
cal participation are comparable to the traditional 
patterns of inequality found in conventional 
modes in terms of, among others, social class. We 
demonstrate that during economically disadvan-
taged times these patterns of inequality are not 
strengthened in the Netherlands. 
Yet, in the interpretation of the results it needs 
to be acknowledged that the time-span studied 
here is rather short and that comparing levels of 
conventional and unconventional political par-
ticipation between 2006, 2010, and 2012 is a crude 
attempt at grasping a comprehensive measure of 
economic downturn. However, note that within 
this timeframe, the Netherlands experienced the 
most severe economic crisis since the 1930s and 
should there be an effect of macro-economic con-
ditions on political participation, this would espe-
cially be observable within the time frame studied 
here. However, incorporating a wider time span 
using more detailed measures of economic down-
turn would be a potentially fruitful alley for fur-
ther research.
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is unavoidable when we attempt to describe and 
design a democratic system in a non-state context 
(Schimmel fennig 2010). Despite these limitations, 
this paper will discuss the competitive character 
of parallel accountability structures and the exis-
tence of fused channels of political representation 
as unique – and problematic - features of European 
demo cracy. More practically, it examines present 
activities at the European Parliament’s shop-floor, 
dealing with the role of European political parties 
and the enduring issue of electoral reform. It will 
conclude with a short outlook on the innovations 
being introduced at this moment for this year’s 
European elections, such as the selection of can-
didates for the Presidency of the European Com-
mission.
New governance and European democracy
An influential suggestion to bridge the divide 
between traditional concepts of democracy, 
such as separation of powers, representation and 
accountability, and the very particular institu-
tional and political scenery of the European Union 
was the “new governance” agenda. In parallel with 
the extension of the EU’s regulatory and (weak) 
distributive powers, the rise in profile of regional 
governments and assemblies, and the enlargement 
of the EU, accompanied by a multitude of support 
programmes to prepare accession, scholars tried 
to make sense of these developments by devising 
new descriptive and analytical tools for what is by 
now known as, variably, European governance, 
new governance, or multi-level governance, to 
name just the three most widely used terms (Bar-
tolini 2011).
In a nutshell, the governance discourse is the 
multi-faceted endeavour to construct a pro-
gramme of legitimation for a political system dis-
cernibly lacking in traditional transmission belts 
for creating popular acceptance. Arguing that 
politicians who depend on electoral accountabil-
The problem of European 
Democracy
The idea of European democracy is of course 
closely related to plans for creating a European 
government. Although former Commission Presi-
dent Prodi’s sporadic hints at transforming the 
Commission into a European government were 
noe well received in politics and academia, it 
remains true that if democracy is the preferable 
mode of choosing and controlling governments, 
then any political system, at whatever level, should 
respect its basic tenets and rules. However, Euro-
pean representative democracy finds itself in a 
singularly fragile state. First, many scholars and 
practitioners today consider electoral politics as 
inefficient for modern public policy-making. They 
recommend placing market regulation and other 
public policies under the responsibility of non-
majoritarian institutions such as the European 
Central Bank or regulatory agencies. Second, 
participatory democracy involving citizens more 
directly, for instance through referendums, has 
become a powerful proposition inspiring not only 
NGOs and other activists but also many political 
leaders and parties, notably the Greens and some 
sections of centre-right and centre-left parties. 
True, both critiques of representative democ-
racy and party rule are directed as much at the 
national as at the European level (Mair 2008). But 
European democracy faces a number of specific 
obstacles we don’t find in nation states. Also, the 
normative terminology necessary to develop an 
understanding of whether European democracy 
is satisfactory or inadequate, workable or imprac-
tical, desirable or dangerous, are mostly derived 
from national liberal democracies of the 20th cen-
tury. This creates a Catch 22 situation: while most 
would agree that a simple transfer of the princi-
pal trappings of national democratic systems to 
the next higher level is insufficient or perhaps 
even plainly wrong, the old conceptual tool box 
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lic policy-making. Although there is not much 
exchange between the two vast bodies of research 
on democracy and governance, respectively, recent 
work on new governance has developed important 
arguments questioning its credentials in terms of 
popular democracy. It would seem, according to 
some of these scholars, that new modes of gov-
ernance “have emerged not only because of their 
alleged superiority in terms of effectiveness and 
credibility but also as an effect of the weakness of 
traditional forms of democratic legitimacy at the 
EU Level”25. Moreover, skewed bargaining pow-
ers and privileged means of access risk to impose 
economic and other externalities on the rest of 
the political community. Designer jurisdictions 
for large corporations and investors (Alces 2013) 
and a quasi-commercialization of sovereignty are 
empirically identified outcomes of multi-level gov-
ernance at the international level (Picciotto 2008). 
If current democratic theory assumes that vot-
ers are acting as contingent rule compliers under 
bounded rationality new modes of governance 
can only work under the condition that they are 
nested in traditional structures of democratic 
accountability, e.g. electoral control and binding 
laws (Bellamy et al. 2011).
Participatory democracy, a promise for Euro-
pean democracy?
The second critique of European representative 
democracy is today an important part of politi-
cal discourse within the traditional components 
of party democracy. A vast body of research has 
taken note of the fact that since the entry into force 
of the Maastricht treaty referendums have become 
a frequent appearance at constitutional moments 
of the EU’s development (Hooghe/Marks 2009). 
Only a handful of member states has so far resisted 
the pressure to go for referendums. One paradox 
of referendums is that they are often initiated by 
the political or party leadership for reasons hav-
25. Bellamy et al. 2011, p. 136
ity are usually not in a position to achieve Pareto-
efficient or other desirable policies adherents of 
new governance strategies favour non-majoritar-
ian institutions insulated from electoral account-
ability. In institutional terms, the non-partisan 
stature of the European Commission, as guardian 
of the treaties and defender of the European com-
mon weal, is in some ways the classic incarnation 
of new governance ideas. The European Central 
Bank and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union are the other important non-majoritarian 
EU bodies although it should not be forgotten that 
internal decision-making in all these bodies is not 
free of majority-based votes. However, the Euro-
pean Commission is a case apart because it is gen-
erally considered to be also a political institution, 
providing the Parliament and the Council with 
legislative input. Whence the crucial question if it 
is a necessary step towards European democracy 
to politicize the Commission’s composition and 
policy-making, to which we will return.
New governance raises two principal questions: 
the first element is whether new governance tools 
such as interest representation, consultation, pub-
lic-private partnerships or multi-level and multi-
forum cooperation and networking are efficient. 
After an optimistic start encompassing notably 
the Open Method of Coordination, the Lisbon 
Strategy to create the world’s foremost knowledge-
based economy and other bench-marking exer-
cises in economic and social policy coordination 
many expectations were not fulfilled (Stephenson 
2013). The public debt crisis starting in 2008 and 
culminating in 2010/11 was only the most drastic 
illustration that rule-making built on voluntary 
acceptance is insufficient in case of a serious pol-
icy challenge.
The second element, more important in the con-
text of European democracy, is to examine how 
new governance strategies deal with the require-
ment of equitable access of all citizens to pub-
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this situation has not improved since the onset of 
the public debt crisis: in a traditionally europhile 
country such as Italy, to name but one example, 
the net percentage of citizens trusting the EU fell 
from + 30% to - 22% between 2007 and 2012.26
In conclusion, both currently discussed alterna-
tives to party and electoral democracy fail to pro-
vide conclusive arguments in favour of replacing 
or restricting the traditional avenues of demo-
cratic legitimation. As far as new governance is 
concerned there may be an attractive methodolog-
ical feature: its preparedness to experiment and to 
develop steps for incremental change and its flexi-
bility to react to yet unknown demands. If we con-
sider European integration as an “experiment in 
identity formation in the absence of the chief force 
that has shaped [national] identity in the past”27 
such flexibility might indeed be an important 
improvement compared to the established con-
flict lines characterising nation-states’ sovereignty 
issues. However, the willingness to turn to such 
experimentation would need to emerge among 
a critical mass of decision-makers. Otherwise it 
would seem highly unlikely that political lead-
ers ignore the existing accountability structures 
determining their professional environment.
The re-emergence of identity as a legal and politi-
cal category
Continuing the experiment of European democ-
racy will certainly need the capacity to look for 
new legal and political instruments. The example 
of the nation-state is deeply engrained in our his-
torical memories and still determines to a large 
extent current geopolitical strategies. Building 
a European democracy hence faces strong head-
winds, not only from voters and national political 
elites but also from academia and constitutional 
courts. Against this it is useful to remember that 
26. Torreblanca et al. 2013
27. Hooghe/Marks 2009, p. 23
ing little to do with the question at hand, such 
as governmental power consolidation or resolu-
tion of party-internal divisions. Their results are 
of course open and sometimes constrain or even 
defy political leadership for a long period of time 
(Hobolt 2006).
Referendums are on simple dichotomous Yes/
No decisions, risk to raise strong emotions and 
determine the political climate for years to come. 
While voters at elections have a choice of different 
ideologies and platforms, in referendums they are 
held to take their pick for one of two simple alter-
natives. Referendums are also known to attract 
voters who express disagreement more easily than 
those who support a given policy. Furthermore, 
negative votes are more likely than positive ones 
to be caused by a variety of different, sometimes 
opposite reasons. A last problem with referen-
dums is that some voters may in general be pro-
European yet still distance themselves from cer-
tain aspects of the multi-faceted integration proj-
ect and therefore vote No on an all-encompassing 
proposition such as the Treaty Establishing a Con-
stitution for Europe.
This analysis would not be complete without men-
tioning the sociology of European citizenship. 
According to UN statistics there about 2-3% of 
the world population migrating to other coun-
tries at any given time. This corresponds exactly 
to the number of citizens living in another EU 
member state beyond short stays for private or 
professional reasons. That internal EU mobility is 
scarcely higher than global migration movements 
reflects in some way Europeans’ cultural, lin-
guistic and professional immobility. Not surpris-
ingly, less than 15% of the EU population identify 
themselves exclusively or primarily as Europeans, 
whereas around 40% have an exclusive national 
identity. European identity is primarily an attri-
bute of the highly educated and well-to-do (Mag-
nette/Papadopoulos 2008, Schmitter 2009). And 
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This line of reasoning remained relatively innocu-
ous for a long time. But the confluence of the pub-
lic debt crisis in some member states and the rati-
fication of the Lisbon Treaty (a watered-down but 
nevertheless substantially similar version of the 
doomed Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe) drove the BvG’s arguments into the new 
territory of “constitutional identity”.28 Democracy 
as the effective possibility to influence policy deci-
sions and electoral equality had long been central 
tenets of BvG doctrine with respect to European 
integration. However, in its Lisbon decision29 and 
in a subsequent case on the minimum electoral 
threshold for the European elections the BvG 
went further than that and maintained that the 
German constitution required a core of legislative 
and political powers which was enumerated in the 
decision. If these powers were emasculated below 
a (yet unspecified) level German citizens would 
lose their constitutionally guaranteed effective 
influence on national policy decisions. Combined 
with the so-called eternity clause of the Basic Law 
this led the Court to the conclusion that the Basic 
Law could only be changed in this respect by the 
German people directly.30
The court goes to great lengths to expound on the 
fact that the Staatenverbund is an association of 
sovereign national states and to detail the condi-
tions for a state to remain sovereign. Particular 
interest has been provoked by the mentioned list of 
inalienable state rights which can never be trans-
ferred to European law-making if the constitu-
tional identity and sovereignty ofemember states 
is to be respected. This list is a list of “pure politi-
cal expediency” – with the Court naming almost 
28. See Lehmann 2010 for a review of scholarly responses 
to the judgment.
29. BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30.6.2009
30. The Court leaves some room for interpretation whether 
this could only happen via a revolutionary constitu-
tional moment or some less radical option such as a 
constitutional convention of the Herrenchiemsee type.
democracy is about the exercise of public power—
and it is beyond doubt that the Union exercises 
public power (Weiler 2012). Furthermore, it has 
been shown that the political and legal develop-
ments since Maastricht have inched the former 
“constitution of the market closer to a constitu-
tionalism grounded in comprehensive principles 
of political legiti macy, however incomplete this 
process may still be” (Isiksel 2012).
One of the most enduring arguments against 
European democracy, rehearsed in many differ-
ent ways over the last 30 years of European Union 
scholarship and case-law, is the lack of European 
identity and a European public space. The rather 
optimistic perspective of neo-functionalism that 
transnational functional interests would create an 
unstoppable dynamic of increasing interdepen-
dence, which would then make necessary supra-
national problem-solving of ever growing scope 
and intensity, accompanied the heady days of the 
Delors Commission and several treaties extend-
ing the European Parliament’s powers. However, 
in parallel at least two other strands of legal and 
academic commentary painted a less sanguine 
picture of the future of Europe. Liberal intergov-
ernmentalism insisted that supranational strate-
gies remained under the firm control of member 
states and were an expression of the economic 
interests of national elites. On the legal front, a 
small number of national constitutional courts, 
under the guidance of the German Bundes-
verfassungsgericht (BvG), questioned the primacy 
of European law over national con stitutional pro-
visions and repeatedly issued reservations defin-
ing a core of national sovereignty untouchable 
by EU legal acts. A considerable amount of legal 
doctrine, popularized in widely read newspapers, 
followed in their wake and maintained that Euro-
pean democracy was an oxymoron: no demos, no 
democracy (recently Grimm 2013).
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same conditions as nationals of that state.” It is 
one of the key features of European citizenship 
that one qualifies for participation in European 
and local elections irrespective of nationality, the 
right depending instead on residence only. For 
this reason alone, each Member of the European 
Parliament not only represents the nationals of a 
given state but all citizens of the Union, not least 
foreign residents of the member state where (s)he 
stands for election.
Instead of taking these incremental steps towards 
transnational democracy seriously the court con-
structs a constitutional dead end: it describes an 
idea of egalitarian and majoritarian parliamentary 
democracy which can only apply in full to central-
ized states; it is already inappropriate to account 
for federal States, including Germany, and can-
not be made to fit the constitutional system of the 
European Union. This type of legal reasoning may 
be a general problem of constitutional law, which 
seems to think in terms of rights and equality 
whereas politics involves, at its core, the organiza-
tion of power. According to an American consti-
tutionalist it may be preferable to leave behind “[u]
nderstandings of rights or equality worked out in 
other domains of constitutional law” because they 
were simply a bad fit for the regulation of politics 
(Pildes 2004).
Coming back to the European situation, the BvG 
ostensibly ignores the European Parliament’s 
efforts to create a European political landscape. 
Its remarkable silence on the extra-institutional 
conditions for meaningful democracy at national 
and European level may insofar hint at substan-
tive indecision within the court. As Wonka has 
argued, the European Parliament provides an 
institutional venue which could fulfil the function 
of creating public awareness of EU decisions, and 
has done so increasingly.32 The exaggerated weight 
given by the BvG to the principle of electoral equal-
32. Wonka 2010, p. 58
all policies whereemember state control is still 
exclusive or at least predominant – and not one of 
principled constitutional interpretation.31 Other 
authors agree that the list is a simple compilation 
and protection of remaining national powers.
There are also long tracts of the judgment speak-
ing about the importance of democracy as a con-
stitutive element for the sovereignty of a member 
state, notably Germany. It is in these paragraphs 
that the BvG considers the European Parliament 
to be structurally unable ever to become a source 
of direct democratic legitimacy. The main rea-
son for this, according to the court, is the very 
strong discrepancy between the electoral impacts 
of citizens from differentemember states. This 
is presented as an unacceptable violation of the 
principle of electoral equality, which is also jeop-
ardized by the attribution of EP seats according 
to national quota. Finally, the court felt obliged, 
contrary to the Maastricht decision, to elaborate 
in great detail that the Basic Law prohibits the 
accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to 
an eventual European federal state. Only the con-
stituent power itself - the people - could make 
such a decision.
The BvG recognised that the Lisbon Treaty 
changes the Parliament’s character so that it will 
no longer consist of “representatives of the peoples 
of the States brought together in the Community” 
but of “representatives of the Union’s citizens”. 
Yet, it does not give this any importance for its 
reasoning on democratic legitimacy at European 
level. In fact, neither the right to stand in Euro-
pean elections nor the right to vote in any given 
state is based on possession of the nationality of 
that state. According to Article 22 (2) TFEU, every 
citizen of the Union residing in anyemember state 
“shall have the right to vote and to stand as a can-
didate in elections to the European Parliament in 
theemember state in which he resides under the 
31. Schönberger 2009, p. 1209
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European representation: 
obstacles and possible responses
The competitive character of inter-related 
accountability structures
In reaction to the failed effort of drawing up a 
Constitution for Europe and the subsequent case 
law new theories of integration such as post-func-
tionalism have been put forward. An important 
element of these theories is the endogenization 
of national identity and the role of political par-
ties and entrepreneurs (Hooghe/Marks 2009). 
Post-functionalists believe that identity is par-
ticularly influential for the general public, much 
more so than for functional interest groups. When 
regional integration extends to the political as well 
as the economic political parties seeking votes and 
trying to minimize internal conflict determine 
whether an issue is politicized or not. Since the 
inception of the public debt crisis this seems to 
create “downward pressure on the level and scope 
of integration”.33 Post-functionalists also include 
geopolitical factors in their models. For instance, 
inter-state rivalries are factored in as impacts on 
elite decision making that are more powerful than 
economic interdependence.
Taking the reflection on political parties one step 
further Philippe Schmitter displays elegantly the 
ambivalent nature of our current situation. While 
“this is not the time to found a political party or 
to expect that any party – whatever the level of 
aggregation – will be able to perform the func-
tions attributed to it in the past”, he is on the other 
hand convinced that the best - in any case the 
most logical - response to the current “elite–mass 
gap in expectations and for re-fashioning multiple 
collective identities according to different levels of 
political aggregation, the place to go would be the 
33. Hooghe/Marks 2009, p. 21
ity leaves aside the importance to select the appro-
priate political personnel obtaining the mandate 
to govern and legislate at a particular level. There 
is a weak link indeed between EU citizens’ formal 
weight of vote and the resulting political mandate 
and success of the parliamentarians that represent 
them in the House.
Finally, the European Citizens’ Initiative intro-
duced by the Lisbon Treaty will significantly 
enhance citizens’ influence on the political agenda 
of the EU legislator. MEPs consider this new 
instrument of citizen participation to be of para-
mount importance for the further evolution of 
European democracy. It may turn out to become 
a constructive version of participatory democracy.
We can conclude that exploring the prospects and 
limits of representative European democracy has 
acquired a new meaning over the past few years. 
Originally an idealistic political project to prepare 
“ever closer union” of the citizens of the EU, the 
construction of an autonomous and legitimate 
democratic system at the European level now 
appears to become a necessary rectification of the 
logic of coupling democracy with the nation state. 
The European Parliament, in agreement with a 
prolific body of scholarship, has upheld that the 
legitimacy of the EU is fed by two streams, one 
flowing from the democratically elected member 
state governments, the other from EU citizens 
enjoying the right to vote for the European Parlia-
ment as an important part of European citizen-
ship. If one of these streams is deliberately cut off 
by national constitutional case law, the question 
of non-nationally derived legitimacy is back on 
the table with new urgency. Failing to reinvigorate 
it may make further democratization of the EU 
impossible, as well as create a major impediment 
to effective policy-making, e.g. in creating a cred-
ible defence against the public debt crisis.
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indeterminate date in the near future”.35 There-
fore, since 2004, with the support of the Commis-
sion, the European Parliament has promoted and 
adopted EU regulations to further the develop-
ment of European political parties and European 
political foundations.
In 2003 Parliament and Council (under qualified 
majority) decided to adopt Regula tion (EC) No 
2004/2003 on political parties at European level 
and the rules regarding their funding.36 It stipu-
lates that a political party at European level shall 
satisfy the following conditions:
a. it must have legal personality in the member 
state in which its seat is located; 
b. it must be represented, in at least one quar-
ter of member states, by Members of the 
European Parliament or in the national Par-
liaments or regional Parliaments or in the 
regional assemblies, or it must have received, 
in at least one quarter of the member states, 
at least 3% of the votes cast in each of those 
member states at the most recent European 
Parliament elections; 
c. it must observe, in particular in its pro-
gramme and in its activities, the principles 
on which the European Union is founded, 
namely the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law; 
d. it must have participated in elections to the 
European Parliament, or have expressed the 
intention to do so.
The Regulation states furthermore that a political 
party at European level shall publish its revenue 
and expenditure and a statement of its assets and 
liabilities annually and declare its sources of fund-
35. Donnelly/Jopp 2009, p. 34
36. OJ L 297 of 15 November 2003, p. 1–4
eventual formation of a supra-national European 
party system.”34
Ever since Schattschneider’s 1942 statement that 
“modern democracy is un thinkable save in terms 
of the parties” research has attributed a central 
role of political representation to political parties. 
Scholars such as Peter Mair, Bernard Manin and 
many others have analysed the way parties have 
changed their appearance and functioning since 
World War II. The representative functions of 
parties became particularly vital at a time when 
distinctions based on property ceased to be nec-
essary qualifications for the right to vote (Schloz-
man et al. 2012, Mair 2008). Obviously much of 
this research has dealt with national parties. How-
ever, the nascent European political parties have 
to face a very similar environment of public opin-
ion. To some extent European parties epitomize 
evolutions that have been observed in national 
democracies: a high concentration of power at 
the top, a lack of party membership and a certain 
withdrawal from voters’ concerns and aspirations. 
In consequence, they face a double challenge: 
convincing voters of the utility of representative 
democracy at the European level and persuad-
ing national party leaders that the emergence of 
a European political landscape might also be in 
their own interest.
National political parties are deeply entrenched in 
territorial rule. They faithfully reflect all sorts of 
administrative, linguistic and cultural boundar-
ies (Lehmann 2011b), which makes it difficult to 
motivate their leadership politically to go beyond 
the existing set-up of nation-states. However, there 
are no strong theoretical or empirical arguments 
for the belief that the nation state is the final geo-
graphical and political destination of democratic 
legitimacy. And there are no reasons to hope that 
an EU demos or polis is “quietly gathering strength 
and substance, ready to emerge fully-formed at an 
34. Schmitter 2009, p. 212
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“outsiders” (who, in any case, are dependent upon 
these national leaders for the further advance-
ment of their career), as is displayed by the cautious 
wording in the regulation on the cross-financing 
of national parties. Parliament’s Committee on 
Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) hence continues 
to explore further steps to make the Euro-parties 
more important players in EU politics.
In a resolution adopted in 2011, on the practical 
experiences gained with the regime for party and 
foundation finance established in 2004/200737 
the Parliament draws some conclusions with a 
view to the next initiatives to take. The resolution 
recalls that the Treaty of Lisbon stresses the role 
of political parties and their foundations to cre-
ate a European polis, a political space at EU level, 
and a European democracy. However, European 
political parties, as they stand, “are not in a posi-
tion to play this role to the full” because they are 
merely umbrella organisations for national parties 
and have no roots in the electorate in the mem-
ber states. Political parties should therefore have 
rights, obligations and responsibilities as legal 
entities and should follow converging general 
organisational patterns. An authentic legal status 
for European political parties and a legal person-
ality of their own, based directly on the law of the 
European Union, would enable the parties and 
their political foundations to act as representative 
agents of the European public interest. In their 
information campaigns the Euro-parties should 
interact and compete on matters relating to com-
mon European challenges.
The proposals of the subsequent AFCO report 
adopted in April 201338 may appear quite technical 
at first sight but enhance the European parties’ sta-
tus vis-à-vis their national counterparts: the envis-
aged regulation defines and implements a legal base 
37. P7_TA(2011)0143
38. Doc. A7-0140/2013, referring to Commission proposal 
COM(2012)499
ing by providing a list specifying the donors and 
the donations received from each donor, with the 
exception of donations not exceeding EUR 500. It 
shall not accept:
 Ȥ anonymous donations,
 Ȥ donations from the budgets of political 
groups in the European Parliament,
 Ȥ donations from any undertaking over which 
the public authorities may exercise directly or 
indirectly a dominant influence,
 Ȥ donations exceeding EUR 12000 per year and 
per donor from any natural or legal person.
Contributions from political parties which are 
members of a political party at European level 
shall be admissible but may not exceed 40 % of 
that party’s annual budget. Funding charged to 
the general budget of the European Union shall 
not exceed 75 % of the budget of a political party 
at European level. The burden of proof shall rest 
with the party. Funds from the general budget of 
the European Union or from any other source may 
not be used for the direct or indirect funding of 
other political parties, and in particular national 
political parties. It is prohibited to intervene, 
financially or otherwise, in national referendums.
The last two provisions incarnate the concerns of 
national political leadership about undue influence 
from the EU level. The restriction to campaign in 
referendums is an evident bulwark against the dif-
fusion of Europe-wide political platforms at strate-
gic moments. Parties’ influence on the selection of 
candidates remains for the moment almost negli-
gible (European Parliament 2009). Their financial 
means for electoral campaigns are feeble and con-
tinue to be under the Damocles sword of national 
regulation. National party leadership is quite ner-
vous about possible minimal influence on the inter-
nal decision procedures coming from the European 
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 Ȥ Europarties obtain the formal right to fund 
EP election activities. However, they may 
not nominate EP candidates or finance cam-
paigns in the context of referendums (includ-
ing those on European issues).
Some member states will need to adopt comple-
mentary national laws to ensure an effective appli-
cation of the Regulation and obtain a sufficient 
transitional period to that end. The regulation is 
to enter into force on 1st January 2017; a review 
will be carried out before the end of 2019.
More internal democracy of European political 
parties: a leftover for reform
Bardi et al. 2010 have outlined political consider-
ations having an impact on the future structure of 
Euro-parties. Although they are in general quite 
reserved about the chances for a satisfactorily 
operational European party system they never-
theless suggest some ideas on how to homogenize 
ideological platforms, improve inter-party coop-
eration and streamline internal democratic pro-
cesses. Such ideas concern issues which have not 
yet caught the attention of most active MEPs. They 
also indicate some problems but also some future 
avenues for reform, some of which have also been 
presented by the former Secretary General of the 
Parliament (Priestley 2010). He notably challenges 
Euro-parties to accept the possibility for individ-
uals to become direct members of such a party. 
Recruiting individual members and activists who 
are more visible for public opinion would democ-
ratize internal party procedures (e.g., through a 
system of qualified majority votes on posts and 
platforms, more influence for party delegates sent 
to congresses, designation by secret ballot of a 
candidate for the Commission presidency, possi-
bly in open primaries).
Until recently, the statutes of only one European 
political party, the EUDemocrats - Alliance for 
a Europe of Democracies (EUD), allowed for full 
for the establishment of a European party in EU 
law from 2017. Euro-parties are, for the moment, 
obliged to register their head offices in one of the 
member states (normally Belgium) under national 
rules. With respect to the ban to contribute to the 
financing of referendum campaigns, Parliament 
has long called for a right of Europarties to partici-
pate in referendum campaigns as long as the sub-
ject of the referendum has a direct link with issues 
concerning the European Union.
The 2013 Parliament resolution led to trialogue 
negotiations with Council and Commission in 
view of a first reading agreement. The main results, 
adopted in April 2014, are as follows:39
 Ȥ European political parties and foundations 
acquire European legal personality by conver-
sion of the national legal personality into a 
successor European legal personality.
 Ȥ Registration conditions verify the respect of 
values on which the EU is founded, including 
observance of EU values by national member 
parties.
 Ȥ An independent authority is created for 
the purpose of registration/verifi cation/de-
registration of parties and foundations. It is 
advised by a Committee of independent emi-
nent persons.
 Ȥ The consequences of manifest and serious 
violations of EU values or failure to fulfil 
other obligations are defined; the Court of 
Justice of the European Union may review the 
legality of the decisions of the Authority.
 Ȥ Flexibility elements for the funding of founda-
tions are introduced, concerning multi-annual 
programming and carry-over provisions.
39. See European Parliament legislative resolution of 16 
April 2014 (T7-0421/2014)
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democracy was the selection of candidates for the 
Commission presidency before the 2014 elections.
Pitfalls of asymmetric electoral representation
Both channels of democratic legitimation of the 
EU are predominantly determined by the same 
principal, national party leadership. This is no new 
insight. In 1987, Reif and Niedermayer noted that 
there was a “marked discrepancy” between the 
function nominally attributed to the European 
Parliament and its real function, notably a mis-
match between high constitutional expectations 
and the practical design of the vote.40 Indeed, the 
1976 European Electoral Act revised in 2002 only 
stipulates the general principles of the proportional 
vote, incompatibility with a national parliamen-
tary mandate and a maximum threshold of 5%. 
All other necessary provisions on campaign rules, 
design of the ballot, apportionment of seats and 
many others remain under the control of national 
legislation. One result of this is that on campaign 
posters and in other media the Europarties only 
exceptionally appear with their own logos and 
platforms. In addition, national party leadership 
selects the candidates for the European elections. 
This reduces the Europarties’ influence and vis-
ibility to a very low level (EP 2009).
A few scholars have developed ideas to improve 
this situation. Some of them appear almost uto-
pian, others may be partially realized over the 
medium-term. Simms (2012) reflects on chances 
for a “new pan-European party” which would aim 
to gain a majority in the European Parliament in 
European elections or, if this turned out to be dif-
ficult, to win majorities in the respective national 
legislatures (or both). This should then lead to the 
emergence of a pan-European party landscape.
In a more realistic vein, Schleicher identified con-
flicts between the goal of making the EP a direct 
popular check of the Commission and the Coun-
40. p. 172. See also Hix 2002.
individual membership of any citizen who might 
be interested to join. One year ago, the Liberal 
party (ALDE) created associate membership for 
individuals who may not be members of a national 
party. Associate members are able to participate 
and be a candidate in online elections that will 
select the delegate(s) representing associate mem-
bers at the yearly ALDE Party Congress. Member-
ship of the other parties is restricted to national 
parties or MEPs. But attitudes seem to change in 
some Euro-parties. At a workshop organised in 
January 2011, the vice-chairperson of the Euro-
pean Green Party announced that the Greens 
would soon envisage a change of their statutes in 
this direction. However, the latest Rule Book of 
the European Green Party of May 2013 does not 
provide for this possibility.
The Parliament had long emphasised the need 
for all European political parties to conform to 
the highest standards of internal party democ-
racy (democratic election of party bodies, demo-
cratic decision-making processes, including for 
the selection of candidates). However, strong 
hesitations to open Euro-parties for individual 
membership remain. In spite of much talk at 
the top of new means of participatory democ-
racy parties themselves remain very hierarchical 
organisations, with strict chains of command at 
and between the various levels of aggregation. It 
follows that these command chains are closely 
watched by party leadership. Any proposal for 
change is examined for its likely effects on the 
present party leadership. Most incumbents hesi-
tate to introduce changes which could jeopardize 
their chances for re-nomination or their control 
powers of the internal party workings. Under 
such conditions problems such as starkly vary-
ing membership from different countries will 
certainly be very difficult to resolve. Some system 
of quotas, vote weights such as super-qualified 
majorities or other balancing acts will be neces-
sary. One important practical expression of party 
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the most relevant tool voters have for overcom-
ing their ignorance of politics is the heuristic pro-
vided by a political party (cf. also Manin 1997) the 
repeated practices of voters would contribute to 
growing an understanding of European politics. 
Two problems with Schleicher’s ideas may occur: 
(1) On what political issues should EP voters form 
their “running tallies” if few salient policies are 
decided at the EU level, and if due to the institu-
tional compromises prevalent in European deci-
sion-making no clear impact of separate parties 
can be singled out? (2) There have already been 
warnings from MEPs and academic commenta-
tors that turnout may fall even further due to new 
and foreign-sounding party names. This develop-
ment can of course not be ruled out and may pos-
sibly constitute a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The last argument brings us to the European Par-
liament’s proposals for electoral reform because 
similar objections have been raised against the 
introduction of a single EU-wide constituency 
for a small number of additional MEPs (Duff 
2010). MEPs have argued, for instance, that such 
a constituency would create a two-class system of 
MEPs, that it would intensify the personalization 
and mediatization of electoral campaigns, and 
that the presentation of foreign-sounding can-
didates would alienate voters even more than is 
the case now. The rapporteur’s rejoinder was that 
“the addition of a transnational list elected from a 
pan-EU constituency would enhance the popular 
legitimacy of the European Parliament by widen-
ing voter choice. The voter would be able to artic-
ulate politically his or her plural citizenship, one 
national, the other European: two votes are better 
than one.”41 One could add that, as we have seen 
above in the analysis of modern representative 
democracy, personalization and mediatization are 
not at all limited to European elections and that 
in view of the lack of interest at present this might 
be an acceptable price to pay. One problem with a 
41. p. 60
cil (its institutional purpose) and the way the elec-
tions are organized (2011). He underlines that 
there are practical tools to create electoral incen-
tives that accord an advantage to territorially 
based parties which are willing to appeal to voters 
other than those of their own constituency. The 
question raised by Schleicher is thus whether elec-
toral rule change can provide a tool for realigning 
institutional purpose and practical implementa-
tion. The most radical idea is to require parties to 
attain a certain threshold of votes in more than 
one member state. Drawing inspiration from the 
regulation on Europarties which requires parties 
to be present or to campaign in at least a quar-
ter of the member states, a party presenting can-
didates for election to the European Parliament 
would need to have a minimum electoral success 
in several member states and appear on the ballot 
separately from the national parties. This would 
allow the Euro-party brands to develop identities 
over time that were separate from those of their 
domestic partners. It would also limit the ability 
of candidates to make purely nationalistic appeals 
that would be unpopular in other countries, as 
candidates from a Euro-party in one country 
could be held accountable for things said by their 
co-partisans in another country.
A less problematic proposal, taken up by other 
authors (Oelbermann et al. 2011), concerns the 
design of the ballots used in European elections, 
which should not carry the acronyms of national 
parties but those of their European partners. 
There may be linguistic details to be sorted out but 
from a rational-choice perspective such a seem-
ingly small change would enable voters to exercise 
their accountability function in direct relation to 
the European parties. This would of course take 
time over several electoral cycles but, as Schleicher 
puts it, it would allow electors to establish “run-
ning tallies” of the political decisions made by 
European parties, thus clarifying the purpose of 
the vote. Finally, since in most modern elections 
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ate press coverage received by Marine Le Pen and 
Geert Wilders on their project of uniting several 
Eurosceptic parties in order to obtain group status 
in the EP is a case in point. Moreover, the selection 
duty would have to be combined with clearer party 
programmes and a more proactive behaviour with 
respect to the election of the Commission Presi-
dent. There is a certain amount of research show-
ing that parties which display a clear position on 
European issues do better in the EP elections than 
others (Lord 2010).
In summary, the EU-wide constituency would 
bring about most of the advantages of multi-state 
thresholds without some of their drawbacks. Plural 
thresholds might well be a further step of reform 
once an EU-wide constituency is well established. 
These proposals are certainly not sufficient to cre-
ate the necessary conditions for a lively political 
debate at the European level but would need the 
restructuring of European political parties out-
lined above (Bardi et al. 2010).
Towards a parliamentary system? The presenta-
tion of candidates for Commission President
One of the key measures in bringing about the 
‘Europeanisation’ of the parliamentary elections, 
more lively intra-party democracy, and higher 
voter participation is the nomination of candi-
dates for President of the European Commission. 
In this regard, the European Parliament adopted 
a resolution on 4 July 2013 on improving prac-
tical arrangements for the 2014 parliamentary 
elections42 calling on the European political par-
ties to nominate candidates for the Presidency 
of the European Commission, who should pres-
ent their political programmes in all member 
states. This initiative has finally been accepted 
by national leaders despite some resistance. The 
five Europarty candidates participated in several 
television debates, campaigned in most member 
42. T7-0323/2013
two-votes system is that many voters are not used 
to it although it would be less of a problem in fed-
eral systems such as Germany where the Bunde-
stag is elected more or less the same way (Erst- und 
Zweitstimme).
The proposal for electoral reform was sent back to 
committee in May 2011 and will only be taken up 
again during the next term. One reason for this is 
that some elements of the proposal would require 
treaty revision. Other proposals in AFCO’s report, 
such as the introduction of semi-open party lists 
or improving the franchise for citizens living in 
other member states, will hopefully be part of the 
renewed reform effort. Perhaps the most radical 
effect of these changes of the electoral procedure 
would be to confront the European political par-
ties with an important political challenge: to select 
the candidates for the EU-wide constituency and 
to stage an effective campaign for them. This would 
in all likelihood transform the posture of Europar-
ties over the years and enable them to acquire a 
more independent role with respect to national 
party structures. It would open a host of necessi-
ties and possibilities for inter-party communica-
tion and cooperation, Europe-wide head-hunting 
for suitable candidates and new energies for the 
implementation of interesting proposals to euro-
peanize the European elections: use Euro-party 
acronyms on ballot papers, require Euro-parties 
to obtain a certain percentage of votes in more 
than one member state and other instruments to 
make regular public appearances of non-national 
politicians the rule rather than the exception.
One day this might even radiate to the selection 
of other MEP candidates. It has of course been 
argued that to elect only 25 MEPs on the new 
transnational quota is insufficient to interest the 
Europarties to spend significant resources on the 
campaign. However, this claim probably underes-
timates the novelty effect and the media impact 
of a cross-border campaign. The disproportion-
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cal deficit. Major decisions concerning the EU 
are taken in an ambiance of “There is no alter-
native”, with little contestation between right 
and left. Many MEPs are painfully aware of this 
when they start to campaign. Being obliged to 
start out stereotypically by acknowledging that 
all mainstream parties are pro-European neuters 
electoral campaigns for the European Parliament 
and inhibits MEPs to spell out their convictions. 
One way out of this might be that the mass pro-
integration parties in Europe regain lost ground 
in the battle over European integration by living 
up to the facts of politicization. The way to do this, 
at least for some observers, would be to politicize 
Europe along the left/right cleavage. As a result, 
European issues ought to be framed in terms of 
the direction of European policies rather than 
with regard to European integration (Börzel/Risse 
2009). The political refusal, by left and right, to 
focus on economic distribution and the manage-
ment of the economy for production and distri-
bution may need to be abandoned for arriving at 
such a politicization (Mair 2008).
The sometimes technical improvements discussed 
by some researchers and by the Parliament should 
be seen as incremental steps to prepare full-fledged 
electoral campaigning at the European level. This 
strategy is not without risks as it may provide a 
platform for jingoist political entrepreneurs along 
the tan dimension found by Hooghe and Marks 
(2009). The optimistic bet would be that feelings 
of territorial and social identity are the result of 
acquiring legal, cultural and political habits and 
of sustained interaction between citizens and 
their political institutions at various levels. On the 
other hand, the power of incumbents in political 
office and of existing legal and political account-
ability structures can hardly be overestimated. 
Resistance to change can certainly be explained 
in a framework of rational choice theories, pos-
tulating that those who benefit from institutions 
already in place have strong incentives to use their 
states and were covered extensively in the press. 
However, the impact of this on voter turn-out has 
been regrettably weak.
There are of course advocates of a non-partisan 
profile of the Commission and authors warning to 
go down the way towards a parliamentary system. 
Indeed, the current institutional structure of the 
EU resembles more a presidential or separated-
powers system (Kreppel 2011). Any move towards 
a more parliamentary system with its dynam-
ics of “government” and opposition parties may 
bring surprises with respect to the acceptance of 
the Commission’s proposals in Parliament or, vice 
versa, the reaction of the Commission to parlia-
mentary legislative initiatives. A further institu-
tional aspect are the absolute majorities required 
for many legislative decision (e.g., at third reading), 
which make it necessary that the major groups 
cooperate. Even if the President of the Commis-
sion were elected by a clear-cut majority in both 
EU “chambers” - the governments gathered in the 
Council being considered as a kind of European 
Bundesrat - he would have to compromise, nota-
bly to confront the problem of forging majorities 
in the EP and of adapting to shifting balances in 
the Council (Magnette/Papadopoulos 2008).
However, the political dynamics developing in all 
parties are a true innovation. The quality media’s 
reactions have been very positive and the means 
at the disposal of the top candidates appeared suf-
ficient. European parties were allowed to support 
their candidates. In addition, there seems to be 
strong cohesion on this point among newly elected 
MEPs and EP groups. The European Council seems 
likely to accept that the future Commission Presi-
dent will be chosen among the party candidates.
Conclusion
In Renaud Dehousse’s words, the EU suffers not 
primarily from a democratic but from a politi-
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On the other hand, the need to make EU public 
policy more transparent (Elmar Brok: Who does 
what, and why?) persists. Citizens expect such 
transparency against the background of what they 
are accustomed to at the national level. Although 
any simple duplication of national institutional 
structures would ignore the specifics of the Euro-
pean political system, declaring the idea of a 
robust European parliamentarianism as utopian 
could also be a sign of intellectual apathy or con-
stitutional fatigue. The case against representative 
democracy in Europe may not be as strong as it 
seems and the costs of making do without it may 
indeed be high (see Kumm 2008). A European 
parliamentary, but partially separate powers sys-
tem will certainly be different from any national 
model (see Bellamy 2010) but in view of growing 
popular discontent about the EU it still seems to be 
one of the most promising and logical avenues, one 
crucial part of which, against all odds, is arguably 
a further development of a European party system.
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ers and party politicians on economic matters is 
identical. If the policy positions of politicians on 
economic matters can be modelled in terms of a 
single dimension and the ideal points of voters on 
economic matters cannot, this undermines the 
quality of democratic representation.
This looks specifically at the policy preferences 
of candidates for the European Parliament and 
the policy preference of those citizens who voted 
for their party in the European Parliament elec-
tions. The focus is on economic matters. This is 
particularly relevant, because, as Costello et al. 
(2012) argue, the bulk of the work of the European 
Parliament is economic nature and because of 
the ongoing economic crisis, economic questions 
have become even more central to the European 
political agenda.
The core argument of this stands in contrast to 
a recent article by Costello et al. (2012). Their 
study used the same data and one of the methods 
employed here, but answered a different question; 
they asked whether a three-dimensional European 
political space (with an economic, cultural and 
European dimension) fit the answers of citizens 
and whether politicians and citizens stood close to 
each other on these dimensions. They determined 
that voters and politicians stood closest to each 
other on the economic dimension. On European 
integration and cultural issues, they found that 
citizens and their political representatives stood 
further apart. Their model included a control for 
acquiescence bias, the tendency of respondents to 
answer questions affirmatively. This will show that 
acquiescence bias is not the reason for the lack of 
coherence. This will spend special attention on the 
theory and method of the article of Costello et al. 
(2012). 
This will have the following structure: first, the 
theory section will show the importance of the 
notion that voters’ views and politicians’ views 
1. Introduction43
Since 2008, Europe has seen an on-going bank-
ing, economic and budgetary crisis. Politicians 
have offered different solutions for this crisis. On 
the right, politicians, like German chancellor 
Angela Merkel, have argued for austerity policies. 
Left-wing politicians, like French president Fran-
çois Hollande, have campaigned on the promise of 
higher taxes for the wealthy and increased govern-
ment spending. This left-right conflict in Europe 
fits the traditional model of political science: 
evidence has shown that the economic left-right 
dimension is persistent at the level of the political 
elite (Benoit and Laver 2006; Budge and Robert-
son 1987; Hix and Noury 2009). There is increas-
ing evidence, however, that voters do not under-
stand economic issues in those terms (Achterberg, 
Houtman, and Derks 2011; Derks 2004, 2006; 
Goerres and Prinzen 2011). Voters’ views are far 
more diverse: 
A single common left-right dimension is an 
important precondition for policy congruence 
between the views of citizens and the political 
elite (Costello et al. 2012; Downs 1957; Thomas-
sen 1999). If the structures that underlie the policy 
preferences of politicians and voters differ, there 
can be no congruence between the policy prefer-
ences of the electorate and their representatives: 
because there are no party politicians catering to 
the preferences of citizens that do not fit in the 
structure underlying the opinions of politicians. 
If all parties offer either policy bundles that con-
sist out of higher taxes and investments in public 
services or bundles that consist out of lower taxes 
and austerity, voters that prefer lower taxes and 
investments in public services cannot be repre-
sented adequately. This article tests whether the 
structure underlying the views of European vot-
43. The author wants to thank Rory Costello for sharing 
his replication data and code and Matthijs Rooduijn 
for his assistance with confirmatory factor analysis in 
Stata.
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for enterprises to thrive; another party may favour 
nationalising the healthcare sector and increas-
ing taxes in order to ensure that citizens have free 
access to this service. By voting for one party, 
voters get the whole bundle (Costello et al. 2012; 
Thomassen 1999). Voters that want lower taxes but 
citizens to have free access to healthcare cannot be 
serviced by parties that either offer lower taxes or 
free healthcare. 
2.1 Economic Left and Right
The question which dimensions structure the 
voter and the party space is a key in political sci-
ence. Scholars disagree over the extent to which 
a single left-right dimension, rooted in economic 
issues suffices to understand voting and politi-
cal decision-making. Some argue that the left-
right economic dimension is ‘a super issue’ which 
includes all these issues or pushes other issues off 
the political agenda (Inglehart and Klingemann 
1976). Other authors have argued that alternative 
dimensions are necessary. These include dimen-
sions concerning religious morality, the environ-
ment, immigration, European integration and law 
and order (Costello et al. 2012; Gabel and Ander-
son 2002; Inglehart 1984; Kitschelt 1994; Kriesi et 
al. 2008; Lipset 1960).
The question is not only which dimensions struc-
ture the political space, but also whether the 
dimensions that structure the voter and the party 
space are identical. Kriesi et al. (2008) and Costello 
et al. (2012) found that all over Europe voters and 
party politicians could be placed in a common 
space. Three dimensions that respectively concern 
economic, cultural and European issues struc-
ture this space. In contrast, Van der Brug and Van 
Spanje (2009; Van der Brug 2008) problematise 
the notion of a common space in which voters 
and party politicians position themselves: they 
find that a one-dimensional solution suffices for 
the party space, while a multidimensional solution 
have the same structure for the theory of repre-
sentation. Next, the method section will discuss 
techniques assessing the dimensional structure 
underlying the view of respondents. In order to 
ensure that the findings presented here are not 
the result of some methodological fluke, differ-
ent techniques will be employed. Then, the results 
sections will show how the structure of the views 
of voters and politicians differs. The result section 
will also address acquiescence bias and then it 
will show what these results mean for the qual-
ity of democratic representation. The conclusion 
sketches an agenda for further research.
2. Left, Right and Representation
A key model in the literature of representative 
democracy is the Responsible Party Model (APSA 
1950; Thomassen 1999). In this model, elections 
function as instruments to link citizens’ policy 
preferences to the policy positions of their repre-
sentatives (Costello et al. 2012; Thomassen 1999; 
Mair 2013). For this model to function three con-
ditions must be met: first, on the supply side of 
politics, politicians or parties differentiate them-
selves by offering different bundles of policies; 
second, on the demand side of politics, voters 
must choose between party politicians on basis 
of their preferences for these policies (Thomas-
sen 1999). Third, party politicians’ and voters’ 
positions must be structured by a single common 
policy dimension: i.e. the positions of parties in 
programs, the actions of members of parliaments 
and the policy preferences of voters should be 
constrained by the same dimension (Costello et 
al. 2012; Downs 1957; Thomassen 1999). The rea-
son for this is that parties offer bundles of policies. 
In order to assure that the bundle of policies does 
not contain policies that the voter opposes, there 
must be a common policy dimension that struc-
tures the positions of party politicians and voters. 
One party may favour liberalizing markets and 
lowering taxes in order to create a better climate 
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On basis of the existing literature one may expect 
politicians to have coherent views about economic 
matters. Existing evidence shows that certainly 
on economic questions the left-right dimension 
is strong and persistent: in terms of the views of 
parties expressed in party manifestos (Budge and 
Robertson 1987), their ideal positions according 
to expert surveys (Benoit and Laver 2006) and 
positions of politicians expressed in the European 
Parliament (Hix and Noury 2009).
Why is this the case? One reason may be that 
party politicians balance responsibility and rep-
resentation when taking positions (Mair 2009). 
Representation comes from the ‘responsible’ 
party model (APSA 1950):44 in order to win elec-
tions, the positions of parties and politicians must 
match those of potential voters. Party politicians 
also bear responsibility for the economic policies 
of the government: Mair (2009) defines a respon-
sible policy as prudent and consistent. According 
to Mair (2009) prudence and consistency limits 
the range of positions party politicians can take: 
parties cannot immediately nationalize all pub-
lic services or abolish all taxes. This argues that 
responsibility limits combinations of positions 
party politicians can take: only by raising taxes 
can the government afford to nationalize pub-
lic services, or tax cuts must be accompanied by 
spending cuts. This is because economic issues 
come with their own logical constraints (Milyo 
2000). Preferences about economic policies are 
not primitive or independent but they cohere in 
an economic logic (Milyo 2000): for instance, the 
level of government spending (one element of the 
economic left-right dimension) has implications 
for taxation levels, price levels and income levels 
(other elements of the economic left-right dimen-
sion). Because responsible politicians will not 
44. The word ‘responsible’ in this model is quite confusing 
as in the literature this element can rather be described 
as ‘responsive’
is necessary for the voters’ positions: the left-right 
dimension structures positions of party politicians, 
while among citizens positions on cultural and eco-
nomic issues are independent from each other.
This article moves away from the ambition to build 
a comprehensive model of voter and party spaces 
and focuses on the dimensionality of one, impor-
tant, issue: the economy. The economic dimension 
is key for understanding of politics: most political 
decision-making concerns economic questions. 
One famous definition of politics itself sees it as 
the way society answers the question ‘who gets 
what, when and how?’ (Laswell 1936). In the clas-
sical model of democracy of Downs (1957) eco-
nomic decision-making, and specifically the role 
of the government in the economy, is seen as the 
overarching political question.
In the literature there is broad agreement that the 
economic dimension concerns two different ele-
ments (Bobbio 1996; Costello et al. 2012; Downs 
1957; Knutsen and Kumlin 2005; Kriesi et al. 2008; 
Lipset et al. 1954): the extent to which one prefers 
government intervention in the economy to the 
free market principle of laissez-faire (economic 
interventionism); and the extent to which one pre-
fers redistribution of income in the interest of the 
less well of (economic egalitarianism). In general, 
leftwing voters, parties and politicians favour a 
government that intervenes in the economy, redis-
tributes income, runs nationalized public services, 
levies high taxes and ensures generous welfare 
state benefits. Rightwing voters, parties and poli-
ticians favour a small government that abstains 
from interfering in the economy, levies low taxes, 
lets enterprises supply services, does not intervene 
in the income distribution and limits welfare state 
benefits. 
2.2 Voters and Representatives
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coherence in the views of citizens to acquiescence 
bias. They control for the fact that citizens with 
weak opinions tend to answer questions affirma-
tively independent of the questions. This tendency 
of citizens to acquiesce is already a sign that the 
views of citizens on these issues are underdevel-
oped. From the perspective of democratic repre-
sentation, the difference in the coherence between 
citizens and politicians is a theoretical problem. 
On issues where the structure that underlies the 
positions of party politicians and voter positions 
differs ‘elections are doomed to fail as an instru-
ment of linkage with regards to those issues’ 
(Costello et al. 2012). 
3. Methods
Spatial models are built on the assumption that 
respondents do not choose their positions at ran-
dom. Their answers reflect a latent low-dimen-
sional structure. Methods of data reduction model 
this latent structure on basis of observed items. 
Applying methods of data reduction in itself is a 
process of creation. Researchers choose particular 
observations and specific measurement models 
(Coombs 1964). Each method comes with its own 
advantages, drawbacks, assumptions, options and 
diagnostics. Therefore, it may be that studies with 
different methods, especially when they seek to 
answer dissimilar questions, come to different 
conclusions about the dimensionality of the politi-
cal space. This also means that there is no “true” 
map of voter or party positions (Benoit and Laver 
2006). Data also does not have a correct dimen-
sionality, what one can assess whether a one-
dimensional model fits the views of politicians 
better than the views of voters (cf. Otjes 2011). In 
order to ensure that the results presented here are 
not an artefact of some specific method, the results 
will be crossvalidated using three methods. 
favour inconsistent policies, the policy positions 
of politicians will tend to cohere. 
For voters, the economy may be a particularly 
‘hard’ issue (Carmines and Stimson 1980): many 
economic measures are technical. The relation-
ship between policy ends, such as income equality, 
and policy means, such as government interven-
tion, may not be apparent. In general, the views of 
citizens may be less constrained: Converse (1964) 
already observed that in the United States many 
voters simply did not have meaningful beliefs, not 
even on questions that dominated the political 
debate for years. His findings have been found in 
other countries and more recent time periods (But-
ler and Stokes 1974; Zaller 1992). Although some 
argue that these findings come from measurement 
error and that using multi-item scales the views 
of voters are more consistent (Achen 1975; Anso-
labehere et al. 2008; ). Recent literature on public 
opinion, using multi-item scales, has shown that a 
large share of citizens has views on economic mat-
ters that are inconsistent from the perspective of a 
single left-right dimension (Achterberg et al. 2011; 
Derks 2004, 2006; Goerres and Prinzen 2011).45 
This pattern has been shown in different coun-
tries, different studies, for general economic issues 
and specific questions about the welfare state and 
using different methods of measuring scale qual-
ity. This leads to the following hypothesis, which 
will be tested in the remainder of this:
The economic views of politicians fit better into 
a single-dimensional economic left-right model 
than the views of citizens about the same subject.
Earlier studies have treated the lack of coherence 
in the views of citizens as a measurement problem 
(Costello et al. 2012; Wagner and Kritzinger 2012; 
Walczak, Van der Brug, and de Vries, 2012) or a 
country-specific anomaly (Sperber 2010). Costello 
et al. (2012), for instance attribute the lack of 
45. ‘Inconsistent’ is not meant as a moral judgment of the 
views of citizens, but as a methodological assessment.
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items that most respondents correctly answer 
(‘easy items’) to items which least respondents give 
the correct answer (‘difficult items’). In this case 
it will model items from left to right. A scale is 
consistent if a one-dimensional structure under-
lies these answers. The extent to which answers 
follow a one-dimensional structure is expressed 
in terms of the number of errors that are made: 
respondents that answer easy questions wrong 
and difficult answers correctly. While Mokken 
scaling was originally developed for dichotomous 
items, polytomous Mokken scaling was developed 
for ordinal items such as the ones employed here 
(Van der Ark 2007). 
These methods come with their own diagnostic 
statistics of model quality. The main question of 
this is whether party politicians have significantly 
more consistent opinions than voters. Therefore 
this will assess whether the responses of voters 
have a worse fit in a one-dimensional model than 
the responses of politicians. Confirmatory factor 
analysis has a number of goodness or badness of 
fit measures: here the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 
will be used. This is preferred over other standard 
measures such as the Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation and the Standardised Root Mean 
Square Residual, which tend to overestimate errors 
in small sample sizes (West et al. 2012). Therefore, 
they cannot be used to compare fit between the 
larger samples of voters and the smaller samples 
of politicians. The CFI is acceptable if it is larger 
than 0.9 (Brown 2006). In assessing the model fit 
of the CFA models it is important to also exam-
ine the direction of the factor loadings: these are 
important, because confirmatory factor analysis 
does not test the assumption that relationships are 
in a particular direction, while the Mokken scale 
analysis and Cronbach’s do. So results can show 
a good fit in confirmatory factor analysis, even 
when the relationships go in against the expected 
direction. The H-value of Mokken scaling and 
the eponymous Cronbach’s are the single diag-
3.1 Methods of data reduction
Methods of data reduction come in two families: 
item response theory and classical test theory. The 
methods of classical test theory, such as Cron-
bach’s a, confirmatory factor analysis, essentially, 
build further on correlation. Cronbach’s a mea-
sures the reliability (‘internal consistency’) of a 
scale (Cronbach 1951). This is operationalised 
as the correlation between the items in the scale 
and the latent dimension. Reliability is a pre-con-
dition for unidimensionality, but not a sufficient 
condition (Cortina 1993). Factor analysis can be 
applied in an exploratory and a confirmatory way 
(Brown 2006). This will employ confirmatory 
factor analysis, as the goal is to test whether the 
positions of voters on a range of economic issues 
can be understood in terms of one dimension. 
Data must meet the assumptions of regression for 
use in these classical test theory methods; these 
assumptions include a normal distribution and a 
linear relation between the items. If the data does 
not conform to these assumptions, classical test 
theory methods tend to overestimate the number 
of dimensions (Van Schuur and Kiers 1994). One 
drawback of structural equation modelling is that 
models sometimes do not converge (Brown 2006): 
this is a sign of poor specification. The number 
of cases may be too low, making the result sensi-
tive to outliers. The data may not fit the assump-
tions. The model may also be too complex for the 
data. While the models can be slightly adjusted in 
order to converge, this will not be pursued here, 
because then the models can no longer be com-
pared between for instance elite and mass level 
responses.
Mokken scaling is a method from the item 
response theory family (Mokken 1971; Van 
Schuur 2003). This method has fewer assumptions 
about the distribution of the data. The method was 
developed for educational tests. The Mokken scal-
ing algorithm builds a structure that ranges from 
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Table 2: Items
Label Question Options Direction
State Public services and 
industries should be 
in state ownership.
A: 5 Leftwing
Enterprise Private enterprise 
is best to solve 
[country’s] economic 
problems.
A: 5 Rightwing*
Interventionism Politics should 
abstain from 
intervening in the 
economy
A: 5 Rightwing*
Egalitarianism Income and 
wealth should be 
redistributed towards 
ordinary people.
A: 5 Leftwing
Abortion Women should be 
free to decide on 
matters of abortion
A: 5 Leftwing
Immigration Immigration to 
(country) should 
be decreased 
significantly
A: 5 Rightwing
Sentences People who break the 
law should get much 
harsher sentences 
than now
A: 5 Rightwing
Marriage Same-sex marriage 
should be prohibited 
by law
A: 5 Rightwing
Referendum EU treaty changes 
should be decided by 
referendum
A: 5 Anti-
European
Parliament The European 
Parliament takes into 
consideration the 
concerns of
European citizens
A: 5 Pro-
European
Trust You trust the 
institutions of the 
European Union
A: 5 Pro-
European
Democracy How satisfied are 
you with the way 
democracy works in 
the EU?
P: 4 Pro-
European
A: Agreement;  
P: Position on a scale; number of answer categories.  
* indicates that the items was recoded in the Mokken and 
Cronbach’s a analyses.
nostic statistics of these methods. An value above 
0.5 indicates acceptable levels of internal consis-
tency (Kline 1999). An H-value above 0.3 indicates 
acceptable levels of scalability (Mokken 1971). 
Table 1: Number of Respondents
Country Candidates Respondents
Austria 42 897
Belgium 56 796
Bulgaria 6 826
Cyprus 7 882
Czech Republic 21 908
Denmark 24 824
Estonia 24 858
Finland 40 897
France 112 871
Germany 140 931
Greece 20 915
Hungary 25 869
Ireland 7 880
Italy 59 844
Lithuania 38 827
Latvia 30 771
Luxembourg 15 877
Malta 9 685
Netherlands 72 920
Poland 35 844
Portugal 17 790
Romania 23 739
Slovakia 26 838
Slovenia 18 914
Spain 56 824
Swedish 159 884
United Kingdom 242 892
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3.3 Acquiescence Bias
This research is similar to that of Costello et al. 
(2012). Using confirmatory factor analysis, they 
find that a three-dimensional structure fits a com-
bined candidate and voter data set. This structure 
includes a three-item economic dimension. Their 
model only shows sufficient fit when they control 
for acquiescence bias, the tendency of respondents 
to answer affirmatively to survey questions, inde-
pendent of what the questions concerns substan-
tively (Billiet and McClendon 2001). This section 
will discuss some methodological issues with the 
solution of Costello et al. (2012) and how these 
will be addressed in this.
They follow Billiet and McClendon’s (2001) solu-
tion for acquiescence bias: the idea is to construct a 
model for two sets of items that are balanced. This 
means that they have an equal number of items 
with ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ wording. And then one 
can estimate three factors: two substantial factors 
related to one of the two sets of items and then a 
third factor which has a fixed loading of one for all 
items. This would be called a ‘response style factor’.
Costello et al. (2012) estimate three substantive 
dimensions: an economic one, a cultural one and 
EU one. They use three economic items (two with 
a left-wing orientation and one with a right-wing 
orientation), while there are four economic items 
in the EES (two left-wing and two right-wing). 
They exclude the item on interventionism.46 This 
is problematic for two reasons: first, the economic 
set of items is not balanced; and second, interven-
tionism is core part of the notion of the economic 
left-right dimension (Downs 1957). None of their 
sets of items are balanced. They use four cultural 
items (three with ‘conservative’ wording and one 
with ‘progressive’ wording) and four European 
items (two with pro-European wording, one with 
46. They do not explain why the interventionism item has 
been excluded but Costello et al. (2012, footnote 3) do 
lament the lack of balance in their items.
3.2 Data Sources
This analyses whether the positions of citizens and 
voters on economic questions can be understood 
in terms of a single dimensional model. The 2009 
European Elections Survey (EES) and the 2009 
European Elections Candidate Survey (EECS) will 
be employed here (Weßels and WZB 2010; Van 
Egmond et al. 2010). Voters and candidates were 
asked to answer the same questions. This allows 
one to compare the extent to which their views 
cohere. The EES was held in all 27 EU member 
states after the 2009 European Parliament election. 
A thousand voters were sampled in each country. 
For the EECS all candidate MEPs were asked to 
answer a questionnaire. 25% of candidate MEPs 
responded. The total respondents per country 
differed strongly, as can be seen in Table 1. Can-
didates and citizens will be analysed separately. 
Only models with 40 or more respondents will be 
presented given how especially Confirmatory Fac-
tor Analysis is sensitive to the number of respon-
dents (Brown 2006). This means that candidate 
surveys from 17 member states will be excluded. 
Because so many countries were excluded a model 
for the candidates from all member states is also 
included.
The EES and EECS were selected, because they are 
the only survey that includes both politicians and 
voters from such a high number of countries. The 
only drawback of the study is that it includes only 
four economic items (listed in Table 2). This may 
be too little basis to assess the coherence of the 
economic left-right dimension. However, given 
the strength that the scholarly literature ascribes 
to the left-right dimension, one would expect that 
these items that concern closely related issues, 
especially in the domain of government inter-
vention, cohere. Respondents with missing items 
were deleted list-wise per analysis. All items have 
been recalculated so that they are in a left to right 
conceptual direction. 
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Table 3: Voter-Level Indicators of Scale Quality 
Polity H a Confirmatory Factor Analysis
CFI State Egalitarianism Enterprise Interventionism
Austria 0.21 0.50 0.9 0.45 0.36 -0.64 -0.36
(0.34, 0.55) (0.26, 0.46) (-0.75, -0.52) (-0.45, -0.28)
Belgium -0.01 -0.02 0.87 0.53 0.20 0.22 0.53
(0.30, 0.75) (0.07, 0.33) (0.10, 0.35) (-0.30, -0.76)
Bulgaria 0.09 0.25 0.89 0.80 0.42 -0.29 0.17
(0.61, 0.99) (0.3, 0.55) (-0.38, -0.21) (0.08, 0.26)
Cyprus 0.01 0.02 0.80 0.33 0.43 0.18 0.28
(0.20, 0.47) (0.26, 0.61) (0.05, 0.32) (0.13, -0.43)
Czech Republic 0.08 0.24 0.82 0.90 0.33 -0.14 0.07
(0.26, 1.55) (0.08, 0.57) (-0.24, -0.04) (-0.03, 0.16)
Denmark 0.10 0.28 Non-convergence
Estonia 0.01 0.02 0.68 0.41 0.43 0.07 0.40
(0.26, 0.55) (0.30, 0.57) (-0.06, 0.21) (0.54 0.25)
Finland 0.09 0.25 0.89 0.28 0.93 -0.12 0.03
(-0.02, 0.58) (-0.04, 1.90) (0.25, 0.04) (0.04, 0.10)
France 0.13 0.34 0.83 0.57 0.24 -0.37 -0.22
(0.35, 0.79) (0.13, 0.34) (-0.52, -0.20) (-0.34, -0.09)
Germany 0.23 0.5 0.84 0.44 0.44 -0.52 -0.41
(0.33, 0.55) (0.33, 0.55) (-0.64, -0.41) (-0.51, -0.31)
Greece 0.09 0.27 Non-convergence
Hungary 0.00 0.01 0.88 0.31 0.66 0.07 0.27
(0.17 0.44) (0.39, 0.92) (-0.03, 0.16) (0.14, 0.40)
Ireland 0.04 0.11 0.89 0.36 0.50 -0.14 0.18
(0.14, 0.58) (0.22, 0.78) (-0.28, -0.01) (0.07, 0.30)
Italy 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.40 0.46 0.04 0.35
(0.26, 0.53) (0.31, 0.61) (-0.08, 0.16) (0.22, 0.48)
Lithuania 0.01 -0.02 0.88 0.39 0.55 0.20 0.29
(0.27, 0.51) (0.383, 0.708) (0.08, 0.32) (0.17, 0.42)
Latvia 0.00 0.03 0.72 0.56 0.27 -0.05 0.29
(0.10, 1.01) (0.06, 0.48) (-0.22, 0.13) (0.05, 0.53)
Luxembourg 0.06 0.17 Non-convergence
Malta 0.01 0.01 0.85 0.55 0.50 0.12 0.24
(0.34, 0.76) (0.31, 0.69) (-0.02, 0.25) (0.13, 0.36)
Netherlands 0.08 0.21 0.73 0.28 0.16 -0.26 -0.33
(0.02, 0.53) (-0.05, 0.37) (-0.46, -0.07) (-0.58, -0.07)
Poland 0.09 0.25 0.79 0.55 0.37 -0.32 0.04
(0.35, 0.74) (0.23, 0.53) (-0.45, -0.19) (-0.07, 0.15)
Portugal 0.02 0.06 0.78 0.82 0.19 0.04 0.14
(-0.23, 1.86) (-0.06, 0.43) (-0.05, 0.14) (-0.07, 0.35)
Romania 0.07 0.2 Non-convergence
Slovakia 0.09 0.27 Non-convergence
Slovenia 0.05 0.14 Non-convergence
Spain 0.07 0.20 0.60 0.43 0.42 -0.19 0.10
(0.130, 0.73) (0.12, 0.72) (-0.32, -0.05) (-0.04, 0.23)
Sweden 0.16 0.41 0.91 0.47 0.61 -0.51 0.00
(0.39, 0.56) (0.50, 0.71) (-0.60, 0.41) (-0.1, 0.09)
United Kingdom 0.09 0.26 0.82 0.57 0.45 -0.40 0.14
(0.44, 0.70) (0.33, 0.56) (-0.5, -0.31) (0.04, 0.24)
Diagnostic statistics for Mokken, Cronbach’s and CFA and CFA factor loadings with 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 4: Candidate-Level Indicators of Scale Quality 
Country H Confirmatory Factor Analysis
CFI State Egalitarianism Enterprise Interventionism
EU27 0.49 0.77 0.99 0.62 0.74 -0.77 -0.56
(0.58, 0.66) (0.70, 0.78) (-0.81, -0.74) (-0.61, -0.52)
Austria 0.73 0.89 1 0.77 0.84 -0.92 -0.81
(0.63, 0.91) (0.73, 0.96) (-1.00, -0.84) (-0.93, -0.68)
Belgium 0.51 0.75 1 0.65 0.64 -0.7 -0.73
(0.44, 0.85) (0.44, 0.85) (-0.89, -0.5) (-0.92, -0.55)
Bulgaria Too little cases
Cyprus Too little cases
Czech Republic Too little cases
Denmark Too little cases
Estonia Too little cases
Finland 0.32 0.59 0.91 0.31 0.63 -0.72 -0.5
(-0.09, 0.71) (0.29, 0.97) (-1.07, -0.37) (-0.82, -0.17)
France 0.57 0.80 1 0.74 0.75 -0.84 -0.51
(0.64, 0.85) (0.64, 0.86) (-0.94, -0.75) (-0.66, -0.35)
Germany 0.67 0.86 1 0.79 0.77 -0.87 -0.72
(0.71, 0.87) (0.69, 0.85) (-0.93, -0.81) (-0.82, -0.63)
Greece Too little cases
Hungary Too little cases
Ireland Too little cases
Italy 0.44 0.71 1 0.71 0.72 -0.85 -0.21
(0.53, 0.88) (0.55, 0.89) (-1.01, -0.70) (-0.48, 0.06)
Lithuania Too little cases
Latvia Too little cases
Luxembourg Too little cases
Malta Too little cases
Netherlands 0.49 0.75 0.89 0.58 0.7 -0.75 -0.67
(0.36, 0.80) (0.50, 0.89) (-0.93, -0.57) (-0.86, -0.48)
Poland Too little cases
Portugal Too little cases
Romania Too little cases
Slovakia Too little cases
Slovenia  Too little cases
Spain 0.48 0.73 0.87 0.62 0.63 -0.85 -0.54
(0.36, 0.89) (0.36, 0.90) (-1.10, -0.61) (-0.78, -0.29)
Sweden 0.55 0.79 1 0.71 0.73 -0.78 -0.6
(0.61, 0.81) (0.63, 0.83) (-0.88, -0.69) (-0.72, -0.48)
United 
Kingdom
0.45 0.74 0.97 0.6 0.71 -0.78 -0.49
(0.51, 0.71) (0.61, 0.81) (-0.88, -0.69) (-0.61, -0.38)
Diagnostic statistics for Mokken, Cronbach’s and CFA and CFA factor loadings with 95% confidence intervals. 
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Costello et al. (2012)’s specification as closely as 
possible. The only difference is that all four eco-
nomic items were included. The basic model with-
out a response style factor is a base line for the 
analysis: models including a response style factor 
must perform better than these baseline models. 
One can only compare the direction and strength 
of the factor loadings for the four economic items 
included in both models. One cannot compare the 
model fit measures, because these depend on the 
strength of other relationships as well (in this case 
the cultural factor, the European factor and the 
response style factor).
anti-European wording and one freely loading 
item). Including a freely loading item.
This will test two models with a response style fac-
tor to see to what extent controlling for acquies-
cence bias truly solves their problem: model speci-
fication A, visualised in Figure 1 follows Billiet and 
McClendon (2001) as precisely as possible. Three 
factors are estimated on two sets of items: an eco-
nomic left-right dimension with all four economic 
items and a three-item European dimension (one 
pro-European, one anti-European and one freely 
loading item). The second model, specification B 
visualised in Figure 2, follows the specification of 
Figure 1: Model specification A
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Figure 2: Model specification B
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a-values are all insufficient, while at the elite-level 
they tend to be sufficient. Again, these results sus-
tain the hypothesis.
Table 3 shows the results of twenty-seven confir-
matory factor analyses at the voter-level. Six of 
them failed to converge under this specification. In 
only two countries, Austria and Sweden, the CFI 
is above the threshold level. In all but three coun-
tries (Austria, Germany and France) at least one of 
the factor loadings is either statistically indistin-
guishable from zero (i.e. there is no relationship) 
or goes in against the left-right dimension. For the 
state-item the factor loadings in two countries are 
indistinguishable from zero. The factor loadings 
for egalitarianism in three countries are indistin-
guishable from zero. When it comes to the enter-
prise variable, the problems become more press-
ing: for three countries the factor loadings are sig-
nificantly in the wrong direction. This means that 
in these countries those who favour free enterprise 
more often than not also favour nationalisation 
of economic sectors. In another seven countries, 
the enterprise factor loading is indistinguishable 
from zero. This means that for just over half of 
the countries, the factor loading for enterprise is 
significant and in the expected direction. For the 
interventionism item, however, the problems are 
even larger: in six countries the factor loading is 
indistinguishable from zero. In another eleven 
countries the factor loading is significant but in 
the incorrect direction: those who favour an equal 
distribution of incomes more often than not want 
less government intervention. This leaves only 
three countries (the aforementioned Austria, Ger-
many and France), where the factor loading is sig-
nificant and in the correct direction. All in all, the 
confirmatory factor analyses indicate that only in 
a single country, Austria, the four-item economic 
model fits a one-dimensional model.
At the candidate-level, all ten national models that 
were ran and the pan-European model. Many indi-
4. Scaling Results
This section looks at the results of the different 
scaling methods. Table 3 and 4 present the H-val-
ues of Mokken scaling, the Cronbach’s a-values, 
CFI for voters and politicians respectively. More-
over, the factor loadings for the state, egalitarian-
ism, enterprise and interventionism variables are 
presented
According to the H-levels in Table 3 in none of the 
27 EU member states, the four economic items fit 
in an ordinal scale: in no country the threshold 
level of 0.3 is met. The best results are in Germany 
and Austria. The H-values for the elite-level, in 
Table 4, provide more justification for a single-
dimensional interpretation. In the 10 countries, 
where enough MEPs are included in the survey, 
the views of these MEPs meet the 0.3-threshold. 
The same is true for the analysis with the candi-
date MEPs from all 27 member states of the EU. 
This means that the views of politicians from all 
included countries can be modelled in terms of 
one dimension. When comparing the H-levels of 
the mass and elite-level one can see that the for-
mer are always lower than the latter. The average 
difference in the H-values between elite and voters 
is 0.37, which reflects the fact that among voters 
the H-values are all insufficient, while at the elite-
level they are sufficient. These results are in line 
with the expectation that voters have less consis-
tent views than party politicians.
The a-values reflect a similar discrepancy between 
voters and politicians. For voters the Cronbach’s 
a-values are insufficient in all but one country 
(Austria). At the elite-level the values are sufficient 
in all included countries and in the pan-European 
data set. This means that among voters the eco-
nomic left-right dimension cannot be reliably mea-
sured by means of these four items, while it can be 
reliably measured at the level of the candidate. The 
average difference between the two values is 0.50, 
which again reflects the fact that among voters the 
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those countries, these factor loadings already con-
formed to this pattern in the model without the 
response style factor. In the thirteen other mod-
els, at least one of the factor loadings is not sig-
nificantly different from zero or in the incorrect 
direction. That means that including a response 
style factor leads to a model where moving to the 
left on an issue like egalitarianism makes it more 
likely for voters to be right-wing on intervention-
ism. Therefore the results would not lead to a sig-
nificantly different interpretation than the model 
without a response style factor, namely that sub-
stantively the items do not fit an economic left-
right interpretation. 
The model specification B (see Figure 2) follows 
the four-factor model of Costello et al. (2012) as 
closely as possible. These results are shown in 
Table 6. This model converges for nineteen coun-
tries. In five countries, all items are significantly 
different from zero and in the correct direction: 
namely in Slovenia, Spain, Austria, France and 
Germany. In three of these, Austria, France and 
Germany, the factor loadings already were in the 
correct direction and significantly different from 
zero without the inclusion of a response style fac-
tor. For one of these countries the results without 
the response style factor did not converge (Slove-
nia). This means that only in Spain the inclusion of 
a response style factor under specification B would 
lead to a different interpretation. As above: in the 
thirteen remaining models, the results would not 
lead to a significantly different interpretation, 
namely that substantively the items do not fit an 
economic left-right interpretation.
The main conclusion would be that the lack of 
coherence in the views of citizens on the economic 
issues is, at least in twenty-one of the twenty-two 
cases where one of these models did converge, the 
result of the response style of the voters. Espe-
cially, the interventionism item, which Costello 
et al (2012) excluded is problematic, while sub-
cators of model fit showed (near) perfect results. In 
all but two countries, Spain and the Netherlands, 
the value of the CFI met the threshold. But even 
in Spain and the Netherlands the CFI for voters 
is lower than the CFI for candidates. Also in Aus-
tria, where the CFI for voters met the threshold 
level, the CFI for voters is lower than the CFI for 
politicians. 
All in all, in each of the factor analyses, the results 
at the voter-level and the results at the candidate-
level stand in contrast. In every country, the 
H-value and the Cronbach’s a for voters are lower 
than these values for politicians and the CFI-val-
ues are higher for voters than for politicians. In all 
but one country the views of citizens on economic 
matters clearly cannot be scaled into a single 
dimensional interpretation. The CFI and Cron-
bach’s a indicate that the views of voters in Austria 
can be modelled in terms of a single dimension, 
although the Mokken scaling results. At the same 
time, the views of candidates for public office from 
all over the European Union meet most of these 
requirements. This provides ample evidence for 
the hypothesis that voter views are less single-
dimensional than views of politicians.
5. Acquiescence Bias
Above two model specifications that controlled for 
acquiescence bias were introduced. Model specifi-
cation A (see Figure 1) followed the prescription 
of Billiet and McClendon (2001) as closely as pos-
sible and estimate three factors (two substantive 
and one response style factor). This includes a 
four-item economic dimension. These results are 
shown in Table 5. With this specification only fif-
teen models converged. The lack of convergence 
may be an indicator that the model is too complex 
for the data. The key result is that the enterprise 
and interventionism factor loading are both in the 
correct direction and significantly different from 
zero, in two countries: Germany and France. In 
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Table 5: Voter-Level Indicators of Scale Quality for Model Specification A
Country Confirmatory Factor Analysis
CFI State Egalitarianism Enterprise Interventionism
Austria Non-convergence
Belgium Non-convergence
Bulgaria 0.99 0.64 0.36 -0.45 0.07
(0.51, 0.77) (0.25, 0.46) (-0.55, -0.34) (-0.03, 0.18)
Cyprus Non-convergence
Czech Republic 0.91 0.70 0.31 -0.29 0.00
(0.46, 0.95) (0.18, 0.43) (-0.41, -0.17) (-0.10, 0.10)
Denmark Non-convergence
Estonia 0.93 0.44 0.37 -0.19 0.26
(0.30, 0.58) (0.26, 0.48) (-0.32, -0.07) (0.15, 0.39)
Finland Non-convergence
France 0.95 0.53 0.25 -0.46 -0.18
(0.37, 0.69) (0.14, 0.35) (-0.60, -0.32) (-0.29, -0.07)
Germany 0.93 0.49 0.46 -0.55 -0.41
(0.40, 0.58) (0.38, 0.55) (-0.64, -0.46) (-0.49, -0.32)
Greece Non-convergence
Hungary Non-convergence
Ireland 0.97 0.33 0.48 -0.18 0.21
(0.18, 0.49) (0.27, 0.69) (-0.33, -0.02) (0.08, 0.33)
Italy 0.98 0.44 0.47 -0.02 0.29
(0.28, 0.61) (0.28, 0.66) (-0.27, 0.23) (0.07, 0.51)
Lithuania 0.97 0.34 0.50 0.04 0.14
(0.21, 0.47) (0.31, 0.69) (-0.09, 0.16) (0.02, 0.27)
Latvia 0.95 0.39 0.26 0.05 0.44
(0.21, 0.57) (0.11, 0.40) (-0.11, 0.22) (0.24, 0.64)
Luxembourg Non-convergence
Malta Non-convergence
Netherlands Non-convergence
Poland 0.94 0.49 0.35 -0.43 -0.03
(0.34, 0.63) (0.23, 0.47) (-0.58, -0.29) (-0.16, 0.10)
Portugal 0.95 0.23 0.36 -0.17 0.12
(0.08, 0.37) (0.12, 0.59) (-0.32, -0.01) (-0.05, 0.297)
Romania Non-convergence
Slovakia Non-convergence
Slovenia 0.98 0.39 0.27 -0.22 0.00
(0.21, 0.57) (0.13, 0.41) (-0.27, 0.18) (0.13, 0.13)
Spain 0.91 0.39 0.37 -0.27 0.02
(0.17, 0.62) (0.15, 0.60) (-0.56, 0.01) (-0.212, 0.27)
Sweden Non-convergence
United Kingdom Non-convergence
Diagnostic statistics for CFA and CFA factor loadings with 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 6: Voter-Level Indicators of Scale Quality for Model Specification B
Country Confirmatory Factor Analysis
CFI State Egalitarianism Enterprise Interventionism
Austria 0.9 0.45 0.4 -0.69 -0.33
(0.37, 0.54) (0.31, 0.49) (-0.79, -0.6) (-0.41, -0.25)
Belgium Non-convergence
Bulgaria 0.95 0.6 0.37 -0.46 0.05
(0.47, 0.72) (0.25, 0.48) (-0.57, -0.34) (-0.06, 0.17)
Cyprus 0.89 0.15 0.33 -0.18 0.06
(-0.03, 0.34) (0.1, 0.57) (-0.35, -0.01) (-0.06, 0.19)
Czech Republic Non-convergence
Denmark Non-convergence
Estonia 0.83 0.44 0.31 -0.22 0.27
(0.29, 0.59) (0.2, 0.43) (-0.36, -0.08) (0.15, 0.39)
Finland 0.81 0.44 0.54 -0.21 -0.01
(0.32, 0.56) (0.4, 0.68) (-0.32, -0.1) (-0.12, 0.1)
France 0.9 0.43 0.26 -0.54 -0.19
(0.34, 0.53) (0.17, 0.36) (-0.64, -0.45) (-0.29, -0.09)
Germany 0.85 0.48 0.46 -0.57 -0.43
(0.39, 0.57) (0.37, 0.54) (-0.66, -0.48) (-0.51, -0.34)
Greece Non-convergence
Hungary 0.93 0.48 0.29 -0.18 0.09
(0.35, 0.62) (0.19, 0.39) (-0.3, -0.07) (-0.02, 0.21)
Ireland 0.84 0.48 0.29 -0.18 0.09
(0.35, 0.62) (0.19, 0.39) (-0.3, -0.07) (-0.02, 0.21)
Italy 0.86 0.29 0.3 -0.41 0.03
(0.13, 0.45) (0.12, 0.48) (-0.6, -0.23) (-0.11, 0.18)
Lithuania 0.92 0.36 0.45 0.03 0.12
(0.23, 0.49) (0.3, 0.6) (-0.1, 0.15) (-0.01, 0.25)
Latvia Non-convergence
Luxembourg Non-convergence
Malta Non-convergence
Netherlands Non-convergence
Poland 0.84 0.43 0.4 -0.42 -0.04
(0.31, 0.55) (0.28, 0.53) (-0.56, -0.28) (-0.17, 0.09)
Portugal 0.88 0.19 0.44 -0.2 0.06
(0.06, 0.32) (0.22, 0.65) (-0.34, -0.06) (-0.08, 0.21)
Romania 0.88 0.43 0.39 -0.4 0
(0.31, 0.56) (0.26, 0.51) (-0.53, -0.27) (-0.13, 0.13)
Slovakia 0.85 0.66 0.27 -0.4 -0.09
(0.48, 0.84) (0.15, 0.4) (-0.53, -0.28) (-0.2, 0.02)
Slovenia 0.8 0.66 0.17 -0.19 -0.11
(0.24, 1.08) (0.03, 0.3) (-0.35, -0.03) (-0.22, -0.01)
Spain 0.82 0.24 0.23 -0.58 -0.19
(0.14, 0.35) (0.12, 0.34) (-0.71, -0.45) (-0.3, -0.08)
Sweden 0.89 0.5 0.6 -0.55 -0.07
(0.42, 0.59) (0.52, 0.69) (-0.63, -0.47) (-0.16, 0.02)
United Kingdom Non-convergence
Diagnostic statistics for CFA and CFA factor loadings with 95% confidence intervals. 
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left-right dimension, one would place voters 
with strongly inconsistent views (like those who 
strongly favour redistribution but also strongly 
oppose government intervention) in the centre of 
the political space. In the two-dimensional rep-
resentation, however, these voters are actually as 
far from the centre as voters who strongly favour 
redistribution and government intervention. If 
party politicians are concentrated along an eco-
nomic left-right dimension and voters are spread 
out in the space more evenly, there will be a large 
discrepancy between voters and party politicians, 
especially those voters with ‘inconsistent’ views. 
Costello et al. (2012) offer a way to express the 
quality of representation by examining the dis-
tance between party politicians and voters: they 
propose calculating the distance between the 
average position of the voters for a party and the 
average position of the candidates of that party. 
In order to illustrate the effect of a one- and a 
multi-dimensional model, the Euclidian distance 
between party politicians and voters is calculated 
in a one-dimensional model, which distorts voter 
positions, and between party politicians and vot-
ers in a four-dimensional model, where each eco-
nomic item represents a separate dimension. The 
distances are divided by the maximum distance 
in the space.47 Following Costello et al. (2012), 
these differences are only calculated for parties 
that have 40 or more citizens voting for them in 
the European Parliament elections and 5 or more 
candidates running for office. Figure 3 illustrates 
the distances between party candidates and their 
voters per party. The x-axis shows the distance 
between parties and voters on a one-dimensional 
scale. On average, this distance is 0.12 (maximum 
is 1). If one unpacks the political space and repre-
sents the true diversity in the positions of voters, 
however, the average distance is 0.18: 47% greater. 
These values are shown in the y-axis of Figure 2. 
47. The maximum is four for the one-dimensional model 
and eight for the four dimensional mode.
stantively the question is whether one supports or 
opposes government intervention in the economy. 
With two different specifications, the inclusion of 
the response style factor only leads to a substan-
tially different interpretation for the interven-
tionism item in a single case. Therefore the poor 
results are more likely to be substantive in nature 
than that they are the cause of a methodological 
singularity.
Figure 3: Distances between parties and voters in one 
and four-dimensional models
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6. Policy Representation
One may wonder: ‘so what, why does it matter? Is 
this more than a matter of academic importance?’ 
The dimensionality of the political space has a 
strong effect on the quality of representation, as 
Thomassen (1999) has argued. The results indicate 
that a large segment of voters has views that are 
‘inconsistent’ from the perspective of traditional 
left-right dimension: for instance they favour 
income equality but oppose government interven-
tion in the economy. Politicians’ views however 
come in two flavours: more income equality and 
more government or less government and less 
income equality. This means that when one col-
lapses the political space into a one-dimensional 
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does not just concern differences in positions (e.g. 
voters are more left-wing than candidates) but it 
concerns the way in which voters and politicians 
use to understand economic questions. 
From the results presented in this, one can derive 
an agenda for further research. The first and most 
pressing issue is whether the patterns presented 
here are the result of an anomaly of one particular 
set of questions, or whether this phenomenon can 
be seen consistently in different European states. 
The findings presented here may also be the result 
of the context of the questionnaire, which was 
executed during the 2009 European Parliament 
election. It may be that the ongoing euro-crisis 
has diminished the strength of the economic left-
right dimension at the voter-level, as traditional 
leftwing and rightwing answers no longer fit the 
economic complexity. Therefore, it may be valuable 
to reanalyse existing voter and candidates’ surveys 
from different countries and from different peri-
ods. Doing this may help one to understand when, 
where and under what conditions voter positions 
on economic issues do cohere.
The second issue is whether the discrepancy 
that was found here actually matters for politi-
cal behaviour. One example: a large segment of 
citizens with ‘inconsistent’ views may find it dif-
ficult to find representation in a party system that 
is highly structured. This may have consequences 
for their volatility: these voters may be more vola-
tile in their vote choice, because the framing of 
the elections matters. Previously, Van der Brug 
and Van Spanje (2009) argued that because a large 
segment of voters has left-wing and authoritarian 
views but parties only offer rightwing-authori-
tarian or leftwing-libertarian bundles, they may 
switch parties dependent on how the elections are 
framed, in terms of a choice over cultural issues 
or over economic issues: they may opt for the ‘left’ 
when elections concern economic issues and opt 
for the ‘right’ when elections concern immigration 
As one can see the policy distances are consis-
tently larger in the four-dimensional space than in 
the one-dimensional space. This shows that a one-
dimensional model of economic issues underesti-
mates the representation problem. 
7. Conclusion
The results presented in this show that voters 
have less consistent views about economic matters 
than party politicians. On economic issues voters’ 
views are not constrained and structured, while 
on the same issues, the views of politicians are. 
The views of politicians from all over Europe meet 
all requirements for a single-dimensional model: 
politicians that favour a more equal distribution 
of income also support the government interven-
tion necessary to realise it. The views of politicians 
tend to cohere logically: for them the relationship 
between policy means and policy ends is clear. 
For citizens, however, economic issues are far 
more complex. They do not see the economic logic 
between means and ends. Therefore their answers 
do not fit easily into a single-dimensional model. 
This has implications for the quality of democratic 
representation in Europe.
Elections are an instrument to translate the prefer-
ences of voters to the political level (Costello et al., 
2012). A key condition for policy representation is 
that that voters’ views and the policy positions of 
candidates are constrained by the same ideologi-
cal dimension. If one distorts the positions of vot-
ers and force them into a one-dimensional scale, 
they are closer to party positions than in a four-
dimensional representation. Voters with extreme 
but inconsistent views cannot be represented well 
by the established parties: they may want less gov-
ernment intervention in the economy and a more 
equal distribution of resources; and all that they 
can choose is more government and more equality 
or less government and less equality. This means 
that on economic issues, the representation deficit 
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better than before the expression (if not genuine 
representation and mobilization) of social divi-
sions (linguistic, ethnic, religious), and it forms a 
powerful normative framework with which per-
sonal-oligarchic agendas are compelled to engage. 
In this context, the opportunities for transnational 
political cooperation offered by Europarty affilia-
tion are important legitimating mechanisms for 
anti-authoritarian strategies, they exacerbate the 
polarisation and the ideological character of what 
would normally be intra-elite competitions, and 
they serve as resources for organizational evolu-
tion and ideological streamlining of what remain 
essentially elite-driven, weakly institutionalized 
parties. 
The Impact of Europarties on 
National Party Politics
For long Europarties were considered secondary 
actors, completely dominated by their member-
parties. Such research that exists on the transna-
tional dimensions of party politics on a European 
level has focused on the role of European Parlia-
ment groupings (Van Hecke 2010, 395-396). When 
it comes to Europarties though, interest has been 
much smaller48. Perhaps this is understandable, 
given that the exact place of Europarties in the 
EU political system is unclear, and that the inter-
actions between them do not follow a discern-
ible pattern akin to proper party system dynam-
ics (unlike European Parliament groups, that are 
seen as contesting socioeconomic issues of Euro-
pean governance reasonably predictably accord-
ing to their relative ideological positions along the 
Right-Left axis, Hix et al 2007). 
Having said that, it might be the right time to 
start considering the role of Europarties in EU 
politics more seriously – and, going beyond that, 
48. Important studies on Europarties include Bardi (2002, 
2006), Deschouwer (2006), Ladrech (2006) and Van 
Hecke (2010).
Introduction
This paper will propose a new avenue in the 
research of the impact of Europe on national party 
politics. More specifically, it will develop some 
theoretical suggestions about the ways transna-
tional party federations (most commonly referred 
to as ‘Europarties’) affect national party politics, 
especially in the EU’s periphery under conditions 
of as yet unformed party systems, semi-authori-
tarian power structures and rampant economic 
and political corruption. These theoretical sug-
gestions will then be assessed with reference to 
developments in three post-Soviet states: Geor-
gia, Moldova and Ukraine. These states all share 
one characteristic that has made their political 
systems reasonably multifaceted and unpredict-
able: The staging of democratic revolutions that, 
even if culminating in little more than alteration 
between factions of oligarchic elites, have made 
genuine competitive politics a normative refer-
ence point (as well as a discursive resource) of 
party competition. The party politics of Eastern 
Europe and the post-Soviet area have been stud-
ied extensively through the lens of literature on 
transition, democratisation and the variants of 
competitive-electoral authoritarian regimes. This 
paper suggests that the increasing closeness of 
these countries to Europe may contribute, among 
other things, to the establishment of more stable 
and patterned party politics. 
The basic argument of this paper is that Europar-
ties can plan an important role in the legitimation 
and consolidation of party politics. In all three 
cases, democratic revolutions have made democ-
ratization/authoritarianism the overarching 
dimension of political competition and increased 
proximity to Europe (through the Eastern enlarge-
ment of 2004-2007 and the creation of the East-
ern Partnership (EaP) in 2008-2009) has allowed 
democratizers to present democracy and ‘Europe’ 
as mutually reinforcing choices. In all three cases 
and to a varying degree, the democratization/
authoritarianism axis has also served to structure 
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pressure of CDU in EPP forums towards centre-
right parties from the European South). And yet, 
the proliferation of this type of cooperation con-
tributes to changes on the national level, even if 
this goes unacknowledged in relevant research. 
The analysis of Poguntke, Aylott, Ladrech and 
Luther of the effect of Europe on national party 
organization for example correctly identifies the 
empowerment of EU specialists within these 
organizations (Poguntke et al 2007). However 
their analysis neglects another interesting orga-
nizational development, namely the establish-
ment and constant empowerment of the position 
of ‘international secretaries’ of parties, whose role 
in liaising with counterparts in other national 
parties has received a boost by the organizational 
expansion of Europarties themselves. 
However, one need not only focus on existing 
EU member-states. Interestingly, Europarties are 
probably the only actor, arena or institutional set-
ting of the EU polity where non-EU policymak-
ers have ready and relatively easy access. All three 
major Europarties have partners in non-EU states, 
and it has been shown that their activity as comple-
ments of the EU’s conditionality ahead of enlarge-
ment is very significant: Europarties have not only 
pushed for organizational changes in affiliated or 
wannabe-affiliated parties in states close to acces-
sion, but they have even influenced these par-
ties’ programmatic and ideological profile (most 
importantly, by pushing these parties to adopt 
unequivocally pro-EU programmatic positions)50. 
Europarties offer to non-EU national party actors 
and to party politicians in EU member-states the 
same palette of benefits: Opportunities for posi-
tive exposure in international and national media, 
campaign assistance, a forum for the promotion 
of a party’s (or a government’s) positions, new pol-
50. See the interesting empirical work of Klápačová (2013). 
On the effect of Europe on the programmatic profile 
of parties before and after EU accession in Central and 
Eastern Europe see Vachudova (2008).
even start pondering the independent effect of 
Europarties on national party politics. To do the 
latter one has to start from the former. Perhaps 
the most important function of Europarties in the 
EU political system is that of providing an alterna-
tive forum for coordination, communication and 
exchange between likeminded political actors. 
Europarties have built up expertise in staging 
summits for their member-party leaders and spe-
cialized meetings for party experts and/or like-
minded ministers ahead of the plenary meetings 
of EU organs. This makes Europarties an arena 
for the exchange of viewpoints, as well as impor-
tant actors in their own right, to the extent that 
Europarties also maintain an independent capac-
ity to put items in the agenda of these meetings. 
In other words, Europarties are trying to carve 
out a niche in the EU polity, mediating between 
the supranational and the governmental-national 
level and exploiting opportunities in a framework 
still firmly dominated by member-parties49.
If we think about Peter Mair’s famous argument 
about the ‘limited impact of Europe on national 
party systems’ (Mair 2000), the effect of Europar-
ties on national party politics (as a subset of the 
overall European impact) should be from mar-
ginal to non-existent. To the extent that Europar-
ties remain creatures of their constituent units, 
national member-parties, any effect of Europe 
on national party politics would probably best be 
attributed to the adaptation activities of national 
parties in national arenas. If anything, Europar-
ties seem incapable to escape the patronage of 
their most prominent members, if these members 
wish to use the arenas provided by transnational 
partisan cooperation to push their positions on 
smaller likeminded partners (as evidenced by the 
49. It is in this sense that Van Hecke (2010) insists on the 
use of the term ‘transnational’ to describe the func-
tions of Europarties. For an example of their coordi-
nating function, see his analysis of their role in the 
Convention to draft the EU Constitution (Van Hecke 
2008).
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(and one suffering a severe legitimation crisis 
across Europe at the moment). In prospective EU 
members on the other hand, accession processes 
of new member-parties to Europarties mirror the 
accession processes of countries to the EU, with 
the eventual choice of partners by the Europar-
ties crucially affecting the position of strength of 
national politicians relative to their competitors. 
Moving further away from the EU, this function is 
amplified in states lying halfway between Europe 
and their Soviet past, riven by ethnic, linguistic 
and religious cleavages and with unstable national 
identities and institutions. Achieving association 
with a Europarty is a choice as monumental for 
national parties in these countries as it is for these 
countries themselves to move closer to Europe. 
It is assumed here that Europarties can influence 
both a party system’s format and mechanics in in 
a context of weakly institutionalized party poli-
tics. First, Europarties can influence the format 
of the party system by forcing for consolidation 
of like-minded parties or by favouring one party 
that slowly eclipses competitors for the same con-
stituencies. Sometimes, this process may actually 
be double-tracked: Europarties care about associ-
ating themselves with strong partners in a given 
electoral arena, and a party’s strength puts it in 
a favourable position to enjoy a Europarty’s asso-
ciation. In conditions of weakly institutionalized 
parties, inability of parties to express major social 
cleavages and dominance of parties by different 
(and usually shadowy) members of economic oli-
garchies, a party’s association with a Europarty 
gives credence to its claims to ideological consis-
tency and seriousness. As competitors slowly fade 
away or merge with Europarty-associated parties, 
one can assume that Europarty nods decisively 
influence the format of these party systems.
Europarty nods can also influence the mechanics 
of a party system – if not the actual direction of 
competition, then perhaps the degree of its polar-
icy ideas, elite coordination, and a powerful signal 
of corporate and ideological identity. Yet what is 
usually welcome but secondary dividends for par-
ties from EU member-states can be an important 
difference-maker for politicians and parties in 
states expecting or hoping to accede to the EU. 
Acquiring ‘European credentials’ by establishing 
affiliation with a Europarty is a visible example 
of what these parties want to achieve as their key 
policy, i.e. European membership. With little 
opportunities to meet European leaders in EU 
summits, Europarty gatherings become first-class 
opportunities for self-promotion. The same logic 
applies to party cadres on lower levels of party 
leadership as well (Klápačová 2013, 29). Counter-
intuitively, while Europarties’ position in the EU 
polity makes them a still modest actor, this very 
same position and function is very important in 
the eyes of politicians from prospective members. 
This paper takes this logic a step further and sub-
mits that Europarties have an equally substantial 
independent effect on the national party politics 
of states beyond the EU’s ‘enlargement zone’, and 
more particularly of states comprising the Eastern 
Partnership. I would even go a bit further in say-
ing that an independent Europarty effect can be 
discerned not only in the programmatic and orga-
nizational outlook of specific parties, but even in 
the systemic parameters of party competition (for-
mat and mechanics) that Mair had seen as being 
relatively impervious to European influence in the 
EU51. While Europarties gain in importance for 
their member-parties in EU member-states, they 
also are part of ‘business as usual’, an ever-impor-
tant actor in an otherwise familiar political scene 
51. Here I follow the identification of different areas of 
Europe’s impact on national political parties as identi-
fied by Ladrech (2002), and particularly on the third 
area, ‘patterns of party competition’, as the phenome-
non to be explained. The mechanism of Europeaniza-
tion I focus on (transnational party cooperation) cor-
responds to Ladrech’s fifth area of research, ‘relations 
beyond the national party system’.
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democracy and authoritarianism: semi-author-
itarian (Kuzio 2005), competitive authoritarian 
(Bunce and Wolchik 2010; Levitsky and Way 
2002), electoral authoritarian (Schedler 2006), 
patronal presidential (Hale 2006) etc. In post-
Soviet states, political-economic oligarchic elites 
competed for control of the state’s resources, pur-
suing more or less personal agendas and manipu-
lating ethnic and other allegiances as they saw fit 
(Bunce and Wolchik 2010, 61; Way 2005). In this 
context, those states that did not turn into outright 
autocracies like Belarus or Azerbaijan developed 
systems exhibiting the outside characteristics of 
competitive democracy (chiefly the regular stag-
ing of elections) but essentially controlled by these 
entrenched and corrupt elites. 
Despite the existence of deep and meaningful 
societal divisions (if not fully developed cleav-
ages as in Western Europe53), party politics in EaP 
states reflect mostly the infighting of these elites, 
sometimes recruiting support ‘from above’ (Hale 
2006: 309). In this context, even if they started off 
as more or less open and competitive, polities in 
Eastern Europe invariably developed into semi-
autocracies by the early 2000s, with political power 
serving as the arbiter between rival oligarchic 
economic interests and the electoral process pro-
gressively closing off against genuine competitors 
arising from the fringes of these elites (Way 2005) 
(even though even crude autocracies like Belarus 
and Azerbaijan never shed the façade of electoral 
competition). Under these circumstances, party 
competition remained inherently unstable and 
weakly institutionalized. Political parties lacked 
such characteristics as rooting in social cleav-
ages, internal democracy or programmatic iden-
tity. Interactions between them did not follow any 
particular pattern (party ‘non-systems’ instead of 
systems). Deeply ideological parties also tended to 
53. On the lack of formed cleavages and the weakness 
of civil society in Eastern Europe see Geddes (2005), 
Howard (2003) and Lewis (2006).
ization (Mair 2000, 31). Association with Europar-
ties calls for interested parties to make ‘European 
orientation’ a core component of their program-
matic orientation (Klápačová 2013). Contestation 
of a state’s relationship with Europe can serve as a 
stable proxy or aggregation of major societal divi-
sions that had been up until that point imperfectly 
reflected in party competition (to the extent that 
these divisions shape political and social identities 
that cue clear-cut attitudes towards Europe, Rus-
sia, the Soviet past, the state etc.). Again, the pro-
cess may run in the opposite direction: It may be 
that some partisan actors in these countries were 
already positively predisposed towards Europe, 
especially if they had sided with anti-authoritar-
ian revolutions against leaderships more or less 
cosy with Russia in the 2000s, or if they have a 
past in anti-Soviet mobilization in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. In any case, ‘Europe’ overlies the 
democratization/authoritarianism axis of compe-
tition in post-revolutionary settings, with politi-
cal actors (usually members of oligarchic elites) 
using ‘Europe’ as a powerful signal and discursive 
resource52. Europarty involvement does not cre-
ate the axis of competition as such, but serves to 
increase its polarization and help other divisions 
feed into it as well.
Party Politics in Georgia, 
Ukraine and Moldova: Democratic 
Revolutions as a Turning Point?
I would not dare to claim expertise of post-Soviet 
politics and Eastern Europe more generally. Based 
on a cursory literature review, it suffices to say that 
most of the regimes in the region have been iden-
tified as falling within one of the categories denot-
ing some degree of hybridity between competitive 
52. Europarty association has served as a powerful legiti-
mating device for suspect political entrepreneurs in 
Western Europe as well. Most typical example is the 
association of Silvio Berlusconi with the EPP (Ladrech 
2002, 399).
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the ruler of the day) as the key stake has allowed 
party competition to become a bit more multidi-
mensional and mobilize social groups along more 
stable patterns through parties. Post-revolutionary 
party systems exhibit less volatility than before, 
while in all three states I am examining the stabil-
ity of party politics was served by constitutional 
changes that gave more power to parliaments and 
weakened the powers of the presidents57. 
In Ukraine after the Orange Revolution of 2004 
and in Moldova after the Twitter Revolution of 
2009, the mechanics of party competition pit the 
presumed heirs of the revolutions that challenged 
the increasingly authoritarian regimes of Leonid 
Kuchma and Vladimir Voronin against the heirs 
of these regimes under conditions of more or less 
competitive electoral contests. In Georgia on the 
other hand, the cycle has repeated itself, with the 
leader of the Rose Revolution of 2003, Mikhail 
Saakashvili, developing authoritarian tendencies 
of his own as president58, eventually losing out to 
another oligarch-challenger, billionaire Bidzina 
Ivanishvili, claiming to be a genuine democrat and 
also backed by mass mobilization. In all three cases, 
the legacy of revolutions functions as argumenta-
tion and resource in competition between parties 
that still remains overwhelmingly controlled by 
exponents of political-economic oligarchy. 
This democratization/authoritarianism axis of 
competition probably would not have been enough 
to cement stable party systems were it not for the 
contemporaneous closing of the distance between 
these states and Europe after 2004. The EU East-
57. Generally presidential systems are seen to be detri-
mental to the development of parties (Croissant 2002; 
Hale 2006; Shugart 1998).
58. Georgia is a good example of what Hale calls 
‘patronal presidentialism’, with Saakashvili (and 
Shevardnadze before him) as examples of initially 
liberal presidents who became embedded in a system 
of all-powerful executive (Hale 2006, 312-313; Had-
enius and Teorell 2007).
be the least successful. Instead, party politics was 
dominated by regime-initiated or oligarchy-lead 
(‘spoiler’ or ‘façade’) parties, with almost non-
existent political programs or ideological refer-
ences, that tended to disappear when their patrons 
lose access to government power. Generally, in 
authoritarian contexts the main structural char-
acteristic is the dominance of one (government-
close) party over small, weak and fragmented 
opposition parties. Depending on intra-oligarchy 
competition, party creation and destruction is fre-
quent and electoral volatility high54.
The three states studied here however all experi-
enced democratic revolutions that halted the pro-
cess of authoritarization of their polities55. Much 
like before the revolutions, the only clear dimen-
sion of competition structuring party interactions 
remained the one dividing pro and anti-regime 
forces. However, this dimension was infused with 
the normative question of democratization and 
political reform as a stake of competition. The 
revolutions allowed challengers of semi-autocra-
cies (all of whom had been part of political elites 
and/or the economic oligarchy during the times 
of semi-autocracies) to claim for themselves the 
mantle of ‘democratizers’. The reflective56 con-
testation of regime shape under the normative 
weight of ‘democracy’ (and not just opposition to 
54. Bader (2010, 75-107) provides a very helpful summary 
of relevant literature.
55. These revolutions took place as reaction to blatantly 
rigged elections, the Rose Revolution following the 
parliamentary election of late 2003 in Georgia, the 
Orange Revolution following the presidential election 
of late 2004 in Ukraine, and the Twitter Revolution 
following the parliamentary election of mid-2009 in 
Moldova.
56. I use the term ‘reflective’ here in the sense that all sides 
claim for themselves the identity of democrats and 
accuse the opponents for authoritarian tendencies. 
This builds on Schedler’s statement about electoral 
authoritarian regimes: ‘At the same time as incum-
bents and opponents measure their forces in the elec-
toral arena, they battle over the basic rules that shape 
the electoral arena’ (Schedler 2002, 110).
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if intra-oligarchy competition drives the creation 
and strategies of weakly institutionalized parties, 
their competition has acquired a certain ideologi-
cal gravitas and more or less patterned dynamics60. 
Europarties in Eastern Europe
Europarties formally have a rigorous approach 
to identifying and associating themselves with 
partners in non-EU members. Vetting of candi-
date parties is particularly demanding, including 
demands for far-reaching organizational and pro-
grammatic adaptations. While Europarties under-
standably seek to expand their presence beyond 
EU borders as a way to increase their own rele-
vance as meaningful arenas of deliberation, coor-
dination and information-sharing in the EU pol-
ity, they are also careful before associating them-
selves with partners. Europarties also want to have 
strong partners, even though a party’s strength 
should only go so far to make it an attractive part-
ner for Europarties on its own. Parties that receive 
a Europarty nod have important advantage over 
rivals of the same political orientation in the eyes 
of the electorate, thus potentially leading to con-
solidation of a part of the party system around that 
privileged party (Klápačová 2013). But Europarty 
influence can be at work even before the nod is 
given. For example, the EPP’s conscious strategy 
is to encourage merges and cooperation between 
likeminded parties, often as an important step to 
eventual accession to the party (reflecting also the 
fact that the EPP itself contains varying ideologi-
cal traditions). 
60. It is important to note that party competition does not 
revolve inescapably around a Europe/Russia divide 
(Way 2005, 239). Voroning in Moldova and Yanuko-
vich in Ukraine have tried to play Europe and Russia 
off each other in the past. Saakashvili’s successor has 
distanced himself from his predecessor’s fiery anti-
Russian rhetoric but has also expressed willingness 
to keep Georgia on a European path. It would also be 
mistaken to characterize pro-Western democratizers 
in the region as inescapably anti-Russian (apart from 
Saakashvili).
ern enlargement and the Eastern Partnership 
exacerbated the already uncertain position of 
these states between West and East. In terms of 
the main dimension of competition, rapproche-
ment with Europe and the West became a readily 
exploited discursive resource in the challengers’ 
efforts to claim democratic legitimacy. Support 
for EU (and/or NATO) accession (or other forms 
of association) has become a very powerful proxy 
of post-revolutionaries’ declared belief in demo-
cratic values. In this way, the main dimension of 
competition also becomes a contrast of projects 
of geopolitical orientation. This in turn serves to 
more firmly link party competition with impor-
tant social, religious or regional divisions in con-
sistent patterns (and not just on account of ad hoc 
elite-oligarchical efforts of mobilization). 
For example, the dissolution of Shevardnadze’s 
authoritarian regime in Georgia gave rise to a pur-
posive policy of antagonizing Russia (that sponsors 
breakaway provinces on Georgian soil) and ori-
enting the country towards NATO membership. 
The Orange Revolution and subsequent electoral 
contests cemented the stark religious and ethnic 
contrasts between West and East Ukraine59. And 
the fall of Voronin’s Party of Communists of the 
Republic of Moldova (PCRM) and competition 
between it and parties of a pro-European alliance 
reflects the divides running through Moldovan 
society between ethnic Moldovans and pro-Rus-
sian minorities, and between Moldovans adher-
ing to the maintenance of an independent state 
(and clamouring for the return of the Russian-
sponsored Transnistrian breakaway province) 
and Moldovans propagating a Romanian iden-
tity (Mungiu-Pippidi and Munteanu 2009, 140-
141; Way 2005, 253-254). In all these cases, even 
59. Of course the East-West divide structured party poli-
tics in Ukraine before the Orange Revolution as well 
(Bader2010, 82). In the post-revolutionary contest 
however one may surmise that this regional compe-
tition reflects deeper divides about Ukraine’s future 
(Way 2005, 257)
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forces, however to the extent that they were also 
looking for associates in these arenas, their involve-
ment also played a role in processes of consolida-
tion (whereby some pro-democratic parties disap-
peared to the benefit of Europarty-associated ones) 
or of intra-coalition squabbles that determined the 
relative strength of pro-European parties. 
In Ukraine the EPP became actively involved in 
the feud between the two main components of 
the Orange Coalition, Our Ukraine of Viktor 
Yushchenko and Fatherland led by Yulia Tymosh-
enko61. Both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko had 
roots in the power structures of Ukraine and ties 
to the Kuchma regime – Yushchenko had been 
Prime Minister while Tymoshenko was a success-
ful businesswoman. Their parties were created 
following familiar patterns of Ukrainian poli-
tics, reflecting regional political-economic power 
structures and having ties to oligarchic interests. 
After the Orange Revolution in 2004 however 
both parties were seen in Europe as bearers of 
demands for Ukraine’s democratization and pro-
European orientation. Consequently, both Yush-
chenko (by now elected President of Ukraine) and 
Tymoshenko sought actively links with Europar-
ties. Forming the biggest party family, expressing 
an unequivocal Atlanticism and being home to all 
major conservative parties with roots in dissident 
anti-Soviet movements in Central-Eastern Europe, 
the EPP was a natural ideological ‘home’ for post-
revolutionary democratizing parties, as well as 
an attractive destination, offering access to most 
major politicians and policymakers of the EU. The 
race to join the EPP became really competitive 
after Yushchenko and Tymoshenko fell out over 
61. In Ukraine electoral coalitions or ‘blocs’ were formed 
prior to parliamentary elections around prominent 
politicians and their parties. Both Our Ukraine and 
Fatherland served as backbones of such wider blocs 
(e.g. the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc) for the elections of 
2002, 2006 and 2007. Since the 2012 elections, blocs 
are banned from running in parliamentary elections 
and results refer to the individual parties.
Either way, the process of vetting can have impor-
tant effects on the shape of party competition in 
the affected countries. On the other hand, the 
degree of wannabe-associated parties’ integra-
tion in Europarties depends on each Europarty’s 
structure. The EPP and PES have three degrees 
of membership: Full members are parties from 
within the EU. Associated members are par-
ties from the European Economic Area/EFTA 
(Norway, Switzerland, Iceland etc.) and from 
accession-candidate countries (Western Balkans, 
Turkey etc.). Parties from EaP and beyond can 
only hope to acquire observer status. This status 
excludes them from decision-making organs, pro-
grammatic debates etc., but gives them opportu-
nity to participate in various meetings, including 
sometimes Europarty summits and other high-
level occasions. ALDE is an exception in that it 
counts all affiliated national parties as ‘full mem-
bers’ regardless of whether they come from EU 
members or not, which makes it probable that this 
Europarty will be much more willing to involve 
itself in national arenas supporting its member-
parties, but also that it will seek associations 
primarily with well-vetted ideological partners 
(perhaps to the detriment of long-term electoral 
strength as a criterion of membership). In this 
section I will investigate how Europarty involve-
ment has contributed to changes in the format and 
mechanics of party competition in Ukraine, Geor-
gia and Moldova after democratic revolutions.
a) Format
Europarties had an effect on the number and rela-
tive strength of parties in EaP states, through their 
active involvement but mostly through their abil-
ity to serve as arenas of political activity and legit-
imating mechanisms in intra-elite competition, 
particularly involving like-minded parties from 
the camp of post-revolutionary democratizers. 
In all three countries, all three major Europarties 
were united in their support of anti-authoritarian 
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ties for self-promotion between the two rivals, it 
clearly favoured Tymoshenko’s version of events 
in her feuds with Yushchenko, and indirectly lay 
the blame for Orange’s failures on the President’s 
leadership (Martens 2009, 215-216). Following 
the 2012 parliamentary elections that witnessed 
the complete disappearance of Our Ukraine, the 
party was suspended from EPP in late 2013, its 
place taken over by ex-wrestler Vitali Klitschko’s 
pro-European UDAR party. 
Table 1: Evolution of relative strength of post-revolu-
tionary forces in Ukraine 
(vote % in parliamentary elections)
2002 2006 2007 2012
Yushchenko-near 
blocs/parties 24.5% 13.9% 14.2% 1.1%
Tymoshenko-near 
blocs/parties 7.5% 22.3% 30.7% 25.6%
UDAR (Klitschko) - - - 14.0%
In Moldova Europarty involvement has served 
to consolidate the forces that sprang out of the 
anti-Voronin Twitter Revolution around three 
parties with direct links to the three major party 
families. The examples of the Liberal Democratic 
Party (PLDM) and the Democratic Party (PDM) 
are characteristic of the consolidating-stabilizing, 
but also disturbing, effects of Europarty involve-
ment. The PDM existed as a label since the 1990s, 
when it formed part of a pro-European govern-
ment in 1998-2001. Yet with the election of PCRM 
into power in 2001, the PDM, as is typical for par-
ties falling into opposition in post-Soviet semi-
authoritarian settings, virtually disappeared, 
and remained irrelevant in the April 2009 elec-
tions that spawned the revolution. Subsequently it 
was taken over by PCRM defector Marian Lupu, 
who led it to a very strong result in the elections 
of late 2009. Under Lupu, PDM was supposed to 
become a consistent pro-European social-demo-
Tymoshenko’s tactical alliance with Viktor Yanu-
kovich’s Party of the Regions that brought about 
the fall of a pro-Yushchenko government in 2006 
and the increasing disagreements between the two 
Orange leaders. Elected Prime Minister in 2007, 
Tymoshenko increasingly sought to marginalize 
Yushchenko as the heir of the Orange tradition 
and as the exponent internationally of Ukraine’s 
pro-Western forces (assisted in this by the consti-
tutionally mandated parliamentarization of the 
Ukrainian political system). Our Ukraine and 
Fatherland joined the EPP as observers in 2007 
and 2008 respectively.
The EPP’s expressed policy was to promote accord 
and cooperation between the two parties, espe-
cially in light of the post-Kuchma forces’ reorga-
nization (EPP-ED Group 2007). It is also a fact 
though that of the two, Tymoshenko exploited 
much more forcefully the opportunities provided 
by association with the EPP. Even though Yush-
chenko was President of Ukraine, and therefore 
should have benefited from opportunities to net-
work and collaborate with likeminded leaders 
across Europe, it was Tymoshenko the one who 
had a much more active and charismatic pres-
ence in EPP activities (also thanks to her capacity 
as Prime Minister of Ukraine) (Fedyashin 2009). 
Even though the EPP lamented the inability of the 
two parties to cooperate, thus losing the 2010 Pres-
idential election to Yanukovich, that result accel-
erated the annihilation of Our Ukraine from the 
political field and the imposition of Tymoshenko’s 
party as the sole legitimate bearer of the post-rev-
olutionary heritage, as well as EPP’s sole legitimate 
representative in the Ukrainian party system. 
Tymoshenko’s rise and Yushchenko’s demise had 
more to do with conditions specific to Ukrainian 
politics of course, but EPP involvement may have 
accelerated this process to the extent that, while 
stressing the need for the pro-European camp to 
be represented by one party and leader, it ampli-
fied the difference in charisma and opportuni-
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Moldova, eclipsing Our Moldova that eventually 
merged into the PLDM in 2011. PL became part of 
the pro-European governments leading Moldova 
since 2009, however electoral dynamics since 2009 
point to its receding role, passing from leading to 
third force of the pro-European coalition. This may 
be due to a combination of its ideological character 
(Wilson 2013) (traditionally a strong predictor of 
electoral weakness in the post-Soviet region) and 
the other two parties’, PLDM and PDM, access to 
political-economic power structures, but it is also a 
tendency that should increase given the difference 
in resources association with the EPP and the PES 
(as opposed to ALDE) provides.
In sum, Europarty involvement in Moldova has 
probably accelerated existing tendencies towards 
consolidation in the party system. With major 
Europarty coverage combined to their rooting in 
major oligarchic interests, the long-term prospects 
of PLDM and PDM as labels (if not genuine forces 
of mobilization) of Moldovan party politics seem 
healthy. The opportunities for interaction with 
important European political figures that EPP and 
PES association provide can indeed be important 
resources for the ruling forces of these parties. The 
same cannot be said of the PL, a more ideologi-
cal party that only rose to prominence during the 
heady days of anti-Voronin and anti-Russia mobi-
lization, slowly lost power relative to the other 
two members of the pro-European coalition and 
whose membership of a smaller Europarty offers 
less support than what the PLDM and the PDM 
can enjoy. Europarty involvement has conflicting 
effects in terms of the health of party politics in 
Moldova, allowing for organizational consolida-
tion and some ideological legitimation of parties 
there while also serving as resource in the efforts 
of oligarchic interests to legitimize and perpetuate 
their presence in the electoral arena.
Table 2: Evolution of relative strength of pro-European 
parties in Moldova 
cratic party, and that effort received a huge boost 
after the PDM was accepted to PES shortly before 
the November 2010 elections (Party of European 
Socialists 2010). 
The PDM also spawned the major party of the 
pro-European post-revolutionary coalition, the 
PLDM. That party was created by business-
man Vlad Filat in 2007, after he quit the PDM, 
attracting mostly the support of members of the 
Christian Democratic People’s Party, an old EPP-
associated party that however lost support when 
it allied with the Communists. The PLDM was 
the second-strongest party in the disputed 2009 
elections, but its rise was meteoric in the next 
two elections of June 2009 and November 2010, 
becoming the backbone of pro-European govern-
ing coalitions, with Filat as Prime Minister. Filat 
sought EPP association already in 2009, and the 
PLDM was granted observer status in 2011, after 
Filat had become Prime Minister. Much like the 
PDM, the PLDM’s claims to consistent centre-
right ideology were pretty shallow (Filat himself 
has a past in pro-Romanian nationalistic student 
politics, but he entered politics through busi-
ness and by working from within the supposedly 
‘social-democratic’ PDM). 
Perhaps the most consistent Europarty-national 
party nexus in Moldova is the liberal one. ALDE 
had been associated with the pro-democratic lib-
eral party Our Moldova before the Liberal Party 
(PL) under Mihai Ghimpu arose as the main par-
tisan expression of the anti-Voronin mobilization 
in April 2009. An ideologue and veteran of pro-
Romanian anti-Soviet pro-democracy mobiliza-
tion in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Ghimpu’s 
pro-Romanian nationalism fell out of fashion in 
Moldova during the 1990s, however his own for-
tunes changed in the context of democratic revo-
lution in 2009. The protracted crisis and three 
consecutive elections of 2009-2010 saw PL estab-
lish itself as the chief force of liberal politics in 
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party) presented a viable alternative to Saakashvili, 
uniting everyone from democrats disenchanted 
with the authoritarian turn of the government to 
hard-core nationalists to Shevardnadze elements. 
Georgian Dream won the parliamentary elec-
tions in October 2012 and the Presidential elec-
tions of early 2013, completing the first peaceful 
transfer of power in the post-Soviet world. That 
victory was celebrated by PES and ALDE (Party 
of European Socialists 2012; Watson 2012b). The 
latter was particularly supportive of Ivanishvili in 
Brussels, it relished Saakashvili’s defeat in the par-
liamentary elections of October 2012, and raised 
the pressure on him to orderly step down after his 
certain defeat in the presidential elections of early 
2013, reflecting the strong investment its member 
parties (the Republicans and new member Free 
Democrats) had made in opposing Saakashvili. 
Much like in Moldova, ALDE was associated in 
Georgia with more-or-less principled partners. 
The PES on the other hand saw in Saakashvili’s 
demise an opportunity not only to embarrass 
the EPP, but also to capture the new big prize of 
the Georgian party system: The Georgian Dream 
party. Portraying a good understanding of the 
role of transnational political affiliations, Ivan-
ishvili has pursued association with PES and the 
PES itself is receptive to the idea (Euractiv 2012). 
This association though has been impeded by evi-
dence of Ivanishvili building an authoritarian sys-
tem around him anew, prosecuting key members 
of the Saakashvili regime for corruption. While 
it is too early to tell, the UNM stands a better 
chance of surviving in opposition than previous 
governing parties, not only because organized 
persecution by Ivanishvili’s government can gal-
vanize its members, but also because EPP mem-
bership promises access to resources of political 
and moral support that the party will only reap 
if it maintains some semblance of organizational 
continuity (European People’s Party 2013c). Geor-
gian Dream on the other hand can afford to forego 
(vote % in parliamentary elections, with actual or eventual 
Europarty affiliation. Italics indicate failure to enter in par-
liament)
2009 (April) 2009 (July) 2010
PL (ALDE) 13.13% 14.68% 9.96%
PLDM (EPP) 12.43% 16.57% 29.42%
AMN (ALDE) 9.77% 7.35% 2.05%
PDM (PES) 2.97% 12.54% 12.72%
In Georgia, for almost ten years after Shevard-
nadze’s fall the Georgian Parliament was domi-
nated by the United National Movement (UNM) 
of President Mikhail Saakashvili, a defector of 
the Shevardnadze regime and leader of the Rose 
Revolution. Saakashvili’s uncompromising atti-
tude towards Russia endeared him to the Atlanti-
cist EPP, home to many anti-Russian conservative 
parties from Central-Eastern Europe. Saakashvili 
was supported in his reelection campaign in 2008 
by right-wing leaders from CEE, and his postur-
ing during the war with Russia in summer 2008 
further contributed to his rapprochement with 
the EPP. While in the beginning the UNM had 
approached the Liberals, in the end it joined the 
EPP as observer in 2008. Thereafter, as Saakash-
vili himself was becoming target of accusations 
of authoritarianism, the EPP provided a valuable 
channel for the UNM to express its positions in 
the European setting. Much like in Ukraine and 
Moldova, the EPP’s propensity to choose a ‘big’ 
partner won out, despite evident problems with 
this choice. 
PES and ALDE were involved in the Georgian 
political scene through small ideological actors. 
The Georgian political scene has traditionally 
been full of small and weak parties with indistin-
guishable ideological profiles revolving around the 
strong governing party of the day. But the stakes 
increased incrementally when reclusive billionaire 
Bidzina Ivanishvili entered the fray as challenger 
to Saakashvili in late 2011. His Georgian Dream 
coalition (centred around his Georgian Dream 
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societal preferences cued by major social divi-
sions in a consistent way. For these reasons, one 
can assume that Europe (and Europarty involve-
ment as a sub-set of Europe’s impact) has an effect 
in increasing polarization of the democratization/
authoritarianism axis, and that it serves as a tool 
in a purposive strategy of polarization on behalf 
of post-revolutionary elites in need of legitimacy. 
In Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko found in the EPP a 
loyal supporter in her quest to maintain the sense 
of urgency of her competition with President Yan-
ukovich after his victory in the 2010 Presidential 
elections. Even as Yanukovich presented himself 
initially as open to Ukraine’s European orienta-
tion, Tymoshenko pursued a principled opposi-
tion against the re-authoritizing tendencies of his 
government. Yanukovich’s case was not helped 
by the handling of Tymoshenko as she was being 
charged for corruption62. The conduct of the trial 
and Tymoshenko’s incarceration gave credence to 
her own claim that Yanukovich is re-establishing 
authoritarian government in Ukraine. The EU 
has thoroughly condemned Tymoshenko’s treat-
ment, but it is the EPP that has been the most 
uncompromising voice. Tymoshenko’s daughter 
has been invited to EPP events and in the party’s 
congress in Marseille in November 2011, there 
was an empty chair with Tymoshenko’s name 
reserved in order to symbolize the EPP’s empa-
thy with her politically motivated persecution. In 
2012, EPP President Martens took the initiative to 
call on the EPP heads and deputy heads of govern-
62. The perceived return to authoritarian practices on 
behalf of Yanukovich also halted a potentially inter-
esting development: In October 2010, as Yanukovich 
was stressing his desire to bring Ukraine closer to the 
EU, the Socialst group in the European Parliament 
(S&D) signed a Memorandum of Cooperation (cover-
ing training and communication) with the Party of 
the Regions (see Severin 2010). It will be interesting 
to monitor whether the Party of Regions will survive 
Yanukovich’s ouster from power after the Euromaidan 
protests in February 2014 and follow its relations with 
other Europarties if it decides to reform itself. 
formal links with PES for as long as it is in gov-
ernment, but both it and PES have common inter-
ests in association. The next political cycle until 
elections in 2016 should determine whether the 
format of the Georgian party system has acquired 
some stability. The survival of UNM in opposition 
is probably the most crucial indicator of this, as 
well as of Europarty effect on the party system. 
Table 3: Evolution of electoral and parliamentary bal-
ance between government and opposition in Georgia 
(parliamentary elections)
2004 2008 2012
Winning Party
(Vote percentage 
and number of 
seats)
UNM UNM Georgian 
Dream
67% 59.2% 55%
135/235 119/150 85/150
Main Opposition
(Vote percentage 
and numbers of 
seats)
Rightists United 
Opposition
UNM
7.6% 17.7% 40.3%
15/235 17/150 65/150
b) Mechanics
It would be a tall order to prove that Europarties 
(and Europe more generally) have had a deci-
sive effect on the fluid, weakly institutionalized 
party systems of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. 
Europe however has had an indirect effect to the 
extent that it is now an important proxy in the 
competition between post-revolutionaries and 
heirs of authoritarian regimes. The democratiza-
tion/authoritarianism dimension of competition 
is qualitatively different from the ad hoc regime/
anti-regime competition that had characterized 
these countries in the past, since it concerns the 
establishment of democracy as such. It is a matter 
of historical circumstance that this competition 
takes place much closer to Europe. If it helps the 
democratization/authoritarianism axis acquire an 
even more fundamental character as a contestation 
of states’ long-term strategic orientation, Europe 
also links intra-elite competition with different 
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November 2010 elections played a role as signals 
of these parties’ commitment to bring Moldova 
closer to Europe in practice. 
Europarty involvement in Moldova then came on 
the heels of a pervasive rhetoric about a demo-
cratic, pro-European camp opposing an authori-
tarian, pro-Russian Communist party. With the 
possible exception of PL though, the parties of that 
camp were (also) vehicles for elite interests mobi-
lizing ‘from above’ parts of the electorate. While 
all three major Europarties supported the pro-
European coalition in its effort to remove Voro-
nin from power in 2009-2010, their involvement 
since then both reflects and reinforces tendencies 
of fragmentation of the pro-European alliance. 
Throughout 2013, a governmental crisis has been 
brewing, reflecting the rival personal agendas of 
Filat on the one hand and Lupu and oligarch Vlad 
Plahotniuc (for many the real force behind PDM) 
on the other, as well as the competition between 
PLDM and PDM in controlling different parts 
of the bureaucracy and judiciary (Calus 2013). 
Filat was removed as Prime Minister in May 2013 
after a series of convoluted moves, some of which 
included both PLDM and PDM requesting the 
parliamentary support of the Communists. The 
victim of these moves ended up being the most 
genuine and ideological member of the coalition, 
the PL, that split and left the government (Wilson 
2013). These developments have been a source of 
embarrassment for the EPP and the PES, forced 
to balance between inclusive calls for pro-Euro-
pean forces to cooperate and their obligation to 
support their associates (European People’s Party 
2013a). The PL seems to have gotten the short end 
of the bargain, as it exited the government but is 
also urged by ALDE to continue supporting the 
overall pro-European direction of the government 
(ALDE Party 2013). It seems that after a period of 
opposition to semi-authoritarian regimes (when 
Europarties and their associates are united in a 
common cause), processes of fragmentation of 
ment to boycott the European football champion-
ships co-hosted by Ukraine (Martens 2012). The 
refusal of the Yanukovich government to allow 
her to travel to Germany for treatment for her 
deteriorating health led, among other factors, to 
the collapse of the free trade agreement between 
EU and the Ukraine, supposed to be signed in the 
EaP Summit in Vilnius in late 2013. Yet while the 
EU officially is seeking a formula to go through 
with the agreement (compromising somehow on 
the Tymoshenko issue), the EPP remains adamant 
for Tymoshenko to be set free before an agreement 
can be signed (European People’s Party 2013b). 
In Moldova Europarty involvement has underlined 
and increased the polarization between post-rev-
olutionary democratizers and post-authoritarian 
Communists, but after 2010 it has also contributed 
to processes of fragmentation of the pro-European 
alliance. After the Twitter Revolution and the con-
tested elections of April 2009, politicians oppos-
ing Voronin’s policies rode the wave of the revo-
lution and claimed an anti-authoritarian political 
identity that helped to cement first a discernible 
mechanics of party competition, and then distinct 
ideological identities within the pro-European 
alliance. Between April 2009 and November 2010, 
a protracted political crisis (revolving around the 
inability of the parliament to elect a President of 
the Republic) and three electoral contests con-
solidated three main parties as components of the 
pro-European alliance, while the polarization of 
the party system around a democracy/authoritari-
anism dimension of competition has also brought 
about a more consistent linkage between parties 
major divisions permeating Moldovan society 
(Mungiu-Pippidi and Munteanu 2009, 141-142). 
Throughout the 2009-2010 crisis, the rhetoric of 
all three Europarties was consistently about gal-
vanizing the unity of the coalition in light of the 
common struggle. Our Moldova and PL’s associa-
tion with ALDE, PLDM’s application to EPP in 
2009 and PDM accession to PES shortly before the 
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Europe and put together the coalition Georgian 
Dream. Ten years after a democratic revolution, 
the dynamics of party competition in Georgia still 
revolved around the question of democratization, 
only the heirs of the original revolution were now 
being framed as autocrats themselves.
With Georgian Dream controlling both parlia-
ment and the post of President, it was the turn of 
UNM and the EPP to cry foul because the new 
government started prosecuting a number of Saa-
kashvili loyalists on corruption charges that felt 
politically motivated (Euractiv 2012)63. The new 
government’s practices have cooled down the 
enthusiasm of ALDE and PES about outmanoeu-
vring EPP in Georgia, even though both Europar-
ties also want to maintain open the prospect of 
maintaining links with strong partners in Geor-
gia. Unlike Ukraine and Moldova, in Georgia 
Europarties backed different sides of the divide 
as the authoritarianism/democratization nexus 
repeated itself. Georgia may become the first post-
Soviet republic with a party system enjoying links 
to the European party system reproducing (at 
least nominally) patterns of competition discern-
ible in the European Parliament and most Euro-
pean states. In this way, a combination of elite 
strategies and Europarty involvement may lead to 
the authoritarianism/democratization axis turn-
ing into a (nominally at least) proper ideological 
one. Much though will depend on the extent to 
which Ivanishvili will follow the examples of She-
vardnadze and Saakashvili down authoritarian 
lines. If he does, the cycle of the authoritarianism/
democratization axis of competition (with major 
Europarties again united on the side of democra-
tization) will most probably repeat itself. 
63. The EPP also adopted a declaration in March 2013 in 
its Summit (where Saakashvili also participated) on 
the state of democracy in Georgia. Ivanishvili retorted 
by writing on open letter to EPP leaders and members. 
post-revolutionary democratic coalitions also 
receive a boost by their leaders’ increasing con-
fidence after they gain the nod of a major party 
family. 
Georgia has been the first non-EU country where 
the European party system has exported not 
just its ideological components but also some of 
its dynamics of competition. Indeed, because in 
Georgia the authoritarianism-democratization 
cycle has repeated itself, with the democratizer of 
2003 being charged of authoritarian tendencies by 
2012, Europarties have found themselves in the 
opposing side of the main partisan divide. While 
in Ukraine and Moldova Europarty involvement 
can be said to have contributed to the polarisation 
of party competition on behalf of post-revolution-
ary democratizers, in Georgia it is this polariza-
tion that has engulfed Europarties, leading to a 
quite untypical war of words between representa-
tives of different party families in Brussels over a 
state where in theory they share the common goal 
of democratization (Euractiv 2012; Watson 2012a). 
Saakashvili built his regime on the legitimacy of 
the democratic demands of the Rose Revolution 
and his own guarantees that Georgian democracy 
would shed its authoritarian characteristics. How-
ever, under conditions of absolute dominance of 
his party, Saakashvili was free of any control and 
checks to built mechanisms of semi-authoritarian 
rule himself. Especially after the failed war with 
Russia in the summer of 2008, Saakashvili was 
seen retreating from his previous promises and 
succumbing to paranoid fears about his opponents’ 
motives (ALDE Group 2012). His self-proclaimed 
support for true democracy in Georgia and purg-
ing of the old regime eventually came to be seen 
as an effort to build a new autocracy itself (Hale 
2006, 312). In an ironic twist of events, Saakash-
vili’s autocratic tendencies fed the creation of an 
opposition pole around Bidzina Ivanishvili, who 
settled back into Georgia after years in Russia and 
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ment of Europarties in Georgia may assist in the 
consolidation of partisan identities after the first 
electoral peaceful transfer of power in the post-
Soviet world. The contrast between Ukraine and 
Moldova on the one hand and Georgia on the 
other show that, for as long as the democratiza-
tion/authoritarian dimension of competition is 
dominant, Europarties will find themselves on the 
side of post-revolutionaries against post-authori-
tarians, and their main effect will concern the 
consolidation of the pro-European ‘democratic’ 
camp. But if the post-revolutionary dimension 
of competition recedes (because democratizers 
turned out to be less committed to democracy as 
initially hoped, and their opponents – even if post-
authoritarian – become more adept in playing the 
democratizing blame game), Europarties are per-
fectly capable of exporting the dynamics of their 
competitive interaction to the EU’s periphery. In 
any case, at least in Moldova and Georgia, one 
would have to wait at least for one more electoral 
cycle to see whether parties that have appeared 
consolidated in government survive their time in 
opposition. 
At the same time though Europarties may also 
serve to consolidate less-than-ideal tendencies. In 
Moldova for example, both EPP and PES pursued 
a combination of interest and values, supporting 
the creation of a mature party system by taking 
in their fold parties that had already grown strong 
under less-than-ideological leaderships. In the 
case of PLDM, it seems that it cleared the EPP’s 
otherwise strict vetting procedure once it had 
established itself as the major political force of 
the pro-European camp. The PDM on the other 
hand went from being an almost non-entity to a 
significant political force under ex-Communist 
heavyweight Lupu, with the party’s shallow ideo-
logical credentials being deemed enough for PES 
to welcome it in 2010. Instead, ALDE has shown 
to be associated with more ideological and con-
sistent partners, perhaps reflecting its own mem-
Conclusion
This paper has proposed a new avenue in studying 
the effect of Europe on national party politics and 
has applied it in a region that has rarely featured in 
comparative analyses of European party politics. 
The starting assumption of this argument was that, 
while Europarties are relatively weak in relation 
to their constituent members within the EU, they 
actually possess significant power towards parties 
seeking to accede to them from countries outside of 
the EU. If in accession-candidate states the process 
of party reform and association with a Europarty 
mirrors (and shadows) the national effort of adap-
tation to conditionality criteria, in states beyond 
the EU’s enlargement zone association processes 
between parties and Europarties reflect the outspo-
ken decisions of parts of the political spectrum 
in favour of Europe, in a context of geopolitical 
uncertainty and fragmented state and social iden-
tities. The paper therefore theorized that ‘the lim-
ited impact of Europe’ per Mair can actually be far 
reaching in as yet unformed party systems due to 
the strategies of political-economic elites seeking 
to consolidate their partisan ‘labels’ as legitimately 
European and ideologically consistent. 
Prima facie evidence of a very preliminary 
empirical research points to important effects of 
Europarty involvement in three party arenas in 
terms of consolidation of partisan corporate iden-
tities and of increase of polarization by underpin-
ning a democratization/authoritarianism dimen-
sion of competition with more substantial con-
testation of states’ geopolitical orientation. It was 
shown for example that EPP membership ampli-
fied processes of consolidation of the post-revolu-
tionary Orange camp around Yulia Tymoshenko’s 
party to the detriment of Viktor Yushchenko’s 
party, that Europarty involvement in Moldova has 
stabilized the organization of post-revolutionary 
forces around three parties with equivalent links 
to the big three Europarties, and that the involve-
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bership structure (where all associated parties are 
full members) as well as its more relaxed attitude 
towards power. In terms of mechanics, Europarty 
involvement assists post-revolutionaries to employ 
Europe as a deliberate polarizing strategy in their 
competition with post-authoritarians. It is also 
probable though that Europe (and Europarty dis-
course in Brussels and EaP states) increases the 
polarized nature of what remains intra-elite com-
petition and struggle between parties with persis-
tently weak rooting in their societies. 
This paper has only offered a primary elaboration 
of this argument. Much more thorough research 
is required to establish whether and how Europar-
ties matter in party politics of EaP states. More 
specifically, the institutional avenues through 
which Europarties affect national partisan strat-
egies, as well as associated parties promote their 
interests and agendas to Brussels and from there 
back into national arenas, must be explored. One 
such institutional avenue can be the meetings of 
European and EaP parliamentarians in inter-par-
liamentary forums, such as the EP-EaP EuroNest 
Assembly, where EaP politicians become social-
ized in the workings of transnational political 
families. This paper has not sought to offer specific 
mechanism-like links between Europarty involve-
ment and outcomes in national party systems. At 
most it was shown that Europarties amplify pre-
existing tendencies in national party systems. The 
temporal congruence between Europarty involve-
ment and some outcomes (in terms of format and 
mechanics) in national party systems though is 
tempting enough at this stage to invite more seri-
ous and detailed research. 
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erence point, référentiel ((Muller, 1995), (Muller, 
2000)); while various scholars asserted that Euro-
peanization is a discourse ((Schimmelfennig, 
2001), (Hay & Rosamond, 2002)). For the aim of 
this paper, we define Europeanization as a combi-
nation of top to down implications coming from 
the EU and also the unofficial effects. 
If Peter Mair was still alive, he may have re-writ-
ten his article on the impact of Europe on national 
party systems (Mair, 2000) with the current situa-
tion in Europe, after six painful years of economic 
crisis. He gave the signals of this intention in his 
EUI Working Paper in 2011 stating that the national 
level no longer has the adequate resources to deal 
with the financial crises, using the Irish example 
(Mair, 2011). Before moving further, it is beneficial 
to sum up what he has been claiming in his 2000 
paper, which gave inspiration to this work.
Mair claimed that Europeanization has a very 
limited direct impact on national party systems. 
He looked through the format and mechanics of 
the party systems of 15 Member States using the 
party positioning data of Leonard Ray (Ray, 1999). 
He also provided country specific information 
about parties and their vote distribution in the lat-
est national election. In addition, Mair discussed 
the limits of spillover mechanism, the absence of 
a European party system and the competences of 
different arenas, the European and national arena. 
In short, Mair has been commenting on various 
issues, which may have gone through changes 
regarding to the very dynamic character of Euro-
pean political space.
With all respect to his memory, this paper will 
revisit and extend his work after fourteen years, 
13 new Member States64 and years of economic, 
financial and social crisis. The paper will follow 
the same structure; check the format and mechan-
ics of national party systems. Before doing so, this 
64. Appendix Table 1 provides the enlargement waves in 
the European Union.
Introduction
Europe has been going through drastic changes 
for many decades. As of 1950, starting as the 
European Coal and Steal Community, the Euro-
pean Union (EU) has become a sui-generis inter-
national organization that nobody could ever 
dream of. Becoming more and more crowded over 
years, the supranational body started to affect and 
shape its members in different dimensions. It has 
been studied deeply over years by many scholars, 
first as the European integration literature with 
many theories behind ((Haas, 1961), (Moravcsik, 
1993), among many others) followed by policy-
making analysis in this new entity. Conditional-
ity for candidate states and Europeanization lit-
erature ((Borzel, 2006), (Featherstone & Radaelli, 
2003)), is full of attempts to measure the effect of 
Europeanization on different countries, on differ-
ent dimensions (Olsen, 2002). 
There are many dimensions to measure, without 
any doubts. Following Peter Mair (2000), this 
paper focuses on the effect of Europeanization 
on national party systems. We claim that today 
Europe has more impact on national party sys-
tems, not only because of the economic crisis, 
but also because of further integration in the EU. 
Before moving further, it is beneficial to explain 
what this paper means with Europeanization, or 
the impact of Europe. 
When we take the examples of Council of Europe 
(1949) or the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR) (1950), we can say that Europeanization 
predates the EU (Majone, 2005). In political sci-
ence literature Europeanization concept is used 
for the effects of European integration on domes-
tic polity, politics and policy (Radaelli & Pasquier, 
2007). This also means that it is not only policy 
implications or law but also “unofficial” effects in 
Member States’ policies. Muller claimed that there 
is Europeanization when the EU becomes the ref-
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between the national arena and the European 
arena is blurring, keeping in mind that Europe 
has been giving many important decisions related 
to daily lives of citizens. European Commission 
evaluating national budgets after parliamentary 
approval or all the measures demanded from the 
rescued countries can be given as examples here. 
For sure, Troika65 deserves a special attention in 
Eurozone crisis, when we talk about international 
pressure. 
Since an ordinary citizen is not able to discrimi-
nate between the political actors in the EU, all the 
messages or implications coming from either the 
EU itself or the Troika is perceived as “Europe”. 
In addition, for these citizens electoral access to 
European decision-making and the proportion of 
consultation with the mass public is questionable. 
Even if the EU has been going through Treaty 
changes, using new instruments and increasing 
the role of the European Parliament (EP), the issue 
of who is representing European citizens is still 
debatable.
In addition to all we have discussed before, Mair 
claimed that the effect of Europe is quite limited 
also because of the non-existence of an elected 
European executive office. This issue has been on 
the table for a really long time, also in Brussels. 
This work will also comment on the topic, after 
certain developments on Martin Schulz being the 
Socialist candidate and Jean Claude Junker the 
Conservative one for the President of the European 
Commission, succeeding Jose Manuel Barroso.
All in all, this work will try to define the effect of 
Europeanization on national party systems, fol-
lowing Peter Mair, in the light of economic crisis 
and further integration Europe has been going 
through. There are many elements that define 
65. The word Troika, coming from Russian, is used to 
define European Commission, European Central 
Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
together, in the Eurozone crisis. 
work will be providing some general information 
on the indicators of party systems, as an addi-
tional section different from Mair’s. 
Furthermore, this paper will provide information 
on newly established parties in Europe, their posi-
tion on pro/anti European integration dimension 
and the votes they received in the latest national 
elections. This is done also for methodological 
reasons, for being able to provide positioning for 
the ones that are not coded in the 2010 Chapel 
Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker et al., 2012). 
For a complete analysis in the EU, this paper also 
includes Eastern Europe. However, comparison 
with Mair’s work is not possible for these coun-
tries. 
The “intensity” of the impact of Europeanization 
is also related to the internal dynamics of Mem-
ber States. It is observed that today with the eco-
nomic crisis most European governments want to 
share the responsibility of increasing taxes or cut-
ting government spending etc., they even want to 
put blame on somewhere else. Even if they keep 
on claiming that economic integration decreases 
the power of the governments (Menendez, 2012), 
they still use the Europe card very often. Mainly 
the South European governments that are fight-
ing with the economic crisis try to put the blame 
on the EU for the unpopular measures. The Span-
ish Socialist leader Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero 
can be given as a good example of this intention, 
especially at the end of his term, even if this was 
not enough for saving his party from punishment 
in 2011 elections. Weaver claims that politicians 
primarily have a desire to avoid blame for unpop-
ular actions (Weaver, 1986). What is going on in 
Europe today, with austerity measures and bailout 
packages, is definitely a situation to try to avoid the 
blame, looking from the perspective of incumbents.
In this regard, it is acceptable to say that the roles 
of arenas have been changing, the distinction 
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Mitchell, 2008) and the dataset of Gallagher (Gal-
lagher, 2013). The author has collected the related 
data of the EU Member States, since the original 
dataset is way broader66. Table 2 below shows the 
election indices for all Member States before and 
after (during) the crisis. 
It is hard to comment on changes on party system 
indicators without knowing each country’s elec-
toral law. Depending on how permissive the sys-
tem is, or how easy to access, there are certain dif-
ferences in the format and the mechanics of party 
systems. We can use the comparison before and 
after the crisis to see how the number of parties 
changed through years. This will open the floor 
to our new discussions on how many new parties 
have been established and how Europe has been 
affecting this process.
When we look at the party system indicators of 
countries that have specific bailout agreements 
and/or austerity measures implemented by the 
Troika, we can observe a certain increase in the 
number of political parties in the electoral system. 
The ENEP index of Greece rises to 7.08 in 2012, 
while it was 3.09 before the crisis. This means that 
the number of parties in the electoral arena has 
been increasing. Ireland shows one point increase, 
from 3.77 to 4.77. Portugal and Spain demon-
strates slight increases from 3.48 to 3.66 and from 
2.79 to 3.34 respectively. The same case is also cor-
rect for Italy, ENEP raises to 5.33 in 2013, while 
it was 4.76 before the crisis. As we can see from 
the data, new parties emerged in all the countries 
mentioned with economic troubles inside. 
66. The indices can be explained as:
- The least squares index (LSq): Measures disproportion-
ality between the distributions of votes and of seats
- The effective number of parties at the electoral level (Eff 
Nv, also termed ENEP)
- The effective number of parties at the parliamentary or 
legislative level (Eff Ns also termed ENPP)
 While N of seats refers to the number given in the 
sources used and is the number on which the calcula-
tions were based.
party systems. For this reason, this paper will con-
tinue with a short assessment of these elements 
with related indices. In addition to these indices, 
volatility data since 2000 will also be provided. 
Afterwards, it will follow Mair’s scheme, with new 
data, providing comments on the change in for-
mat and mechanics of the party systems. Before 
the conclusions, this paper will also provide com-
ments on the spillover mechanism and the chang-
ing dimensions in national and European arenas.
Main Elements of the Party Systems
There is a huge literature on the description of 
main elements and types of the party systems. 
Duverger (Duverger, 1954) identified two-party 
and multiparty systems as the major types, while 
Blondel (Blondel, 1968) introduced new catego-
ries. Following that, Rokkan (Rokkan, 1970) has 
shifted the party system classification from vote 
share to seat share, focusing analysis on relative 
strengths of parties, instead of absolute strengths. 
According to the well-known definition of Sar-
tori (Sartori, 1976), a party system is a “system of 
interactions resulting from inter-party competi-
tion”. Following various descriptions, Laakso and 
Taagepera (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979) offered the 
effective number of parties calculations and Ped-
ersen (Pedersen, 1980) proposed various indica-
tors (the Gini-coefficient, the index of fractional-
ization, the fragmentation index etc.). Including 
Mair himself (Bardi & Mair, 2008), there has been 
a certain effort to define the parameters of party 
systems. Here we will make a comparison of party 
system indicators of Gallagher (Gallagher, 2013) 
before and after (better said during) the economic 
crisis. Electoral volatility data will also be pro-
vided for getting deeper in this analysis. 
Before reproducing the analyses of Mair, it is quite 
useful to provide brief information on election 
indices in the literature. For this reason, we use 
the book of Gallagher and Mitchell (Gallagher & 
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Table 2: Comparative Election Indices (Pre/Post-Economic Crisis in Europe)
 
Country
LSq Eff Nv (ENEP) Eff Ns (ENPP)
 Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
1 Austria 2.92 2.84 4.79 4.94 4.24 4.59
2 Belgium 3.37 3.77 9.04 10.04 7.91 8.42
3 Bulgaria 5.49 10.88 5.1 5.34 4.07 3.15
4 Croatia 7.58 12.31 4.23 4.57 3.07 2.59
5 Cyprus 2.42 1.69 4.29 3.86 3.9 3.6
6 Czech Republic 5.72 5.51 3.91 6.35 3.1 5.07
7 Denmark 1.24 0.73 5.30 5.71 5.11 5.61
8 Estonia 3.43 5.09 5.02 4.78 4.37 3.84
9 Finland 3.2 2.95 5.88 6.47 5.13 5.83
10 France 13.58 17.66 4.32 5.27 2.49 2.83
11 Germany 2.78 10.10 5.02 3.74 4.44 2.80
12 Greece 7.14 11.42 3.09 7.08 2.61 4.30
13 Hungary 5.13 11.67 2.8 2.82 2.4 2
14 Ireland 5.85 8.69 3.77 4.77 3.03 3.52
15 Italy 4.67 17.34 4.76 5.33 4.07 3.47
16 Latvia 4.77 2.78 7.49 4.75 6 4.23
17 Lithuania 11.14 9.08 8.9 7.59 5.78 5.28
18 Luxembourg 4.22 5.23 4.25 4.85 3.63 3.93
19 Malta 1.44 1.75 2.08 2.05 2 1.97
20 Netherlands 1.03 0.90 5.8 6.46 5.54 6.22
21 Poland 5.82 5.95 4.59 3.74 3.54 3
22 Portugal 5.69 5.68 3.48 3.66 2.85 2.93
23 Romania 3.32 6.2 3.93 2.54 3.60 2.12
24 Slovakia 5.53 8.62 6.11 4.95 4.81 3.43
25 Slovenia 3.89 3.64 4.94 5.57 4.23 4.73
26 Spain 4.49 6.93 2.79 3.34 2.36 2.6
27 Sweden 3.02 1.25 4.66 4.79 4.15 4.54
28 United Kingdom 16.73 15.1 3.59 3.71 2.46 2.57
Source: Author’s Self Evaluation from Gallagher (2013)
Note: Austria (2008, 2013), Belgium (2007, 2010), Bulgaria (2005&2009, 2013), Croatia (2007, 2011), Cyprus (2006, 2011), 
Czech Republic (2006, 2010&2013), Denmark (2005&2007, 2011), Estonia (2007, 2011), Finland (2007, 2011), France (2007, 
2012), Germany (2005&2009, 2013), Greece (2007&2009, 2012 (both)), Hungary (2006, 2010), Ireland (2007, 2011), Italy 
(2006&2008, 2013), Latvia (2006, 2010&2011), Lithuania (2008, 2012), Luxembourg (2009, 2013), Malta (2008, 2013), Neth-
erlands (2006, 2010&2012), Poland (2005&2007, 2011), Portugal (2005&2009, 2011), Romania (2008, 2012), Slovakia (2006, 
2010&2012), Slovenia (2008, 2011), Spain (2008, 2011), Sweden (2006, 2010), United Kingdom (2005, 2010)
Note: Even if there is a discussion on the starting time of the crisis, mainly the elections before 2008 are taken as pre-crisis, 
while the ones afterwards are taken as post-crisis, even if the crisis is not finished yet. When there are two elections, the 
arithmetic average has been taken.
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where n is the number of parties in the system and 
Pi is the electoral support in percentage for a party 
i at time t and (t+1). 
Appendix Table 2 provides the volatility rates for 
the EU Member States since 200067. With this data, 
in addition to all the party system indicators we 
have been using, we can see if there is an intrigu-
ing trend in electoral volatility in particular. It is 
true that electoral volatility may have different rea-
sons. When we look at Graph 2, Eastern European 
case is quite different than Western European one. 
Electoral volatility has been declining in Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia after the 
67. There is no up-to-date source for volatility in Western 
Europe. The author has created her own data set. In 
this process she is very grateful to Dr. Pedro Riera, Dr. 
Raul Gomez and Dr. Svante Ersson (Ersson, 2012) for 
sharing all the information they have. 
Another very important concept when we try to 
define the party systems is volatility. If there is a 
change, or in case of collapse of party systems, 
there will be high volatility. For this reason it is 
crucial to calculate volatility rates in Europe in 
the times of crisis. Traditionally, Pedersen Index 
(Pedersen, 1979) has been used in volatility cal-
culations while studying Western democracies 
((Bartolini & Mair, 1990), (Elff, 2007) etc) and also 
Eastern Europe ((Lewis, 2000), (Rose & Munro, 
2003), (Tavits, 2005), (Powell & Tucker, 2014) etc.). 
Pedersen Index is:
Graph 1: Comparative ENEP Index for the EU Members
Source: Author’s Self Evaluation from Gallagher (2013)
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of national governments and the political parties 
that make up those governments. This brought up 
the idea of a certain direct impact of Europe.
Before going further, we can review MSs that got 
deeply affected from the economic crisis. To start 
with, the situation in Greece deserves specific 
attention. We can confidently say that the bailout 
agreement and its conditions had been the most 
important issue in the agenda for the May and 
June 2012 election. Moreover, it also affected the 
structure of party competition, which has a cer-
tain impact on the party system. Apart from the 
extreme case of Greece; Portugal, Ireland, and also 
Spain, can be given as examples. The case of Italy 
is even more striking; the EU “forced” a change of 
government by placing excessive pressure on Ber-
lusconi government, which finally led to the elec-
tion of a technocrat, Mario Monti, as the Prime 
Minister of the country from 2011 to 2013. 
We can cautiously conclude that, the roles of are-
nas, European and national arenas have been 
changing drastically due to the economic and 
financial crisis. The European arena is making 
more and more decisions about the lives of Euro-
pean citizens. This has always been the case after 
the establishment of the EU for some issues; how-
ever, became even more visible first with the com-
mon currency Euro and then with the austerity 
measures and rescue packages of the economic 
crisis. The Troika has been controlling tax raises 
and government spending cuts for years now. At 
this point, it is too hard to avoid the effect of the 
European Union. National political parties look-
ing for office are aware that when they govern, 
they need to sustain the status-quo of austerity 
measures. Especially big, mainstream parties are 
almost obliged to stay in line with EU regulations 
at the moment. This makes us question again the 
increasing impact of Europe in the times of crisis.
EU membership. When we look at economically 
troubled countries of Southern Europe, we see a 
different trend. In Portugal there was an increas-
ing drift, even if the volatility has been very low 
for all these years. Italy’s index first increased, and 
then decreased in the last elections.
When we look at the case of Greece, the most 
interesting of all, we can see a certain increase in 
volatility for the last elections. Spain, on the other 
hand, being a low volatility country in general, 
also showed an escalation. The causal relation-
ship between electoral volatility and party system 
change should be established way more carefully, 
which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
After providing the necessary background infor-
mation on party system indicators, the paper will 
continue with format and mechanics analysis. It 
will follow the same sequence with Mair, it will 
first replicate his analysis on format and mechan-
ics, and then will comment on various issues 
related to Europe, following his footsteps.
Europe and National Politi-
cal Party Systems in the Times 
of Economic Crisis: Format and 
Mechanics
Even if we do not exactly know the long run 
economic implications of the crisis, the political 
implications have started to get visible in the short 
run. Since public debt increased very quickly in 
some MSs, their national economy became unsus-
tainable and they required specific bailout mecha-
nisms and austerity measures. These countries 
even became a threat to entire Monetary Union 
and the common currency Euro itself. For this 
reason, the EU as a whole in general, European 
Commission (EC), European Central Bank (ECB) 
in cooperation with International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) as the Troika in particular, started to get 
involved more and more on the policy making 
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be wrong to claim that format and mechanics are 
still key elements of the party systems since Sar-
tori (Sartori, 1976). 
Format
Following Mair’s argument, we claim that Euro-
peanization might have an effect on the format of 
the party systems, which is the number of political 
parties in national arena. For the purpose of our 
study, this means that as a direct consequence of 
Europeanization, new political parties might have 
been established. These parties can be pro-EU 
integration, which is mainly the case for the main-
stream parties governing the Member States, since 
the cost of exiting the EU is quite high. While 
there are also some extreme left and right parties 
strictly anti-EU integration. Still the main issue is 
how many political parties have been established 
with the specific agenda related to European inte-
gration, or in a more contemporary way pro/anti 
bailout or austerity measures dimension. 
Table 3 shows all the newly established parties, 
their groups of pro/anti-EU integration dimen-
As another point claimed by Mair, the national 
party systems are resistant to change coming 
from Europe, since a certain spillover mechanism 
is absent due to the non-existence of a European 
executive office. He gave some credit to europar-
ties, however also mentioned the absence of Euro-
pean party system. These two issues still keep 
their validity today. However, there are certain 
developments in Brussels claiming that the Euro-
pean Parliament (EP) will elect the president of 
the European Commission (EC). When this hap-
pens, there will be competition for a European 
executive office, which may change the spillover 
mechanism dynamics. 
For getting further, next part starts with an analy-
sis of the direct impact of European integration 
on the format and mechanics of the national party 
systems. Format of a party system can be described 
as the number of relevant parties in the electoral 
arena. The mechanics of a party system on the 
other hand concerns the modes of interaction 
between the related parties. There are many other 
things to analyze when the topic is party systems 
as we also mentioned above. However, it will not 
Graph 2: Comparative Volatility (Pederson Index) for the EU Members
Source: Author’s Self Evaluation from the volatility data set
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can be taken as an indication of the effect of Euro-
peanization. 
Before moving to the analysis related to posi-
tioning of the political parties, it is quite ben-
eficial to skim through the national parliamen-
tary elections in Europe. Appendix Table 2 also 
shows national parliamentary elections in every 
MS since 2000. Every country had at least three 
national parliamentary elections in the meantime. 
These elections can be named as pre-crisis and 
post-crisis according to the year they have been 
held. We claim that this analysis will provide us 
the opportunity to observe the degree of inclusion 
of the EU as a dimension in the newly established 
parties. For this purpose, some recent data has 
been derived from the 2010 Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey (CHES). The dataset provides expert data 
on positioning of 237 political parties on Euro-
pean integration in all EU Member States except 
Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta. The survey also 
includes political parties in Norway, Switzerland 
and Turkey. For the purpose of this study, we have 
only taken the data of MSs.
Table 4 replicates the Mair table about the mechan-
ics of the party systems with new data. However, 
in this analysis there is a certain problem of time 
mismatch. The “newest” complete comparative 
expert survey that we can use is still the 2010 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey. However, for a better 
analysis of the effects of the economic crisis, lat-
est national elections should be used. This means 
that our expert survey does not contain certain 
information on political parties that are recently 
established. For this reason, personal judgment is 
included in newly established parties, which are 
mentioned in Table 369. 
69. Using Chapel Hill expert survey criteria all the politi-
cal parties in Table 3 have been coded. With the lat-
est developments, some existing parties also changed 
their positions in the scale. However, they are left as 
they are in the expert survey. 
sion and their percentage of votes in the latest 
national elections68. It is important to underline 
not all the newly established parties are anti-EU 
integration. Looking at Table 3, we can see that 
there are twenty-one new political parties. Five 
of these parties are strongly anti-European inte-
gration and almost all of them have a vote share 
higher than five percent in the latest parliamen-
tary elections, as we can see from the table. Five 
Star Movement in Italy with 25.9% of the votes 
and ANO2011 of Czech Republic with 18.7% of 
the votes deserve special attention.
Before moving further, it is important to intro-
duce a new discussion that definitely deserves 
further attention. Innumerable numbers of schol-
ars have been commenting on the pro/anti Euro-
pean integration. Not only expert surveys but also 
manifesto projects locate political parties in this 
dimension. However, with the economic crisis 
there is certain change on the focus of this dimen-
sion. With the clear case of Greece, political par-
ties have been competing over a new issue, being 
pro/anti bailout packages.
Mechanics 
The second way Europeanization might have 
affected the party systems in MSs is the mechan-
ics of the party system, which is, basically, the 
interaction between the relevant political parties. 
For this section, we will be analyzing if political 
parties in national arena locate themselves in anti/
pro-European integration dimension and com-
pete over it. This will provide us the opportunity 
to observe the possible existence of new cluster-
ing. If any new clustering can be observed, this 
68. The positioning of the political parties in the pro/anti 
EU integration scale is done by personal judgement, 
which is open to discussion. However, there are no 
recent expert surveys that position the newly estab-
lished parties. The analysis will be repeated with the 
new data in 2015.
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in the case of Czech Republic, the Eurosceptic 
party Civic Democratic Party (ODS) lost 12.5 per-
cent of the votes and 37 seats in the Parliament, 
in between 2010 and 2013. However, these votes 
have been taken by ANO 2011, newly established 
center-right party, which has taken 18.7 percent of 
the votes and won 47 seats in the Parliament, fol-
These newly established parties deserve special 
attention. To start with, in the case of Austria, the 
newly established Eurosceptic party, Team Frank 
Stronach (FRANK) got 5.7 percentages of the 
votes and won 11 seats in the Parliament70. On the 
contrary of the rising Euroscepticism in Europe, 
70. The party is located in the anti-EU integration group 1. 
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the last elections. Because of the electoral system 
in France, they only have 2 chairs in the Parlia-
ment. When the right wing extreme is mentioned, 
Greece should be underlined with its strongly anti-
European party Golden Dawn. It was established in 
1993; however, in 2012 they took 6.9 percent of the 
votes and won 18 seats in the Parliament. In addi-
tion to Golden Dawn, ANEL, the newly established 
lowing the winning Social Democrats. This party 
is opposing the adaptation of euro, and does not 
want any deeper integration or any more bureau-
cracy from Brussels.
Here we should also comment on right wing 
extreme movements. In France Front National 
(FN) increased its votes from 4.3 to 13.6 percent in 
Table 4. Support in the most recent national elections, by position on European integration
 Country Percentage Votes for 
Strongly Pro-European 
Integration Parties (N of 
Parties)
Percentage Votes for 
Strongly Anti-European 
Integration Parties (N of 
Parties)
Percentage Votes for 
Parties Neither Strongly 
Pro nor Strongly Anti 
European Integration (N 
of Parties)
1 Austria 68.2 (4) 29.7 (3) 0 (1)
2 Belgium 83.9 (10) 8.2 (3) 2.3 (1)
3 Bulgaria 72.7 (7) 7.3 (1) 1.7 (2)
4 Croatia 76.4 (6) 5.6 (1) 13.1 (5)
5 Czech Republic 46.2 (5) 33.6 (2) 7.7 (2)
6 Denmark 71 (5) 19.8 (3) 9.2 (1)
7 Estonia 93.3 (5) 0 (0) 2.1 (1)
8 Finland 66.8 (5) 19 (1) 12.1 (2)
9 France 68.9 (8) 20.5 (4) 0 (0)
10 Germany 73 (3) 4.7 (1) 16 (2)
11 Greece 48.3 (4) 45.8 (5) 0 (0)
12 Hungary 75 (5) 16.7 (1) 7.2 (1)
13 Ireland 72.9 (3) 12.1 (3) 1.8 (1)
14 Italy 35.8 (10) 29.7 (2) 29.4 (6)
15 Latvia 39.6 (2) 0 (0) 56.9 (4)
16 Lithuania 73.7 (9) 0 (1) 15.3 (2)
17 Netherlands 43.5 (4) 19.7 (2) 35.5 (5)
18 Poland 65.8 (6) 29.9 (2) 0 (1)
19 Portugal 78.5 (3) 0 (0) 13.1 (2)
20 Romania 80.2 (5) 0 (0) 0 (1)
21 Slovakia 57.4 (6) 0 (1) 27.9 (4)
22 Slovenia 75.9 (6) 0 (0) 26.5 (4)
23 Spain 84.2 (8) 0 (0) 10.8 (9)
24 Sweden 80.1 (5) 11.3 (3) 7.3 (1)
25 United Kingdom 24.7 (2) 37.3 (5) 30.5 (3)
Source: Author’s self-evaluation from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and the database of http://parties-and-elections.eu
Note: For a better comparison the parties are grouped the same way as Mair did, 6 and 7 being strongly-pro European integra-
tion; 1 and 2 being strongly anti-European integration and 3, 4, 5 being neither strongly pro nor strongly anti European integra-
tion. Since the parties without any seats in the national parliaments are left out, the vote percentages don’t sum up to 100%. 
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newly established parties in Eastern Europe also 
deserves special attention. Since they joined the 
EU 10 years ago after Communism, it takes a while 
to get their party systems stable. Deeper analysis 
on the topic deserves further background infor-
mation, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Table 5 demonstrates the comparative results of 
political parties and their vote shares with Mair 
paper. When we look at the results, there are some 
points that deserve special attention. There are 
countries with a certain increase of votes of anti-
European integration. This means that not only 
the number of parties is increasing, but also the 
vote shares they take are on the rise. 
The case of Greece has already been repeated vari-
ous times in this paper. In addition, there is a cer-
tain increase in anti-EU integration votes in Aus-
tria, Belgium and Denmark. As we will elaborate 
further on the forthcoming sections, this work 
underlines the necessity of a new dimension/issue 
definition that may create better competition for 
national political parties. The pro/anti EU integra-
tion dimension is not fully representing the cur-
rent agenda. There can be various political parties 
that are not against the EU integration as a whole, 
but certainly against the austerity measures com-
ing from outside. This work claims that if we posi-
tion political parties on a dimension that is more 
competitive today, the effect of Europeanization 
will be even more visible.
Graph 3 provides a visual display for the changes. 
Looking at the graph, the rise in the UK and the 
Netherlands deserves to be underlined. In the UK, 
three anti-EU integration parties took 36.1 per-
cent of the votes. There is a similar situation in the 
Netherlands. Two anti-EU integration parties got 
25.4 percent of the votes. 
As a final case, in Ireland, another bail-out coun-
try, there are two anti-European parties that have 
taken 7.5 percent of the votes. However the major-
conservative party, is a softer Eurosceptic. Finally, 
Democratic Left (DIMAR) is a social democratic 
pro-European small party that belongs to the cur-
rent coalition (ND, PASOK and DIMAR).
When we look at Germany, Alternative fur 
Deutschland (AfD) won 4.7 percent of the votes 
in 2013. However, they are not represented in 
the Parliament because of the 5 percent thresh-
old. Still, this is an important party in Germany 
because of the political history of the country. In 
general, the main political parties in Germany are 
pro-European, as a certain heritage from the past. 
The case of Germany also deserves to be under-
lined. German citizens feel like they are paying for 
the mistakes of Southern Europe. Therefore, they 
also feel like “Europeanization losers” in the times 
of crisis71.
Italy has a very sui generis case. There are four 
new parties established and participated in 2013 
national elections. Their votes are summing up 
to 36.4 percent of the votes. The success of Mov-
imiento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement – MCS) 
needs to be emphasized. With 25.6 percent of the 
votes, they have 109 seats in the Parliament. This 
party, the main leftist Eurosceptic party, and an 
anti-establishment movement founded by the for-
mer comedian Beppe Grillo, advocates a referen-
dum to withdraw Italy from the Eurozone. In the 
right politics, the main Eurosceptic party is the 
older Lega Nord; which is regionalist and right-
wing populist. Scelta Civica, for its part, is a new 
party strongly pro-European and founded by the 
former Prime Minister Mario Monti.   
Case of Slovenia is also important since its winner 
is a newly established party, Pozitivna Slovenija 
(Positive Slovenia – PS) that has taken 28.4 per-
cent of the votes and won 28 seats in the Parlia-
ment as a pro-European party. The discussion on 
71. The analogy is created from Kriesi’s description of 
“globalisation losers” (H. Kriesi et al., 2006), (H. e. a. 
Kriesi, 2012).
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EP elections has been low, also with a downward 
trend. Many scholars are still trying to explain 
the reasons behind this phenomenon ((Franklin, 
2001), (Flickinger & Studlar, 2007), (van der Eijk & 
van Egmond, 2007), among many others))72. This 
phenomenon is very alarming, opening the floor 
to the discussion of democratic deficit in the EU. 
There have been seven elections and the partici-
pation rate has been showing a downward trend 
since then. For also this reason, it is important to 
link national political parties and Europe.
While discussing the limited impact of European-
ization to the national arena, Mair underlined two 
main assumptions. The first one was claiming that 
national political parties are “gatekeepers”. He 
claimed that they “rehearse” once again national 
politics within the European electoral arena. Even 
72. The turnout rates of all EP elections can be found in 
the Appendix.
ity of the votes are still taken by pro-European 
political parties. We should also keep in mind that 
the latest election in Ireland took place in 2011. 
Claiming results of next election would be dif-
ferent after the implications of the bail-out agree-
ment (2011-2015) is safe. 
The Limits of Spillover and the 
Absence of a European Party 
System
To start, it is beneficial to highlight that direct 
elections to the European Parliament, starting 
from 1979, is an important cornerstone of demo-
cratic representation in the EU. It opened a whole 
new arena for electoral representation and cre-
ated another incentive for political parties. How-
ever, there has always been a problem, which even 
got deeper throughout years. The turnout in the 
Table 5: Support for Parties in the Most Recent National Elections, By Position on European Integration
 Country Percentage Votes for Strongly 
Pro-European Integration 
Parties (N of Parties)
Percentage Votes for 
Strongly Anti-European 
Integration Parties (N of 
Parties)
Percentage Votes for Parties 
Neither Strongly Pro nor 
Strongly Anti European 
Integration (N of Parties)
  2000 (Mair) 2014 (Toygur) 2000 (Mair) 2014 (Toygur) 2000 (Mair) 2014 (Toygur)
1 Austria 71.9 (3) 65.7 (3) 22.2 (2) 28.2 (2) 4.8 (1) 6.1 (1)
2 Belgium 72.8 (7) 55.7 (8) 0(0) 2.3 (2) 21.0 (5) 25.5 (3)
3 Denmark 77.1 (5) 70 (5) 12.5 (3) 19.8 (3) 10.0 (2) 9.2 (1)
4 Finland 49.0 (3) 79.8 (5) 6.0 (2) 4.1 (1) 40.6 (3) 13.7 (2)
5 France 49.3 (4) 78.8 (6) 16.1 (2) 9.2 (3) 20.2 (2) 0 (0)
6 Germany 75.5 (3) 75.6 (6) 1.8 (1) 4.7 (1) 18.5 (3) 24.4 (2)
7 Greece 92.0 (4) 82.3 (3) 5.6 (1) 12.1 (3) 0 (0) 5.6 (1)
8 Ireland 32.7 (2) 83.7 (4) 0(0) 7.5 (2) 58.0 (6) 0 (0)
9 Italy 39.9 (4) 43.6 (8) 24.3 (2) 8.3 (1) 28.9 (3) 40.5 (5)
10 Netherlands 56.4 (3) 46.8 (4) 0.6 (1) 25.4 (2) 37.1 (5) 26.7 (4)
11 Portugal 79.6 (3) 76.1 (3) 9.9 (3) 7.9 (1) 9.3 (2) 9.8 (1)
12 Spain 85.9 (10) 85.5 (11) 0(0) 0 (0) 10.7 (1) 7.7 (2)
13 Sweden 75.8 (4) 83.5 (6) 16.5 (2) 11.3 (3) 5.1 (1) 0 (1)
14 United Kingdom 63.3 (5) 25.3 (3) 2.6 (1) 36.1 (3) 30.7 (1) 29.9 (2)
Source: Author’s self-evaluation from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and the database of http://parties-and-elections.eu and 
Mair (2000)
Note: Only Member States that are common in both of the papers are displayed here.
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juncture of Europe in the times of crisis and 
with further integration. However, for proving 
the argument, we need further analysis and also 
the results of the forthcoming elections in 2014. 
Also, there is an alternative way of thinking. Even 
if national elections are still second-order, which 
means that parties are competing in national 
dimensions and also voters are voting in line with 
that, national arena is including more “Europe” 
today. As an example, if the Greek parties are 
competing in pro/anti bailout dimension already 
in national elections, they will also campaign this 
way for the EP elections. With this logic, it will 
already include more Europe. However we need 
certain issue salience analysis, which is beyond 
the scope of this paper.
The second argument of Mair, the situation on 
the absence of a European party system hasn’t 
changed so much since 2000. However, there are 
some signs of competition for an unofficial execu-
tive office. There is a certain consensus on the 
the profiles of the candidates for being a member 
of the European Parliament are still supporting 
this claim. National political parties are choos-
ing people that have been serving in the national 
arena and remain connected to their parties. They 
even think the EP as a retirement place for their 
long-serving members.
Without any doubt, “gatekeeper” claim opens the 
floor to the discussion of the second-order char-
acter of EP elections. As mentioned by Reif and 
Schmitt (Reif & Schmitt, 1980), and also restated 
by Schmitt later (Schmitt, 2005) the EP elections 
tend to be second-order national elections, since 
people vote with national concerns. In addition, 
Hix and Marsh measured what they call “Euro-
pean effects” in 25 EU States and conclude that the 
position a party takes on Europe is largely irrel-
evant to its performance (Hix & Marsh, 2007). 
This paper claims that EP elections should become 
less second-order when we look at the new con-
Graph 3: Anti-European Integration Political Parties: A Comparison – Mair & Toygur
Source: Author’s self evaluation using Mair (2000) and Toygur (2014)
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Today, Europe itself is way more visible in national 
arena because of the blame-avoiding attitude of 
national governments. Especially the Southern 
European governments have been using the EU 
for avoiding the responsibility in unpopular mea-
sures, like spending cuts or tax rises. In other 
words, Europe is not taken out from the national 
arena and depoliticized anymore, as Mair claimed 
in his paper. Today, Europe has a say that is also 
acknowledged by political leadership in domestic 
politics. 
As a final remark, it is also very important to note 
that in some countries various political parties are 
adopting anti-European stance, as we also men-
tioned before, they take over a significant part of 
the electoral market. They even got one step fur-
ther, bringing the exit from the Monetary Union, 
or even the EU itself, to the table. This means that, 
if the bad economic conditions continue to prevail, 
there will be further competition among national 
political parties on EU related dimensions. 
Conclusion
This paper revisits the analyses of Peter Mair 
(2000) on the limited effect of Europe on national 
political parties and party systems. The same 
sequence of logic has been used for comparison. 
The paper revisited the format and mechanics of 
party systems using The Chapel Hill Expert Sur-
vey. There is a replication of Mair’s analysis on 
locating political parties in the pro/anti European 
integration dimension. However, there was a cer-
tain time mismatch between the latest expert sur-
vey and national elections that we can observe the 
possible effects of Europeanization in the times 
of crisis. For this reason, all the newly established 
political parties are coded and situated into the 
existing groups, following the logic of the expert 
survey and the grouping done by Mair. Methodol-
ogy behind the collection of all the new informa-
tion has been provided in the paper.
selection of the President of the European Com-
mission. The winner of the 8th European Parlia-
ment elections that will be held in May 2014 will 
also decide the next President. This can be counted 
as one step further, although it is not sufficient yet. 
It also means that the European Commission will 
reflect the preferences of European citizens.
Different Arenas, Different Com-
petences?
In his paper Mair pointed out the necessity of dis-
tinction between different electoral arenas, local/
regional arena, national arena and the European 
arena. He also claimed that the division of issue 
responsibility didn’t emerge in the case of Europe, 
like it did between regional and national arenas. 
In addition, he discussed the role of the EP, which 
has changed with the Lisbon Treaty, in European 
decision-making in comparison to the effect of 
national governments through the Council(s). 
Mair stated that individual voters could transmit 
their preferences through the national govern-
ments to the European decision making, which is 
still valid today. However, he continued with the 
distinction of issues decided by the national arena 
and the European arena, which is changing over 
the years. Today, national policy making has the 
influence of Europe, and it is not fully in the con-
trol of inter-governmental organs, especially when 
it comes to economic policies.
All in all, it is still true that as long as the intergov-
ernmental dimension dominates (or at least has the 
same influence with) the supranational one, politi-
cal parties will keep on focusing on competing in 
the national arena, since they can control it better. 
However, it is also true that Europe increasingly 
restricts the policy manoeuvre of European gov-
ernments, which should be accepted by the political 
parties that would like to rule the country. Troika 
implementations are not voluntary even if the rules 
are defined with national governments.
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related to the economic policies of the EU, there will 
be a better measurement of party/voter proximity. 
Last but not least, the relationship between the 
electoral de-alignment and disengagement of citi-
zens and increasing impact of Europe on national 
arena in the times of further integration also 
deserves further attention. The attitudes towards 
the EU and trust on its institutions (especially on 
the European Parliament) have been dramati-
cally changing with the economic crisis. For this 
reason, the inclusion of public opinion data may 
enrich the study.
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APPENDIX
Appendix Table 1: The Enlargement Waves of the European Union (1957 - 2014)
Founding Countries (1957) 1st (1973) 2nd (1981) 3rd (1986) 4th (1995) 5th (2004) 6th (2007) 7th (2013)
Belgium Denmark Greece Spain Austria Czech Republic Bulgaria Croatia
Germany Ireland  Portugal Finland Estonia Romania  
France United Kingdom   Sweden Cyprus   
Italy    Latvia   
Luxembourg     Lithuania   
Netherlands     Hungary   
     Malta   
     Poland   
     Slovakia   
     Slovenia   
Source: Author’s self evaluation from the European Commission’s Website
Appendix Graph 1: European Parliament Elections’ Turnout
Source: Author’s Self Evaluation from the European Parliament Database 
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attitudes for the radical right, investigating the 
degree to which welfare politics is relevant for 
radical right support. 
Indeed, welfare attitudes prove to be a significant 
characteristic and determinant of the radical right 
vote (Derks 2006, De Koster et al., 2012). In a sem-
inal contribution, De Koster et al. have established 
the relation between welfare attitudes and radical 
right voting. They find that welfare attitudes such 
as welfare populism or welfare chauvinism are not 
only high among the radical right electorates, they 
also underlie support for these parties (De Koster 
et al. 2012). Yet, this empirical evidence is limited 
to the Dutch case. Furthermore, most of the litera-
ture on the radical right electorate, and their rela-
tion to welfare issues, focuses on the working class 
(Mau & Mewes 2012, Rydgren 2012). The relation 
between voting and welfare attitudes among other 
social groups certainly exists; notably for the self-
employed, another overrepresented group in the 
radical right electorate. On the aggregated level, 
the direct linkage between economic globalization 
and support for the new right is mediated by the 
welfare state – its type and scope (Swank & Betz 
2003, Arzheimer 2009). Thus, the role of welfare 
politics in the radical right support is puzzling. 
In a nutshell, the existing analyses linking welfare 
politics to radical right vote are too restrictive (in 
terms of selected countries, time period and social 
groups studied). They also often lack a compre-
hensive theoretical framework of how welfare pol-
itics determine the radical right vote. Providing a 
comprehensive framework to assess the relation 
between welfare politics and the radical right vote 
is the goal of this paper. By bridging the literature 
on the radical right vote to the political sociol-
ogy of the welfare state, I address the question 
of how can welfare politics influence the radical 
right vote? What are the sociological mechanisms 
of this relation? This paper aims at providing a 
1. Introduction
Research on West-European radical right parties 
has produced an extensive literature. Rarely has 
an electorate been so intensely analysed (to name 
a few: Betz 1994, Kitschelt 1995, Mudde 2007, 
Rydgren 2012). However, scientific explanations of 
radical right voting behavior are not settled; this 
debate is lively. 
Two major sets of explanations are generally 
offered to account for the radical right vote (Oesch 
2008, Rydgren 2012). On the one hand, the cul-
tural explanation show that the radical right vote is 
greatly determined by diversity and immigration 
issues (Rydgren 2008). Globalization is expected 
to intensify these cultural conflicts and fuel the 
radical right’s electoral successes (Mudde 2007, 
Kriesi et al. 2012). On the other hand, economic 
factors are brought up to account for the radical 
right vote. First, a sociological profile of the radi-
cal right voter can be established across Europe: 
the working class constitutes the core electorate 
of the radical right in Western Europe (Oesch 
2008, Rydgren 2012). On the supply side of elec-
toral politics, radical right parties have adapted 
to the interests of their (potential) electorate: not 
only do they offer economic agendas, but they also 
adapt these agendas to the expected preferences of 
their voters (Rydgren 2007). Their stances on the 
welfare state are usually different from that of tra-
ditional right-wing parties, and they are believed 
to adopt the working class’ support for redistri-
bution (De Koster et al. 2012). However, when 
studying the radical right vote, cultural and eco-
nomic issues prove to be intensely interconnected, 
to the point that the two dimensions are blurred 
(Häusermann and Kriesi, 2011). The economic 
and cultural dimensions of the radical right vote 
are somewhat entangled. Cultural determinants 
of the radical right vote are important, and have 
been largely analysed. However, recent research 
has focused on the electoral relevance of welfare 
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assumption of a risk-based welfare state approach 
(Hall & Soskice 2001; Rehm 2007). The relation-
ship between the individual and the welfare state 
is rather instrumental: welfare state institutions 
originate in the benefits individuals obtain from 
it (Mau & Veghte 2007). In terms of welfare atti-
tudes, the economistic perspective assumes that 
individuals express their preference for welfare 
arrangements (taxes, level of redistribution, insur-
ance) in terms of the maximization of their eco-
nomic utility (Alesina & Giuliano 2009). 
When individuals rationaly maximize their wel-
fare, they do not only favour policies that directly 
benefit them, but also those that reduce their eco-
nomic risks. Individuals calculate the benefits of 
complying with welfare institutions in terms of 
its costs (Iversen & Soskice 2001; Blekesaune & 
Quadagno 2003). Welfare preferences are defined 
by the exposure to risks. The welfare state can be 
seen as an institution that collectivises the risks of 
individuals. Individuals support the welfare state 
because it is intended to prevent from and deal 
with risks. They maximize their utility by sharing 
those risks. Therefore, the major perceived eco-
nomic risks match the different benefits provided 
by welfare institutions: age, disability, sickness, 
and unemployment. Welfare state institutions 
provide safety nets that guarantee resources in 
these cases where income is interrupted: pensions, 
healthcare, unemployment benefits. However, this 
relation is rather complex, individuals do not just 
favour welfare policies because they directly gain 
from it, they have to assess their risks, their position 
in the society and compare themselves to others. 
Globalisation and economic insecurity
Economic risks are not simply the result of the 
individuals’ rational assessment of their economic 
situation. Structural transformations of the econ-
omy directly impact individuals’ evaluation of 
risk. Globalization gives rise to new conflicts (eco-
theoretical framework to understand the relation 
between the radical right vote and welfare politics. 
To explore the relation between welfare politics 
and the radical right vote I will rely on a normative 
theory, based on the moral economy of the welfare 
state; and on a risk-based theory. Social sciences 
and, it is worth noting, also economists agree that 
two functionalist conceptions of the welfare state 
exist. The welfare state can be conceived as the 
institutional set-up for risk management. On the 
other hand, the welfare can be seen as the institu-
tional set-up that reallocates wealth and reduces 
social inequalities (Mau & Veghte 2007). The 
economist label this first conceptualization of the 
welfare state, conceived as insurance, the “piggy 
bank function”. The second, a more moral con-
ception of the welfare state, can be labelled “ the 
Robin Hood function” (Barr 2012). 
First, I will develop the risk-based theory, and 
explain how economic insecurity can account for 
the radical right vote. Then, I will propose a nor-
mative theory that links welfare attitudes result-
ing from norm violation to this voting behaviour. 
For both these approaches, I will first define how 
individuals’ welfare preferences are shaped, and 
second how it influences voting for the radical 
right. 
2. Economic insecurity and the 
radical right
Self-interest and the collectivisation of risks
The welfare state’s primary goal can be conceived 
as a social insurance for individuals. Individuals 
would comply with the welfare state arrangements 
(taxes, social contributions) to the extent that 
it guarantees them a safety net in case of loss of 
resources. Individuals’ self-interest is the founding 
principle of welfare state legitimacy; it justifies its 
existence. The self-interested citizen is the major 
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openness and changes. In other words, the losers 
of globalization may not only express preferences 
for more protecting social policies, they may also 
directly reject the causes of globalization. The next 
section deals with the question of the influence of 
growing economic insecurity of on radical right 
voting behaviour.
The two sides of economic insecurity
Losers of globalization face increasing economic 
insecurity; theoretically, according to a self-
interest driven model of welfare preferences, they 
should expresses preferences for more securing 
welfare policies. Moreover, they should express 
important opposition to the process of economic 
globalization. This is in line with the factor endow-
ment model developed in economic theories. The 
more skilled have more to gain form globalization 
than the lower skilled. Losers of globalization, and 
mainly blue-collar workers become less important 
in the economic arena as trade with countries that 
have abundant low-skilled workers increases. The 
opposition to globalization has to be understood 
in terms of economic self-interest: economic glo-
balization increases the “losers’” economic inse-
curity, and contributes to low incomes and weak 
labour-market positions. 
I argue that when evaluating economic global-
ization, individuals – especially the losers of this 
process – feel more economically insecure. While 
addressing the causes (rejection of the globaliza-
tion) and the consequences (increasing demand 
for welfare protection), they can be expected 
to vote for the radical right. Therefore, I use the 
concept of economic insecurity as both increased 
individuals’ economic risk and negative percep-
tion of economic globalization. (A similar, though 
not identical distinction is found in Scheve and 
Slaughter (2004), they consider that economic 
insecurity shapes perception of globalization, and 
nomic and cultural) that produce oppositions and 
new forms of competitions among individuals.
In their landmark study on the effects of structural 
changes on political conflicts, Kriesi et al. argue 
that globalization gave rise to a revived economic 
competition. This process has constituted groups 
of “winners” and “losers” (Kriesi et al. 2012). Con-
sidering the realm of the welfare state, this new 
competition has led to increasing economic risks, 
chiefly income instability, unemployment, and 
labour-market instability. These new risks directly 
influence the individuals’ economic security; they 
feel personally threatened. Moreover, these new 
risks are predominant among certain categories 
of the population. The industrial working class is 
the most exposed to international competition. 
However, the new risks do not only affect blue-
collar workers only, more generally low-skilled 
individuals are confronted to increasing com-
petition that increases their insecurity. Overall, 
the globalization of the economy has increased 
workers’ economic insecurity. Yet, establishing 
this relation, Scheve and Slaughter leave open the 
question of what consequences this growing eco-
nomic insecurity has on welfare attitudes (Scheve 
and Slaughter 2004). 
Following the “economic logic” of globalization, 
individuals evaluate its consequences. They espe-
cially emphasize its negative consequences in 
terms of competition (Kriesi et al. 2008). The los-
ers of globalization feel entitled to a form of repa-
ration from their economic precariousness and 
insecurity (Kriesi et al. 2012). Based on the self-
interest theory of welfare demands, such increas-
ing economic insecurity should trigger higher 
demand for welfare insurance. Such a demand 
for more securing welfare policies addresses the 
economic consequences of globalization. How-
ever, individuals can also addresses the causes 
of increasing economic insecurity, and therefore 
express frustration and oppositions to economic 
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Radical right parties in Western Europe have tar-
geted the two aspects of economic insecurity that 
are likely perceived by the “losers of globalization”: 
reject of economic globalization and increased 
risks that prompt demand for more welfare state 
intervention. They aim at defending those who 
were “left on the side of modernization”, those 
who lost more than they gained in economic and 
social changes.
The general expectation is that economic inse-
curity triggers a need for risk protection (Figure 
1). The causal mechanism linking individual eco-
nomic insecurity to voting for the radical right is 
“demand for protection”. 
Aggregate unemployment, trade openness, capi-
tal mobility, foreign immigration are contextual 
variables that influence positively the radical right 
vote (Swank & Betz 2003; Arzheimer & Carter 
2006). The macro-level relation between global-
ization and the radical right vote is an incentive to 
understand the individual level link between eco-
nomic insecurity and the radical right. The next 
sections deal with these specific mechanisms. The 
mechanism, which drives the relation between 
economic insecurity and the radical right, is one 
of protection. I argue that radical right parties 
have successfully attracted “losers of globaliza-
tion” because they are openly opposing globaliza-
on the other hand reduces the capacities of gov-
ernments to provide social insurance). 
To this point, economic insecurity is not logically 
linked to voting for the radical right. Indeed, leftist 
parties usually match the demands that result from 
economic security, which is higher intervention of 
the welfare state (Houtman et al. 2008). However, 
empirically, the lower educated and the people 
from low social classes combine the rejection of the 
welfare state with a more egalitarian view of social 
justice (Archterberg et al. 2011). Egalitarianism is 
not only compatible with rejection of the welfare 
state institutions, it can positively influence voting 
for the radical right (De Koster et al. 2012).
Hence, this relation between economic insecurity 
and the radical right vote relies on part of the con-
vergence hypothesis: the parties that usually hold 
office, both on the right and on the left, tend to 
converge in terms of economic policies. Kitschelt 
argues that voter then become indifferent to the 
economic dimension of politics, and focus on the 
cultural dimension (Kitschelt 1995). Another pos-
sibility is that such convergence benefits the radi-
cal right (Carter 2005). More precisely, individu-
als most negatively affected by economic global-
ization are attracted to parties that hold radical 
position on the globalization process itself, such 
as radical right parties. 
Figure 1 - Relation between economic insecurity and radical right vote
Globalisation and economic insecurity - The two sides of economic insecurity
Individual Economic Risk
Negative perception of 
Globalization
Economic Insecurity Vote for a Radical Right 
Party that represents 
the status quo
Demand for protection
- Extended welfare state
- Limiting the globalization process
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(not necessarily nationalist, but as opposed to the 
globalization process), and the radical right con-
fronts the causes of their increasing economic 
insecurity.
The consequences of globalization: economic 
risks and the radical right
Individuals that face increased economic risks, 
those in danger of becoming precarious are 
expected to support the radical right. Global-
ization has increased the economic risks of the 
losers of globalization (blue-collars worker but 
also the tertiary sector “précariat”). These risks 
are multiple, and of various nature. Since some 
social categories are more likely than others to 
be economically threatened, risk pertain firstly to 
labour-market position. The distinction between 
insiders and outsiders in the labour market mir-
rors that of winners and losers of globalization. 
Being at risk in terms of employment strongly 
influences both welfare preferences and electoral 
behavior (Schwander 2012). Individuals do not 
only perceive economic risks in possible loss of 
income or labour-market position, their assess-
ment in intertwined in concerns relative to the 
welfare state. For instance measuring economic 
insecurity has to include healthcare expenses on 
top of mere income (see for instance the Economic 
Security Index, Hacker et al. 2013). Economic risks 
can even be measured in a broader way than with 
strictly economic indicators. Economic insecurity 
can lead to social exclusion. The notion of pré-
carité embodies this broad conception: being poor 
is not only having limited resources, it also means 
growing away from the rest of society and the feel-
ing of being left out. The insecurity index EPICES 
(“Evaluation de la précarité et des inégalités de 
santé pour les Centres d’Examen de Santé”) inte-
grates items on lifestyle, social and familial risks. 
It is positively associated to the radical right vote 
(Mayer 2012). Increased competition on the labor 
market, higher unemployment, difficult access to 
tion and denationalization. Individuals that face 
increased economic risk may support the radical 
right, because it appears as a “status quo” party 
(Geering 2013). A protective vote for a status quo 
party is one that refuses the changes that brought 
economic insecurity. The notion of a status quo 
party gathers the two dimensions of economic 
insecurity: rejection of the causes of change, pro-
tection against its consequences. Not only have 
radical right parties opposed structural changes 
in society (economic and cultural), but they are 
also even expected to turn to a “interventionist-
nationalist” position. This stance combines the 
rejection of denationalizing processes, and eco-
nomic interventionist stances that address the 
question of economic insecurity. Many losers of 
globalization express this combination of ideas, 
and radical right parties are expected to focus on 
such electorate (Kriesi et al. 2012). 
The cause of economic insecurity: rejection of 
globalization and the radical right
Individuals can assess the causes of their increas-
ing economic insecurity. Globalization is per-
ceived as the responsible process for increasing 
economic risks. If radical right parties have for 
some time advocated Kitschelt’s winning for-
mula, they have always criticized international 
openness and mondialisme (Swank & Betz 2003). 
Indeed, the belief that the internationalization 
of the economy is significant in increasing eco-
nomic risks is wide-ranging. This is particu-
larly true for the less-skilled individuals, which 
are “much more likely to oppose freer trade and 
immigration than their more skilled counter-
parts” (Scheve & Slaughter 2001). This idea is 
consistent with the factor endowment model, the 
workers and low-skilled, since they are the most 
threatened by economic globalization, are likely 
to support it the less. In a nutshell, the losers of 
globalization are expected to support the radical 
right because those parties remain nationalistic 
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attitudes. The concept of moral economy enables 
to widen the mechanisms of attitude formation, by 
adding a normative side to the narrow self-interest 
factor. It has been extensively referred to in recent 
literature on welfare attitudes (Mau 2004; Svall-
fors 1996, 2012). The moral economy is composed 
of the rights and obligations of citizens regarding 
welfare politics. 
The three norms of the moral economy of the wel-
fare state
To understand which norms constitute the moral 
economy of the welfare state, it is necessary to go 
back to the foundations of the Welfare state. The 
foundations of the welfare state do not refer to 
the history of the welfare institutions, but rather 
to the justifications of the welfare state, its legiti-
macy. Academic consensus has been reached on 
what these justifications are (Goodin et al. 1999, 
Barr 2012, Greve 2013). I argue that the moral 
economy of the welfare state is constituted of 
three overarching norms: social justice, reciproc-
ity, and self-reliance. These norms encompass the 
six common moral justifications of the welfare 
state found in the ‘foundations of welfare’ litera-
ture (Goodin et al. 1999). 
The norm of social justice encloses three moral 
justifications of the welfare state: reducing pov-
erty, promoting social equality, and promoting 
stability. Reducing poverty was always a primary 
concern of society, welfare institutions originated 
in “Poor Laws” (Goodin & Mitchell 2000). To 
define poverty, one needs to take distance with a 
minimalist approach (fulfilling basic needs neces-
sary for physical existence) but consider relative 
deprivation. The welfare state is justified by trying 
to minimize the relative deprivation. The promo-
tion of social equality has evolved guarantying an 
equality of status (equality under the law, equality 
of vote) to equality of opportunity. This equality 
of opportunity is very pertinent when considering 
healthcare are all motives for the losers of global-
ization to support parties of the “status quo”. The 
radical right parties are such parties, those who 
refuse structural changes and strongly oppose it. 
These parties frame economic globalization in 
terms of “labour and social security” more than 
any other party family except for the radical left 
(Höglinger et al. 2012). Few other parties than the 
radical right can capture the economic insecurity 
of the losers of globalization. Increased economic 
risks trigger a demand for protection and state 
intervention that can be matched by the radical 
right. By defending the status quo, these parties 
tend to support economically interventionist poli-
cies and favour a widely protecting welfare state.
To sum up, two logics structure the relation 
between economic insecurity and support for 
the radical right: economic risk and negative 
perception of globalization. Certainly, these two 
mechanisms interact. Strong individual risk and 
negative perception of globalization are charac-
teristics associated to the losers of globalization. 
They express preferences on the demand side that 
exactly match the radical right parties who are 
shifting to the “interventionist-nationalist” side of 
political conflict (Kriesi et al. 2012).
3. Welfare Normative Beliefs 
and The Radical Right
Why a normative theory of the welfare state?
A normative theory of the welfare state chal-
lenges a conception of welfare attitudes that is 
solely based on self-interest. Normative and cul-
tural factors explaining these attitudes are at least 
as important (Mau 2003; Van Oorschot 2008; 
Svallfors 2007, 2012). “The electorates of advanced 
industrial societies do not seem to be voting with 
their pocketbooks, but instead primarily moti-
vated by ‘sociotropic’ concern” (Inglehart 1990). 
The same argument can be made about welfare 
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tution – here the welfare state – can by explained 
through reciprocity, as a norm requiring that 
individuals cooperate with government demands 
but only as long as others also do (Levi 1997). The 
definition of the population of those expected to 
contribute is of central importance: those who 
contribute are deserving of social benefits, those 
who don’t are not. Practically, the ‘deservingness’ 
debate demonstrates the central importance of the 
norm of reciprocity in the moral economy of the 
welfare state. When individuals evaluate who is 
entitled to welfare benefits, past and future contri-
butions are of major importance. For instance, the 
elderly are always ranked as the most deserving, 
because they have contributed during their whole 
life. (Van Oorschot, 2008). 
The last norm of the moral economy of the welfare 
state is self-reliance. It has always been the norm 
(meaning the convention) when individuals con-
sider welfare (Goodin & Mitchell 2000). Self-reli-
ance is at the centre of the welfare state narratives. 
Individuals who are perceived to be self-reliant, 
sufficient without state intervention, are positively 
viewed (Halvorsen 1998). Regarding the founda-
tions of the welfare state literature, self-reliance is 
tightly linked to the dimensions of efficiency. In 
that sense, not only are individuals responsible for 
their own welfare; but poverty, need of assistance 
are viewed as a personal failure (Hasenfeld & Raf-
ferty 1989). Self-reliance is also very important at 
the macro-level, since dependence is envisaged as 
violating the rule of ‘Pareto efficiency’ (when no 
one can be better off, without some others being 
worse off). Too great dependency bears greater 
cost on the general welfare of society (Goodin et 
al. 1999). For these reasons, self-reliance is the 
third central norm driving the moral economy of 
the welfare state. 
the welfare state. For instance, egalitarians tend 
to promote the better distribution of social goods, 
such as jobs. “Full employment policies” become 
therefore crucial aspects of the promotion of social 
equality (Goodin et al. 1999). The last dimension 
of social justice is to promote social stability. Not 
only do societies need to be stable to remain inte-
grated, but individuals also want stability in their 
personal lives. This is the aim of “social security”: 
ensuring resources to individual when their reg-
ular sources are interrupted. Empirical evidence 
supports the idea that social justice is a central 
norm defining the moral economy of the welfare 
state. Not only do those elements form a coher-
ent scale of what the government responsibilities 
should be in the eyes of the citizens (Svallfors 2012) 
; but individuals also judge positively the effects 
of the welfare state, such as the prevention of pov-
erty, of social unrest, and enhancing population 
well-being (Van Oorschot 2012). Merging these 
different – though very close – aspects, I consider 
social justice to be one of the three core norms of 
the moral economy of the welfare state. 
The norm of reciprocity is the second central 
norm of the moral economy of the welfare state. 
It is closely linked to what theoricians of welfare 
state foundations label the promotion of social 
inclusion. The idea of distributive justice pre-
supposes a political community that divides, 
exchanges and shares social goods. This coopera-
tion is both the cause and the consequence of inte-
grated communities, and it builds on social capital 
(Putnam 1993). One of the founding dimensions 
of the welfare state is therefore to promote inclu-
sion, through the action of welfare institutions. 
Reciprocity is the main prerequisite for individu-
als to cooperate. This is extremely relevant for the 
groups that are expected to contribute the most. 
The idea of belonging to a community is a forceful 
justification for the welfare state, under the condi-
tion that relations among individuals are perceived 
to be reciprocal. ‘Contingent consent’ to an insti-
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welfare state. To understand the relation they can 
have on voting behaviour, one needs to consider 
how norms define attitudes, and how these influ-
ence the vote. First I will argue on a theoretical 
point that norms, and especially their violations, 
can shape welfare attitudes. Then, I will develop 
the causal mechanism that links the perception of 
the violation of the norms of the moral economy 
of the welfare state to the radical right vote. 
Norms are considered to be the “cement” of soci-
ety (Parsons 1968). Moreover, normative beliefs 
correlate positively with individual behavior 
(Fishbein 1967). The norms of the moral economy 
of the welfare state do not only shape the different 
welfare states, they influence attitudes and behav-
iours of individuals. 
Much of the literature on norms has focused 
on the question of norm compliance, and most 
importantly on norm deviance. Since norm con-
formity is the most common, it is thus less inter-
esting behaviour (Merton 1986). Focusing on 
an individual’s deviance, and its consequence 
for this individual only is poblematic (Bicchieri 
& Muldoon 2011; Brennan et al. 2013). In terms 
welfare preferences, I argue that the most impor-
tant influence of norms is the perceptions of other 
individuals’ compliance to the norms or their vio-
lation. Normative beliefs have to coincide both 
with what an individual thinks, but also to what 
he believes the others think, and should do (Bic-
chieri & Muldoon 2011). The normative approach 
to welfare attitudes implies that social represen-
tations are shaped by normative beliefs, that is 
followed by either consent or dissent within and 
among social groups (Staerklé et al. 2011). Norma-
tive beliefs should not be considered “external” or 
“exogenous”, individuals evaluate those norms in 
relation to the representation and perceptions that 
they have of society, and that is mainly other indi-
viduals’ behaviour.
Norms and Institutions
The three central norms of the moral economy of 
the welfare state are not fixed, and certainly not 
equivalent over time, countries, classes and indi-
viduals. Norms are not the result of the simple 
aggregation of preferences; individual as well as 
more systemic factors contribute to shaping the 
moral economy of the welfare state. Much of the 
literature that considers the normative dimen-
sions of welfare attitudes stands on an institu-
tionalist point of view. Esping-Andersen’s seminal 
contribution on welfare regime types insists on 
the idea that those regimes have to be considered 
in terms of social relations. Each of these regimes 
is grounded on “shared moral assumptions” (Esp-
ing-Andersen 1990). Institutions, as the formal 
rules, procedures and practices that structure the 
relationship between individuals and the state, 
shape both norms and interests, and their effect is 
considered as “paramount” (Svallfors 2007, Larsen 
2008). The impact of institutions on welfare atti-
tudes has been specifically observed: “in simpli-
fied form, the mental figure looks like this: insti-
tutions give rise to certain interests and norms, 
which in turn either reinforce or undermine the 
original institutions” (Rothstein, 1998). Welfare 
regimes are rooted in distinct normative values, 
but regimes themselves tend to “mold” the welfare 
attitudes (Svallfors 1997, Mau 2004). This recipro-
cal relation exists whether looking at institutional 
arrangements or tangible public policies (Mettler 
& Soss 2004). This section defined the constitutive 
norms of the moral economy of the welfare state, 
grounded in moral justifications for the founda-
tions of the welfare state, and influenced by exist-
ing institutions. The next section will develop how 
those norms can shape attitudes, and political 
behaviour.
Norm violation
Social justice, reciprocity and self-reliance are 
the driving norms of the moral economy of the 
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hypothesis is that this blame (extreme welfare atti-
tude) can translate into a vote for the radical right. 
This section presents the welfare attitudes associ-
ated to each of the three core norms of the moral 
economy of the welfare state. I argue that indi-
viduals who perceive that a welfare norm is vio-
lated will hold extreme position on the associated 
welfare attitude. This extreme attitude is the result 
of a differentiation process: a norm-violating out-
group is defined, and its deviant behaviour antag-
onizes some individuals. The radical right par-
ties are likely to capture this welfare antagonism 
because they are ideologically prone to such dif-
ferentiation processes (Figure 2). 
Normative welfare attitudes and radical right 
voting
Nationalism is central to the ideology of radical 
right parties. These parties define bounded com-
munities, those of the natives (Mudde 2007). Fur-
thermore, exclusion is a characteristic of radical 
right parties, considering different groups than 
the mere national community (Sniderman et al. 
2000). They are essentially movements of exclu-
sion (Rydgren 2005). Another part of the litera-
ture on radical right parties focuses on the pop-
ulist ideology. Even if populism is a “thin ideol-
ogy”, it has a “chameleonic character” (Betz 1994; 
Mény & Surel 2002; Mudde 2004); it displays an 
exclusionary trademark. Populism relies on an 
antagonism between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Populism is 
founded on a vertical and a horizontal opposition. 
Whether directed at the ‘corrupted elite’ (vertical) 
or another out-group (horizontal), the mechanism 
is one of differentiation between a heartland, an 
The framework I want to propose for the assess-
ment of the impact of norms on welfare attitudes 
and consequently on voting behaviour is an inter-
active one. It is an individual’s assessment of the 
compliance of others to the norms of the welfare 
state that mainly shape his welfare attitudes. More 
precisely, welfare attitudes and following electoral 
preferences are sharply influenced by the percep-
tion that others violate one (or more) of the three 
core norms of the moral economy of the welfare 
state. Differentiation is the mechanism that leads 
the perceptions of the violation of norms of the 
moral economy of the welfare state to polarized 
welfare attitudes. These extreme welfare attitudes 
underlie support for the radical right. Normative 
beliefs produce different representations for dif-
ferent social groups Boundaries are set between 
those groups, and as a result, some a positively 
connoted (in-groups), others are negatively con-
noted (out-groups) (Tajfel 1978). The antagonisms 
produced between groups are the central feature of 
normative beliefs (Staerklé et al. 2012). As a result, 
the norm-violating individuals are differentiated, 
they are considered an out-group, and thus con-
sidered as negative elements of society (Kreindler 
2005). For the moral economy of the welfare state, 
this implies that some individuals are perceived 
as violating the norm of social justice, reciproc-
ity, or self-reliance. Each of these norms can be 
translated in more explicit and concrete welfare 
attitudes. The perception of a violation of one, or 
more, of the core norms of the moral economy of 
the welfare state results in extreme positions in 
terms of those welfare attitudes. As a result of this 
extreme attitude that is driven by group differen-
tiation, blame is put on the out-group. My general 
Figure 2 - Mechanism linking the perceived violations of norms to the radical right vote
Perceived violation of one 
of the core norms of the 
moral economy of the 
welfare state
Extreme position on 
a welfare attitude 
that directly targets a 
responsible out-group
Vote for a radical right 
party that blames directly 
the targeted out group. 
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ports a “system of social protection only for those 
who belong to the ethnically defined community 
and who have contributed to it” (Kitschelt 1995). 
It has been presented as a central feature of popu-
list right vote in Europe in recent years (De Koster 
et al. 2012). Welfare chauvinim fits very well with 
the idea of ‘violated reciprocity’ (Van Oroschot 
2008, Van der Waal et al. 2010). Immigrants are 
considered an out-group less entitled to welfare, 
because they have contributed less (by nature they 
arrive in the welfare system later; in addition they 
are perceived as a structurally dependent group). 
They are viewed as a threat to the welfare state that 
is based on the norm of equal reciprocity. Paral-
lel to welfare populist attitudes, immigrants also 
constitute an out-group at which welfare chauvin-
ism is directed. Thus welfare chauvinism is con-
ceptualized as a specification of welfare populism, 
as it relies on the same principle of violated reci-
procity74. Some individuals believe the norm of 
reciprocity is violated, and they express extreme 
welfare populist or welfare chauvinist attitudes. 
They believe that undeserving groups – whether 
they are an elite or an out-group such as immi-
grants – unfairly monopolize welfare benefits. 
These welfare populist or welfare chauvinist are 
more likely to vote for radical right parties.
Welfare retrenchment is the welfare attitude asso-
ciated to the norm of self-reliance. The norm of 
self-reliance insists that individuals should not 
rely on the welfare state to fulfil their needs. Those 
who are autonomous are positively viewed. On the 
other hand, individuals who are deemed “welfare 
dependent” are negatively viewed. The relation 
between the norm of self-reliance and the attitude 
of welfare retrenchment is complicated, because 
it plays both on the micro and the macro level. 
74. Parallel to this sociocultural approach of welfare 
chauvinism is a socioeconomic one. “Realistic 
conflict theory”, assumes that some groups are in 
competition for scarce or valued social resources. 
However, this approach has been empirically 
proven wrong (Mau & Mewes, 2012)
idealized community and a negatively perceived 
group (Taggart 2002). Because of these exclusion-
ary features, radical right parties are expected to 
capture the antagonisms produced by the percep-
tions of norms violation. In other words, citizens 
who display extreme welfare attitudes because 
they feel some individuals are violating a core 
norm of the moral economy of the welfare state 
are more likely to vote for radical right parties. 
The next section details the attitudinal mecha-
nisms that would influence such behaviour. 
Welfare populism is the attitude derived from the 
norm of reciprocity. It emerges when individuals 
feel an out-group is not contributing its share of the 
welfare social contract. Parallel to the two-dimen-
sional opposition of populism, welfare populism 
can differentiate a vertical and a horizontal out-
group. On the one hand, the ‘welfare scroungers’ 
designate those that abuse the welfare system, the 
‘welfare dependents’ that violate the norm of reci-
procity. On the other hand, the ‘corrupted elite’ is 
an encompassing notion that gathers economic 
elites, but also the constitutive elements of the 
welfare system. In that sense, public servants can 
become the target of such welfare populism, as 
they are the elites of the welfare system, and can 
be deemed usurpers of its benefits. Thus, the wel-
fare populist opposes the ‘hard working citizens’, 
the ‘little guys’ to citizens and elites who do not 
contribute their share to the welfare system while 
greatly benefiting from it. This distinction echoes 
the one expressed by Saint-Simon, which opposed 
a productive class to the ‘social parasites’73. The 
parasites are those who do not participate in the 
industrious production. Those parasites are the 
out-group targeted by citizens, and they believe 
the radical right parties also oppose such individ-
uals. Welfare chauvinism is an attitude that sup-
73. “Sur la querelle des abeilles et des frelons ou Sur la 
consommation respective des producteurs et des 
consommateurs non producteurs” published in 
1819. 
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of the imagined “us”. This idea is particularly rel-
evant for some categories of the population. For 
instance, the working class usually displays high 
levels of egalitarianism. Workers and the less well-
off tend to express egalitarianism the most dra-
matically (Svallfors 2012). At the same time, the 
working class is considered as the core electorate 
of the radical right (Oesch 2008; Mau & Mewes 
2012, Rydgren 2013). Therefore we can hypothe-
size that some individuals who feel they are part of 
a group that is suffers from the violations of social 
justice and thus are strongly egalitarian, are likely 
to vote for the radical right. 
Table 1 - Mechanisms linking welfare normative beliefs 
to radical right voting
Violated 
Norm
Targeted 
out-group
Resulting 
Welfare 
Attitude
Vote 
for the 
Radical 
Right
Reciprocity Welfare 
scroungers/
Immigrants
Welfare 
populism/
Chauvinism
+
Self-Reliance Welfare 
dependents 
/ lazy
Welfare 
Retrenchment
+
Social Justice Poor/”us” Egalitarianism +
I have shown how the perceived violations of the 
norms of the moral economy of the welfare state 
can lead to group differentiation and welfare atti-
tudes that can translate into radical right vote 
(table 1). Yet, this moral economy is a complex sys-
tem of norms, which most likely interact together. 
It is very possible that the interactions of welfare 
attitudes resulting from the perceived violation 
of welfare norms may increase their influence on 
voting for the radical right. For instance, when 
both norms of reciprocity and social justice feel 
violated, individuals can feel the “us” in-group 
is not entitled to enough social benefits, whereas 
some are not contributing their share (welfare 
scroungers or immigrants). Alternatively, the 
critics of the welfare state under the violations of 
Much of the libertarian economic tradition, most 
prominently Hayek and Friedman, argues that 
the welfare state is not the ideal arrangement to 
maximize the well-being of a society. They argue 
the welfare state should be reduced to its minimal 
form, because its institutions foster dependency, 
corrupt citizens from a righteous conduct; and 
therefore does not allow for the maximization of 
welfare. It is very unlikely that individuals think 
about the norm of self-reliance on a macro-level 
economic scale. However, citizens can perceive 
that some individuals violate the norm of self-reli-
ance by becoming voluntarily welfare dependent. 
Then, individuals can assess that the welfare state 
institutions foster such behaviours, and thus feel 
they should be retrenched. According to Kitschelt’s 
famous “winning formula”, radical right parties 
hold (or held) preferences for the reduction of the 
welfare state’s scope and range (Kitschelt 1995). 
Therefore, because some individuals believe the 
welfare state foster of form of dependency that 
benefits an out-group that violates the norm of 
self-reliance, they are more likely prefer the reduc-
tion of the welfare state policies.
Egalitarianism is the welfare attitude associated 
to the norm of social justice. This welfare attitude 
often has been equated to support for the welfare 
state (Svallfors 1999). However, egalitarianism is 
not just support for welfare institutions. Express-
ing egalitarian views can even go along critical 
views pertaining the welfare state (Achterberg et 
al. 2011). Here, egalitarianism is considered as the 
attitude expressed when individuals feel the norm 
of social justice has been violated. In terms of dif-
ferentiation, citizen perceive this violation because 
they can identify out-groups that are clearly in 
precarious conditions. Contrary to the out-groups 
defined when assessing the violations of reciproc-
ity and self-reliance norms, the out-groups here 
are not necessarily judged negatively. In fact, 
referring to the framework of populism, individu-
als can feel that those less well-off citizens are part 
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eses rely on different assumptions about the wel-
fare state, and the way individuals interact with 
it. However, the hypotheses are considered more 
complementary than competing. 
The two theories of the welfare state underline the 
capital role of institutions. On the one hand, eco-
nomic risks are mediated through welfare insti-
tutions. Different welfare policies determine the 
scope of economic risks. Very generous regimes, 
in terms of welfare insurance of resource redistri-
bution, will reduce the economic risks of individ-
uals. Conversely, individual face higher economic 
risks and are more subject to macro-level eco-
nomic changes in minimal welfare states. On the 
other hand, institutions are a decisive influence 
on the shaping of common norms of the welfare 
state. As noted before, welfare institutions trans-
pose the significant norms of the moral economy 
of the welfare state (and their relative prevalence), 
but these institutions “mold” the welfare norms as 
well. Macro-level characteristics such as welfare 
institutions are a determining factor in the rela-
tion between welfare politics and the radical right 
vote (Figure 3)76.
76. For the purpose of clarity, the influence of wel-
fare norms on welfare institutions was not repre-
sented. The object of this framework however is to 
the norms of reciprocity and self-reliance can be 
combined. The retrenchment of the welfare state 
can be associated to the expression that welfare 
redistribution benefits an undeserving ‘welfare 
elite’, or that its beneficiaries should be limited to 
the most deserving (excluding unemployed and 
immigrants for instance)75.
Conclusion
This paper considers two hypotheses that contrib-
ute to the explanation of the radical right vote. 
First, the “losers of globalization” are expected 
to face economic insecurity; confronted to eco-
nomic risk and expressing a negative perception 
of globalization, they seek protection by voting for 
radical right parties. Second, individuals that feel 
the core norms of the moral economy of the wel-
fare are being violated, and thus express extreme 
welfare attitudes that target a specific group, are 
expected to support radical parties that reflect 
these group boundaries. The previous sections 
have assessed these mechanisms. Both hypoth-
75. Drawing from the first hypothesis, another inter-
action is conceptually possible. However, it is very 
unlikely that a significant share of individuals, 
or specific social groups combine egalitarianism 
and welfare retrenchment attitudes. 
Figure 3 – A conceptual framework for explaining the radical right vote through welfare politics
Economic Insecurity 
- Individual Risk Perception
- Perception of structural changes
Moral Economy of the Welfare state
- norm of Social Justice
- norm of Self-Reliance
- norm of Reciprocity
Vote for the Radical Right
Welfare State Institutions : 
- Regime type
- Scope of welfare
- Distributional profile of countries
Macro-level phenomenon
Mechanism linking 
welfare politics to Radical 
Right voting
Micro-level phenomenon
Extreme Welfare Attitudes
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the conclusion that “what we see here, then, and 
exceptionally in European political traditions, is 
the separation between representation on the one 
hand, and government on the other” (23). Bet-
ter said, the functions that each type of parlia-
ment, whether national or European, is normally 
expected to perform are being allocated in new 
ways among the different parliamentary levels, 
and this has important consequences on both 
institutional levels. 
This is a consequence of the competences of the 
European and the national parliaments in the EU 
system, but also more generally of the increased 
awareness of European citizens that, particularly 
in times of crisis, parliaments (whether European 
or national) are no longer sovereign. These con-
siderations are not new, and they have been in fact 
the object of a large and growing literature (e.g., 
Raunio 2009). What I wish to add are some impli-
cations drawn from political theory and some 
insights drawn from the study of a different multi-
level dynamic, that between state and sub-state 
levels. 
In representative parliamentary democracies, 
parliaments are supposed to perform three fun-
damental functions: allow the expression and 
facilitate the transformation of political prefer-
ences thus giving voice to the people; forge the 
popular will to be then enacted by the executive; 
and exert control over the enactment of the latter. 
I will call these, with Urbinati (2006), voice, will 
and surveillance. The co-existence of two par-
liamentary levels in the EU multi-level political 
system has caused a separation of these tasks and 
an unconventional allocation of each to different 
parliamentary levels (or to none at all). Citizens’ 
reaction so far has been (mostly) to keep “vot-
ing as usual”, as if national parliaments were still 
fully in control of all three functions and as if the 
European Parliament were in control of none. The 
crisis may put an end to this collective delusion 
Introduction
This paper will look at elections in multi-level 
political systems from a very particular angle: 
that of the division of labor – in the issuance of 
voice, expression of will, and exertion of control 
– between representative assemblies at different 
governmental levels. My expertise, in truth, does 
not lie in elections, but rather in the two processes 
that take place before and after casting the vote: 
the ways in which societal preferences are formed 
and ordered, and the decision-making processes 
through which they are enacted and transformed. 
I have never really studied elections per se, but 
rather as effects or premises of other political 
phenomena. My considerations on elections in 
multi-level political systems, then, will be mostly 
theoretical and address the problems that the 
interactions among levels create to the meaning 
and practice of representation. My analysis will 
therefore be institutional and normative rather 
than behavorial and empirical, but I hope to show 
that the institutional setting in which European 
and national elections take place is likely to affect 
the behavior of voters. What I wish to develop is a 
reflection on how the coexistence and interaction 
between two parliamentary levels is affecting rep-
resentation at each level. 
I will argue that elections in the EU multi-level 
political system are causing a reallocation of the 
traditional parliamentary functions among the 
different levels and are also inducing the transfor-
mation of some of these traditional functions. In 
fact, elections are losing some of their traditional 
functions also within national democracies, in 
part because of the multi-level dynamics at play in 
Europe and in part because of independent devel-
opments. In making these statements, which are 
commonsensical from a governance point of view 
but that could be shocking for election special-
ists, I am comforted by the words of Peter Mair 
and Jacques Thomassen (2010) who had come to 
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and even informal forums which involve actors 
at levels other than the national and the suprana-
tional, i.e. also sub-national and societal actors. 
In reconstructing the genealogy of representa-
tive democracy in its slow and difficult normative 
emancipation from the ideal of direct democracy, 
Urbinati draws attention to the enduring influ-
ence of the democratic ideal of the autonomous 
(literally, self-legislating) people as opposed to the 
supposedly inferior reality of a people that selects 
(representative) legislators. Regrettably, represen-
tative democracy was therefore theorized as a nec-
essary expedient which delivered an inferior type 
of democracy. For the early modern republican 
tradition, then, sovereignty still coincides with the 
expression of will. By identifying the threads of an 
alternative theorization, Urbinati rather reminds 
us that sovereignty is as much about the expres-
sion of judgment (voice and surveillance) as it 
is about the activation of will. Judgment in turn 
requires “presence through ideas and speech” 
(Urbinati 2006: 3), an activity which cannot be 
delegated once and for all to elected representa-
tives. Hence, elections do not exhaust the demo-
cratic essence of our contemporary democracies. 
Nevertheless, they are a fundamental component 
of democracy for, through the act of voting and 
selecting representatives, citizens set in motion a 
process of democratic representation that, unfolds 
well beyond elections and entails also surveillance 
and potentially revocation powers. “Focus on the 
presence through ideas and speech reveals partici-
pation and representation not as alternative forms 
of democracy but as related forms constituting a 
continuum of political judgment and action in 
modern democracy” (ibid.). 
The essence of democracy is “political equality 
with public control” (Weale 1999). Political equal-
ity entails the equal right of all citizens to partici-
pate in the expression of judgment (isegoria) and 
in the formation of will (isonomia). Judgment in 
and induce a new awareness as to the real powers 
of these two parliamentary levels. The outcome of 
national elections that have taken place since the 
onset of the crisis seems to reveal this new aware-
ness and the upcoming 2014 elections of the Euro-
pean parliament will most probably reveal it even 
more clearly. 
In this paper, I will first illustrate the three demo-
cratic functions of representative assemblies. I will 
then argue that in the EU multi-level political sys-
tem these functions have been separated and allo-
cated to different parliamentary levels, and I will 
conclude by showing how this affects both institu-
tions and the kind of representation that they can 
offer European citizens. I will finally suggest how 
this might affect electoral behavior in the 2014 
European parliamentary elections. 
The role of elections in 
representative democracies
In representative democracies elections are the 
system through which representatives are chosen 
and parliaments – the embodiments of the sov-
ereign people – are formed. Representation is the 
distinctive trait of contemporary democracies: not 
a second best to direct democracy but arguably 
a superior form or, in any event, an apt form of 
democracy in times of full democratization (Urbi-
nati 2006). Through elections, citizens do not only 
appoint legislators or express policy preferences, 
they also express their sovereignty as a people. 
But while elections are the necessary condition for 
representative democracy, they are not a sufficient 
condition. Representation is not exhausted by elec-
tions. Far from being antithetical or inimical to it, 
as some elitists would claim, representation does 
not rule out direct participation, which is rather 
a necessary complement to elections in any truly 
democratic representative democracy. Moreover, 
representation does not only occur in parliamen-
tary assemblies, but also in other decision-making 
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of representation (Pitkin 1967)”. It also leads to a 
general downgrading of the articulation of voice as 
channeled by purely consultative EU bodies, such 
as the Committee of the Regions, or to the expres-
sion of will performed by governance arrange-
ments which take place at the implementation 
stage of policy-making (Piattoni 2012). 
“Representation highlights the idealizing and 
judgmental nature of politics, an art by which 
individuals transcend the immediacy of their 
biographical experience and social and cultural 
belongings and interests, and educate and enlarge 
their political judgment on their own and other’s 
opinions” (Urbinati 2006: 5). Urbinati wants to 
bring about a fuller appreciation of representation 
as advocacy, that is, as the formation and expres-
sion of judgment in both its active and passive 
aspects. In this respect, representative democracy 
is superior to direct democracy in that it forces 
citizens to elevate themselves from their specific 
conditions, while obviously departing from their 
biographical details when expressing their views 
and interests. “Political representation … entails 
a complex political process that activates the ‘sov-
ereign people’ well beyond the formal act of elec-
toral authorization. Representative politics has the 
power of unifying and connecting … the ‘fluctu-
ating units’ of civil society by projecting citizens 
into a future-oriented perspective” (Urbinati 
2006: 5). Through democratic representation, then, 
the subject – the constituency or the demos – is 
created: disparate individuals, entrapped in their 
own particularities, discover to have common val-
ues and interests and become a collective subject.
In this respect, Nadia Urbinati’s theorization has 
some points of contact with Michael Saward’s 
understanding of representation as “claim-mak-
ing”: “A maker of representation (M) puts for-
ward a subject (S) which stands for an object (O) 
which is related to a referent (R) and is offered to 
an audience (A)” (Saward 2006: 302). Representa-
turn has two aspects: an active, ex-ante (Urbinati 
calls it “positive”) “doing” as proposing and acti-
vating and a more passive, ex-post (Urbinati calls 
it “negative”) “doing” as receiving and surveilling 
(which is the precondition for public control). So 
judgment is not merely an ex-post evaluation of 
someone else’s activity or inactivity, as if the only 
reactions could be “consent or rebuff” (Urbinati 
2006: 5), but also an ex-ante activity of propos-
ing and activating. Contrary to the current ten-
dency to consider the right to decide on one’s own 
destiny all that matters in democracy, both judg-
ment and will are essential elements of democratic 
representation. In fact Urbinati underscores the 
importance of the former vis-à-vis the latter. In 
other words, while the contemporary emphasis on 
the will has almost obliterated our appreciation for 
judgment, the new turn to representation (Kröger 
and Friedrich 2012) signals a renewed attention to 
judgment. 
In electoral studies, the emphasis on the expres-
sion of will has driven an almost exclusive atten-
tion to the role of political parties in the forma-
tion of governmental majorities: the emphasis has 
been on “democratic government” rather than on 
“democratic representation” (Mair and Thomas-
sen 2010: 22). “The very notion that we can have 
representation as such, or representation without 
an intimate connection to government, is quite 
alien to a European tradition of political represen-
tation in which representation and government 
are combined through the aegis of party” (ibid. 
23). More generally, in EU studies, the distinction 
is often made between the institutional “power” to 
decide and mere “influence” on decision-making, 
perhaps because the former is more easily observed 
and formalized than the latter. I have argued else-
where (Piattoni 2013) that exclusive attention to 
the expression of will leads to an understanding 
of representation as a mere act of delegation, and 
ultimately to a notion of representation as authori-
zation, which is an impoverished or partial notion 
Elections in Europe in Times of Crisis                                   CONTENTS á190
tion as advocacy, as a process through which what 
is common among disparate individuals becomes 
apparent as it gets extracted and distilled in the 
very process of representation. It should be added, 
though, that such an ongoing dialogue does not 
take place only in representative assemblies, but 
even more frequently during actual mobilization 
inside and outside institutional (decision-making) 
settings and even in everyday societal activities 
and in the streets. 
‘Representation is a comprehensive filter-
ing, refining and mediating process of politi-
cal will formation and expression. It models 
the object, style and procedures of political 
competition and action. It helps to deper-
sonalize the claims and opinions, which in 
turn allows citizens to mingle and associate 
without erasing the partisan spirit essential 
to free political competition or obscuring the 
majority/minority divide. … Representation 
can never be truly descriptive and mimetic of 
social segmentation and identities because of 
its unavoidable inclination to transcend the 
“here” and “now” and to project instead a 
“would-be” or “ought-to-be” perspective that 
translates almost naturally into advocacy’ 
(Urbinati 2006: 6). 
In this sense much representation takes place also 
in governance settings. Through representation 
interests are upgraded and expressed as particu-
lar instances of more encompassing, categorical 
interests or as embodiments of fundamental val-
ues. This is also why the discursive, deliberative 
aspect of politics is so crucial: because democracy 
as mere selection of representatives might become 
an elected form of oligarchy and because democ-
racy as mere expression of will might become an 
act of enlightened despotism. 
tive claims work if the audience accepts the claim. 
“A representative claim is a double claim: about 
an aptitude or capacity of a would-be representa-
tive, and also about relevant characteristics of a 
would-be audience (nee constituency)” (ibid. 303). 
Representation as judgment accomplishes what 
representation as will cannot: while the expres-
sion of will presupposes the existence of an object 
(a demos, a constituency, a forum), representation 
as judgment is capable of creating one. 
Makers of representative claims attempt to evoke 
an audience that will receive the claim, and (hope-
fully, from the maker’s point of view) receive it in 
a certain, desired way. Makers of representative 
claims suggest to the potential audience: (1) you 
are part of this audience, (2) you should accept this 
view, this construction — this representation — of 
yourself, and (3) you should accept me as speaking 
and acting for you. The aim of the maker of the 
claim in such cases can be said to be to avoid dis-
putatious ‘reading back’, or contestation of their 
claims, by would-be audience members. (Saward 
2006: 5).
Clearly, representation as claim-making implies 
that there must be a dialogue between the object 
(often coinciding also with the audience) and 
the claim-maker. The object is often constituted 
through the claim-making activity of the rep-
resentative. Obviously, the claim will be all the 
more successful the more it resonates with “ready 
mades, existing terms and understandings which 
the would-be audience will recognize” (ibid.). 
While this may appear as a fleeting and ethereal 
notion of representation, it describes particu-
larly well a situation – like that which obtains at 
EU level – in which the represented are somehow 
still undefined or are still in the process of being 
constituted into a constituency or even a demos. 
This vision of representation as an ongoing dia-
logue between a claim-maker and an audience 
rhymes well with Urbinati’s view of representa-
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First, EP elections are “second order national elec-
tions” (Reif and Schmitt 1980), meaning that they 
are fought on national issues and not on issues of 
direct pertinence of the European Parliament. As 
a consequence, national electoral cycles will affect 
the outcome of EP elections, giving an advantage 
to governmental parties if EP elections are held 
close to national elections or to opposition par-
ties if they happen to take place in the middle 
of the electoral cycle (Hix and Lord 1997). Gen-
erally speaking, turnout at EP elections will be 
lower than at national elections and small and 
opposition parties will tend to do better at EP 
than at national elections, as voters will take this 
chance to express their dissent vis-à-vis their cur-
rent governments. The European Parliament will 
therefore be composed of a rather disparate set 
of representatives selected for the “wrong” rea-
sons, that is, without any sort of “mandate”77 to 
form judgment and express will on EU issues but 
rather with a potentially overwhelming mandate 
to oppose and criticize the Union. Compounding 
factors are the absence of true pan-European elec-
toral campaigns, the absence of a pan-European 
public sphere, and the lack of a pre-existing Euro-
pean demos. 
Second, as a consequence of this state of affairs, 
the obvious roles of the European and the national 
parliaments, particularly in the expression of 
judgment function, are inverted (Mair 2000: 28): 
“[I]t is argued that the national electoral 
arena is best suited to the contestation of 
key European issues, whereas the European 
arena is best suited to debate about more eve-
ryday policy questions. More often than not, 
however, the debates are actually pursued the 
other way around, with the result that elec-
77. Mandate is here understood in a weak, common-lan-
guage sense rather than in the strong sense (as bind-
ing or imperative mandate) normally attributed to it 
by political philosophers. 
The EU multi-level parliamentary 
field
The coexistence, within the EU multi-level politi-
cal system, of two (in fact more!) levels of political 
representation complicates the activity of demo-
cratic representation. Conventional (and Lisbon 
Treaty) wisdom has it that EU citizens enjoy two 
types of electoral representation: direct electoral 
representation in their national parliaments and 
the European parliament and indirect electoral 
representation in the Council of the European 
Union and the European Council through their 
national governmental representatives and heads 
of state and government. National parliaments 
serve a double function: they contribute to the 
formation of political will at EU level through the 
authorization that they grant their governmental 
representatives to decide in the Council and the 
European Council, and act as a control mecha-
nism on EU legislation through the early warning 
mechanism (EWM) in defense of the subsidiar-
ity principle. The European Parliament directly 
contributes to legislation at EU level through the 
ordinary legislative procedure and exerts a certain 
degree of control on a number of agencies (Com-
mission included) and committees. The Council 
and the European Council are only indirectly 
representative of their national constituencies, 
but they are democratically legitimated to make 
decisions on their behalf. What more could a EU 
citizen ever wish (Moravcsik 2002)?
Since long, the literature has highlighted a number 
of problems with this inter-parliamentary “division 
of labor” (Mair 2000) which are well known and 
will be here rehearsed only in order to then focus 
on their effect on representation as understood 
above and their impact on elections. I will here 
focus exclusively on directly representative institu-
tions, ignoring the problems connected with indi-
rectly representative ones (see Piattoni 2013). 
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pean integration in an effort to shake up the party 
system” (ibid. 968-9). 
This explanation can be contrasted with an alter-
native explanation according to which extrem-
ist parties oppose European integration because 
“European integration is primarily a market-lib-
eral project mitigated by some measure of regu-
lated capitalism. The Euro-skepticism of extreme 
parties arises, therefore, not only from their oppo-
sition to the EU’s policies but also because they 
reject the ideology of the EU’s construction” (ibid. 
969). In a later article, Hooghe and Marks (2008) 
argue that also the European Parliament is char-
acterized by this type of dichotomy, which could 
be of great significance for an interpretation of 
the type of representation offered respectively by 
national and European parliaments. In the TAN 
end of the spectrum we could find those parties 
of the extreme left that still subscribe to an ideol-
ogy according to which national industries must 
be defended at all costs, while in the GAL end we 
could find neo-liberal parties willing to bet on 
green technologies to develop the global indus-
tries of the future. To the extent that this line-up 
is not simply reproducing a left-right dynamic but 
reflects in changes that may be taking place at both 
ends of the more conventional dichotomy, this dif-
ferent interpretation of the political space would 
allow for a new type of realignment between poli-
tics at national and EU level. Yet, official rhetoric 
is apparently still unable to capture and articulate 
these new developments. 
The fourth fundamental element that affects the 
type of representation expressed by both types of 
representative assemblies is their different collo-
cation in the democratic chain of delegation and 
their different institutional powers (Strøm et al 
2003). National parliaments, while politically rela-
tively disempowered by the process of European 
integration, are nevertheless still the central for-
mal institutional juncture in the chain of repre-
tions in each arena fail to prove decisive. The 
voters have a voice, of course, but it tends 
to be on matters that sometimes cannot be 
decided in the particular arena in question” 
Even though later Mair acknowledged that 
Euro-parties in fact behave pretty much as most 
national parties and that the political space in the 
European Parliament does not differ substantially 
from that of most national parliaments, stretch-
ing along a left-right dimension (Mair and Thom-
assen 2010), the disconnect between the types of 
issues debated in national parliaments and in the 
European parliament, and therefore the different 
motivations with which national and EU repre-
sentatives are elected, are still argued to have an 
impact on the type of representation being offered 
in each of them. 
Third, despite the momentous institutionalization 
of the European Parliament and the “normaliza-
tion” of EP political dynamics, other authors have 
argued that, rather than a conventional left-right 
political space, the European Parliament presents 
a green, alternative, libertarian (GAL) versus tra-
ditional, authoritarian, nationalistic (TAN) politi-
cal dichotomy (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002). 
They start by observing that extremist left and 
right parties oppose European integration, while 
centrist (social democratic, Christian democratic, 
liberal, conservative) parties favor it. They argue 
that this phenomenon can be explained by sheer 
political opportunism: “Parties that are successful 
in the existing structure of contestation have little 
incentive to rock the boat, while unsuccessful par-
ties, that is, parties with weak electoral support or 
those that are locked out of government, have an 
interest in restructuring contestation. The same 
strategic logic that leads mainstream parties to 
assimilate the issues raised by European integra-
tion into the Left/Right dimension of party com-
petition leads peripheral parties to exploit Euro-
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older community policies (such as agriculture) or 
newer intergovernmental policies (such as EMU). 
Even in federal systems (to which the EU system is 
sometimes assimilated), it is the federal chamber 
that may be excluded from some decisions, never 
the house of representatives! Moreover, the fact 
that most of the EP’s decisions “must” be politi-
cally supported by super-majorities clearly shows 
that this chamber lacks a conventional majority-
opposition dynamic, which is the hallmark of 
a working parliament. This too tends to muzzle 
electoral competition and to encourage the vote 
for extremist, anti-systemic parties rather than for 
centrist ones, given the impossibility of perceiv-
ing with any accuracy the political difference that 
casting the vote for one or the other centrist party 
would really make. In their turn, national parlia-
ments, while institutionally stronger than the EP, 
are not doing so great either. 
With exceptions, national parliaments are per-
ceived to be the big losers of European integra-
tion (Raunio 2011). The process of integration 
has caused a “verticalization” of politics, mean-
ing that national executives and their represen-
tatives are in the driving seat of most decisions, 
both political and technical. Only extraordinarily 
well-organized national parliaments – the Dan-
ish Storting is a myth is this respect – can attempt 
to keep abreast of EU decision-making and make 
their voice heard with any consistency. With 
the Treaty of Lisbon, national parliaments have 
acquired greater powers, particularly the possibil-
ity of inducing a revision of legislative proposals 
when issuing a yellow or an orange card in the 
“early warning mechanism”. Moreover, the hori-
zontal relations among European Affairs Com-
mittees (COSAC) and more generally among 
parliamentary chambers has created what Crum 
and Fossum (2009) call a “multilevel parliamen-
tary filed” which could, in theory, allow sustained 
exchanges of judgment and voice among national 
parliaments. Unfortunately, it would seem that the 
sentation that flows from the people to the execu-
tive and the bureaucracy and are normally also 
perceived to be the crucial institutional link in the 
chain of accountability that flows in the opposite 
direction. National parliaments are therefore at 
the center of those institutional chains of delega-
tion and accountability that are normally consid-
ered as the supporting structure of representative 
democracy (Curtin 2007). Urbinati’s criteria for 
democratic representation are both more nuanced 
and more demanding and they are not captured 
by simply checking whether parliaments are insti-
tutionally centrally positioned along the chains of 
delegation and accountability. 
The fact that the European Parliament has acquired 
greater co-decision powers and increased control 
functions does not compensate for the fact that a 
European “government” does not germinate from 
within the EP and does not respond directly to it. 
Various attempts at linking at least the selection 
of the President of the Commission to the politi-
cal orientation of the European Parliament and its 
increased powers to approve or reject the candidate 
President and the college of Commissioners do 
not compensate for the fact that the EU executive 
does not correspond to a EU-wide parliamentary 
majority – and this confirms the distinctiveness 
of the EP vis-à-vis national parliaments. Likewise, 
the protracted tug-of-war between Council and 
Parliament over the control powers of the latter 
vis-à-vis comitology committees (Pollack 2003) 
demonstrates how also the surveillance function 
of the European Parliament has been hampered 
by its peculiar institutional position. Contrary to 
national parliaments, then, the European Parlia-
ment is not yet institutionally central to any chains 
of delegation and accountability. 
A fifth, more political aspect of the distinctiveness 
of the European Parliament is the fact that, unlike 
all other parliaments, it is partially excluded from 
a number of highly relevant policy areas, be they 
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tion of will? Finally, are voters induced to vote at 
EP elections in order to select those representatives 
that will best fulfill these functions? Since the Sin-
gle European Act (1988), the European Parliament 
has managed to raise the volume of its voice and 
strengthen the expression of its will. With the help 
of the European Court of Justice (Pollack 2003), 
it has gained co-decision powers in an increas-
ing number of policy areas. However, if we want 
to analyze separately the expression of voice and 
the exercise of will, we need to focus on the acti-
vating and proposing powers of the EP separately 
from its decision-making powers. With regard to 
policy initiation, we notice that the Commission 
still enjoys, at least formally and in most policy 
areas, the exclusive right of legislative proposal. 
While not strictly within its institutional powers, 
however, the EP can find ways of proposing legis-
lative initiatives and of activating the Commission 
to produce legislative initiatives of EP interest. 
Through own-initiative opinions and by support-
ing influential policy networks, the EP can work 
behind the scenes to set into motion a process that 
initiates legislation on issues that are of interest to 
the EU populace. By the way, this is precisely how 
the Committee of the Regions operates (Piattoni 
and Schönlau forthcoming). 
Alliances between members of the European 
Parliament, Commission functionaries and civil 
society activists have been observed to have led 
to important chapters of EU legislation: gender 
equality legislation has been stimulated precisely 
by a “velvet triangle” (Woodward 2004) formed by 
women’s lobbies, pro-gender equality MEPs and 
feminist bureaucrats (or “femocrats”).78 Simi-
larly, environment-friendly MEPs have succeeded 
in stimulating environment-conscientious Com-
missioners who have then promoted environmen-
tal legislation which responded to diffuse citizens’ 
concerns (Lenschow 2005). To the extent that 
78. The implicit reference is obviously to Theodore Lowi’s 
“iron triangles” (Lowi 1979). 
Euro crisis has distorted this field in favor of some 
national parliaments – such as the Bundestag 
and the Assemblée Nationale – at the expenses of 
others – such as the parliaments of the southern, 
debt-burdened states – and has therefore injected 
a new type of “democratic deficit” into the Union 
(Benz 2013). 
The provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon and in par-
ticular the EWM, while formally giving substance 
to the surveillance powers of national parliaments, 
has so far had a minimal impact (and will prob-
ably continue to do so). However, the EWM con-
tains a certain potential for the upgrading of the 
common interests of several national constituen-
cies which should not be underestimated. In this 
respect the experience of an even weaker EU body, 
like the Committee of the Regions, is instructive. 
It is precisely because it cannot count on any con-
stitutionally enshrined decision-making powers, 
that the CoR has learnt how to upgrade the ter-
ritorial interests of its members and to make its 
voice heard by seeking to influence more subtly 
the community’s decision-making process (Piat-
toni 2012). 
Fragmented democratic represen-
tation
Under these circumstances, which aspects of rep-
resentation are offered, respectively, by national 
and European parliaments? From Urbinati (2006) 
we know that the three functions of representa-
tion are the articulation of voice, the production 
of will, and the exercise of surveillance. Does the 
mutual co-existence of national and European 
parliaments stifle the fulfillment of their demo-
cratic roles? 
Let us look first at the European Parliament. 
Does the EP allow for the articulation and expres-
sion of voice? Does it exercise surveillance on the 
executive(s)? And does it contribute to the forma-
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and comitology committees’ decisions (Pollack 
2003, Curtin 2007), but its relative success has 
not depended on the pressure of the electorate. 
In other words, when trying to defend its pre-
rogatives and strengthen its institutional position, 
the EP is not so much responsive to its electorate 
as it is driven by an inter-institutional jockeying 
for power. We must conclude with Schimmelf-
ennig (2010) that the democratization of the EU 
is driven not so much by societal pressures as by 
inter-institutional dynamics.
As is known, the EP has made its greatest strides 
in the exercise of will, which is the second funda-
mental component of democratic representation 
and that to which most EU scholars have directed 
their attention. As is known, the EP now has co-
decision powers in most areas of EU competence. 
While studies suggest that the enhanced codeci-
sion powers have in fact made the Commission’s 
position and role more central, not necessarily the 
Parliament’s, still the EP now co-decides in almost 
all chapters of legislation. Does this guarantee 
political equality to all EU citizens? The resound-
ing answer has been “no” and, according to some 
scholars (Kröger and Friedrich 2013), this is a fun-
damental problem. Strict proportionality and an 
“essentialist” notion of demos (Weiler, Haltern 
and Mayer 1995) induce these scholars (and the 
German Constitutional Court) to conclude that 
only a European Parliament that represents pro-
portionally the several peoples of the Union can 
be entitled to democratically express the will of 
the Union (ibid.). 
The idea of an EU demos should be obtained by 
arithmetical aggregation of the several peoples of 
Europe appears questionable in itself (Lord and 
Pollak 2013). However, to the extent that national 
political systems are organized mainly along a 
left-right spectrum, their aggregation may in fact 
give rise to a surprisingly coherent political space 
(Mair and Thomassen 2010). In no political sys-
EP elections have returned a significant number 
of environment-friendly MEPs, we may say that 
citizens can indeed exert (the positive aspect of) 
judgment through the European Parliament. How-
ever, one cannot fail to notice how circuitous this 
activity necessarily is. How many MEPs have been 
actually elected because of their EU-level green 
agenda? How many of them have campaigned on 
a green agenda that explicitly mentioned the EU as 
an important level at which to act? Has the green 
vote rewarded EP candidates for what they prom-
ised to do at EU level or for their past, present and 
future activities at national level? Have not in fact 
transnational NGOs been much more effective in 
proposing and activating the Commission than 
environment-friendly MEPs? The literature con-
firms that the green, alternative, libertarian (GAL) 
wing of the EP occupies an entire extreme of the EP 
political space, but the extent to which it has been 
elected to the European Parliament to that end is 
still unclear (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002). 
How about the passive side of judgment, that is, 
receiving and surveiling? As we know, the Euro-
pean Parliament cannot dismiss the Commission 
President or his commissioners unless they are 
accused of misconduct or wrongdoing – and even 
then the solution may be a political resignation 
rather than a vote of censure (cf. the Santer affaire). 
However, surveillance is also a menial and day-
to-day activity, and concerns the extent to which 
the “government” of the EU (at least the Commis-
sion, comitology committees, and other agencies) 
are kept on their toes as regards the translation of 
legislative decisions into outputs and the imple-
mentation (or supervision of implementation) of 
those decisions. This is particularly important to 
the extent that these agencies and committees are 
often called to complete the legislative process by 
translating general principles into actionable cri-
teria and standards. The EP has fought tooth and 
nail to protect its right/duty to be kept informed 
on committees’ activity and to control agencies’ 
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of the Commission. Right now, MEPs are elected 
on the basis of how much or how little they claim 
the EU should legislate, not on how they actually 
(co)-legislate, that is, on whether they promote a 
coherent political agenda. High doses of poten-
tially lethal de-institutionalizing pathogens are 
thus inoculated into the parliamentary body. The 
expression of will is consequently diverted onto a 
different agenda, one that has to do with the scope 
and reach of the EU as a whole – in a word, with 
its constitutional complexion.
National parliaments find themselves in the 
opposite situation. They are the seat of detailed 
bargaining over policy decisions whose contours 
(if not detailed content) have often been decided 
elsewhere (at EU level). Parliamentary fights 
often concern the short-term implementation of 
framework decisions taken elsewhere, rather than 
long-term strategies. The crisis has only accentu-
ated this situation. Many authors have denounced 
the apparent “suspension of democracy” in those 
Euro-area members states subjected to special sur-
veillance because of their shaky national accounts 
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain – the 
GIIPS). Extraordinary elections or new govern-
mental majorities have been necessary in some of 
these countries to face the emergency caused by 
the risk of default on national debts, but nowhere 
has democracy been actually suspended. Over-
sized majorities or grand coalition governments, 
in fact, are becoming more common also in Euro-
area member states that for the moment do not 
appear to suffer from the crisis, such as Germany. 
Generally speaking, times of crisis suggest the 
expansion of majorities to include also normal-
times opposition parties. This is, for example, 
what has happened in Italy, where grosso modo 
the “emergency” grand coalition that sustained 
the Monti government supported also the follow-
ing two governments. Is this general decline in 
majoritarian politics a consequence of the crisis, 
the effect of the reversal of roles between European 
tem, however, does the electoral system secure 
equal amount of representation to each individual 
voter. All sorts of disproportionalities are caused 
by natural thresholds and demographic changes. 
Special provisions are often expressly introduced 
to secure proportionally greater representation to 
citizens inhabiting more sparsely populated areas, 
who have a harder time exercising those other 
forms of participation that contribute, together 
with voting, to the expression of voice and will.79 
Moreover, nowhere in Europe (with the only pos-
sible exception of Germany, in fact) has the exis-
tence of the national demos been the precondi-
tion for state- and democracy-building. Rather, 
the construction of the national demos has been 
the (often incomplete and contested) outcome of 
those processes (Bartolini 2005). Strict propor-
tionality, therefore, does not seem the solution to 
granting “political equality” to the citizens of the 
Union (Lord and Pollak 2013). 
If Mair’s (2000) “reversal of roles” thesis is still 
valid – something that Mair himself has later 
questioned (Mair and Thomassen 2010) – then 
MEPs’ legislative activity is not what drives the 
European vote, and this is a much more dam-
ming circumstance than the absence of strict 
proportionality. In order to make the vote for the 
EP politically consequential, proposals are being 
tabled attempting to link the vote for the Euro-
pean Parliament to the selection of the President 
79. In Italy, citizens registered to vote in populous elec-
toral district (like, for example, that including Rome) 
“buy” 11% less representation that the citizens regis-
tered in less populous electoral districts (such as, for 
example, Sardinia). In Norway, a Bondeparagrafen 
was explicitly introduced in 1859 to grant inhabitants 
of the rural districts greater representation than those 
of the city districts. The paragraph was eliminated in 
1959 and, admittedly, the OSCE-ODHIR task-force 
signaled among the areas for improvement in the 
2013 Norwegian elections “the unequal weight of the 
vote among constituencies” (OSCE-ODHIR 2013: 1). 
However, absolute electoral equality, understood as an 
absolutely equal weight of all votes, cannot be reason-
ably pursued. 
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mal capacity to defend the principle of subsidiar-
ity (receiving and surveilling). One-third of the 
votes allocated to national parliaments (two each, 
for a total of 56 votes) can issue a reasoned opinion 
requesting the Commission to revise a legislative 
proposal which is deemed to breach the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality, to which the 
Commission can react by maintaining, amending 
or withdrawing the proposal (yellow card). If rea-
soned opinions are submitted by at least a simple 
majority of the votes allocated to the national par-
liaments, the proposal must be reviewed. After 
such review, it is now the Commission that may 
decide to maintain, amend or withdraw it. If the 
Commission decides to maintain the proposal, a 
majority in the European Parliament or 55% of 
the member states in the Council, may oppose 
it, but this is very unlikely. Some commentators 
(e.g., De Wilde 2012) think that this alone is suf-
ficient to conclude that the Treaty of Lisbon has 
not contributed to filling the democratic gap of 
the Union. Raunio (2011) concurs but argues that 
national parliaments have increasingly become 
the “gatekeepers” of integration since it is their 
receiving and surveiling functions that have been 
increasingly strengthened rather than the expres-
sion of will or the articulation of voice.
I too believe that it is the misallocation of judgment 
and will at the national versus the European level 
that is responsible for much of the democratic defi-
cit we experience today in Europe. To the extent 
that they express judgment and exercise will in the 
wrong assembly on the wrong issues at the wrong 
time, national candidates and voters prevent them-
selves from engaging in that meaningful dialogical 
exchange which makes for democratic representa-
tion. Unless the multi-level institutional context in 
which representation takes place is fully factored in 
and voters and representatives behave accordingly, 
the distance between European candidates and 
voters cannot be shortened. 
and national parliaments or just a trend common 
to all democracies (UK included)?
Let us now turn to national parliaments. At 
national level, there is still ample space for acti-
vating and proposing measures that complement 
EU legislation. The better organized national 
parliaments manage to direct their governmen-
tal representatives’ activity in the Council and 
the European Council even before decisions are 
made (Raunio 2011). Much of this activity is pre-
mised on national parliaments receiving EU leg-
islative proposals early on from the Commission 
and assessing them in terms of the national inter-
est. It also consists in adapting EU legislation to 
the national context without distorting or other-
wise deflecting it. Unfortunately, this important 
expression of voice and will is often obliterated by 
emptier, although noisier, activities such as com-
plaining against decisions already made in Brus-
sels by national representatives (at least in some 
EU member states). Raunio (2011) convincingly 
argues that such a muffled expression of judgment 
is due to the actual lack of interest on the part of 
the main governmental and opposition parties 
to debate publicly the issues that really matter in 
plenary sessions (accessible to the wider public). 
They share an interest in carrying out these dis-
cussions in closed (or less publicized) parliamen-
tary committee debates, in which the distance 
between their factual support to EU policies and 
their public disavowal of the same would become 
apparent. While this behavior serves the imme-
diate purposes of “mainstream” parties and the 
cause of “integration by stealth”, it does under-
mine the role of national parliaments as forums 
for the articulation and expression of judgment on 
EU issues. 
National parliaments have always had the pos-
sibility – in fact the right and duty – to oversee 
the activity of European institutions, but with the 
Treaty of Lisbon they have also acquired the for-
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by accepting to act as if they no longer were rep-
resentatives of general purpose governments, such 
as regions, provinces and municipalities, but as if 
they were representatives of a particular point of 
view, the view from the grass-roots. By acting as 
if they were functional interests – that is by aggre-
gating distinct territorial interests into categorical 
interests – they are managing to express judgment 
– they activate, propose, receive and surveil other 
EU institutional bodies – much more effectively 
then they would if they tried to express their will, 
that is, to gain decision-making and veto powers 
(Piattoni 2013). In this latter case, CoR members 
would inevitably be forced to promote the institu-
tional interests of their particular constituencies; 
thus creating even more complex “joint decision 
traps” (Scharpf 2010) and forgoing the possibility to 
create new types of constituencies: those of EU citi-
zens who have similar first-hand experience of EU 
policies and can therefore give important insights 
into their effectiveness “on the ground”. By stick-
ing to the apparently more menial representational 
task of articulating voice and exerting surveillance, 
the CoR might even claim to express judgment on 
EU policies better than most national parliaments.
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